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Abstract
The opportunity cost concept has been advocated as the prime decision cost 
concept by economists and accountants, notably scholars of the London 
School since Nineteen Thirties. However, there are certain conditions as 
discussed by Edwards (1937) and Coase (1938) which have to be met before 
the opportunity cost concept can be functionally applied in the accounting 
context. Moreover, there are few research into the decision practices of 
accountants and business managers relating to the application of the 
opportunity cost concept in business decisions. Thus, it is uncertain if the 
concept is adopted in practices by managers and executives. The purposes 
of this paper are, therefore, to carry out a critical review of the opportunity 
cost concept, both in terms of its theoretical validity and its applicability to 
the business context, as well as to investigate whether the concept has 
actually been adopted in practice for business decisions. Based on the 
contents of the agency theory, behavioural decision theory (which includes 
the Resouceful, Evaluative, Maximising Model), expectancy theory, and the 
theory of choice, a model which is termed the Expectancy Decision 
Processing Model is proposed to explain the decision behaviour of business 
managers and how they would adopt or otherwise the opportunity cost 
concept, represented by the opportunity cost accounting model within the 
accounting context, in making decisions under different circumstances. 
Results of the analyses indicate that accountants and managers very often do 
not invoke the opportunity cost accounting model in making decision 
calculations. Managers will only invoke the opportunity cost accounting 
model in calculating the possible payoffs of different decision alternatives 
when two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that they find no 
difficulty in making use of the opportunity cost accounting model; the 
second condition is that the opportunity cost accounting model will provide 
a priority ranking of the decision alternatives that is desired by the managers 
who are maximising their own decision benefits.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Proposed Contribution of the Research
Managers inevitably make decisions every day in running businesses. From the 
accounting perspective, managers require accounting and related data which can 
provide valuable information for them and assist them in making the right decision 
and selecting the correct course of actions. The ways to collect, process, and present 
accounting information, however, depend very much on how managers select and 
adopt different accounting approaches and models. Although the opportunity cost 
approach has been advocated as the prime approach to be adopted for decisions 
(Edwards 1937, Homgren 1986), there is no sufficient evidence that this model is 
actually adopted by managers in practice. Thus the main purposes of this research 
are to identify the managers' behaviour in the selection of accounting decision 
models which provide required information for decision making purposes, and to 
compare and explain these identified behaviour with the Expectancy Decision Cost 
Model as proposed by the candidate. The main contribution of this research will 
thus he on the validation of the Expectancy Decision Cost Model which can be used 
as a comer stone for further studies in the revelation of the interactions between 
managerial decision behaviour and the choice of accounting decision models.
Moreover, since the research sample units are chief accountants and executives of 
the listed business corporations in Hong Kong, who have much knowledge about the 
Chinese market and the ruling party of China, and who are actually making huge 
investments in the Chinese market, an understanding of their decision behaviour 
greatly facilitates business people and investors of the Western World to have more 
knowledge on how Chinese people make business decisions and how they feel about 
the Chinese market. Pleased or not, China will be one of the major markets in the 
world for the next decades, with substantial potential of return and profitability. 
However, many businessmen in the Western countries still are not familiar with the 
business practices and habits of the Chinese merchants. The results of this research 
will provide a good example of how businessmen in Hong Kong make business 
decisions, and how they deal with their investments in the Chinese market.
Contribution of Chapters
For the purpose of achieving the desired contributions as proposed by the candidate 
in performing this research, it is expected that the individual chapters of the research 
report will contribute to the overall value of this research as follows :
Chapter One - Introduction
A summary introduction is made at the beginning to signify the theme of the 
research and the background that leads to the justification in performing 
various research activities. An encounter of the origination of the opportunity 
cost concept together with a detailed analysis of the arguments regarding the 
rationality and conceptual validity of this concept is also made in the first 
chapter. These background analyses form the core base for subsequent 
analysis to be carried out in achieving the desired objectives.
Chapter Two - Decision Process and the Theory of Opportunity Cost
In this Chapter a detailed analysis is carried out regarding the role of the 
opportunity cost concept in a decision making process. The opportunity cost 
concept is viewed from a value perspective, and based on the value 
perspective, the cost concept is critically reviewed about its applicability and 
adaptability in decision situations in the present day commercial environment 
which is drastically different from what was perceived decades ago, when the 
opportunity cost concept was rigorously advocated by the London and 
Austrian scholars. Through the critical review process, it can be 
demonstrated that the opportunity cost concept may not be viable to business 
applications, unless certain conditions are fulfilled. Chapter Two thus 
contributes to the whole paper by providing a conceptual base for the
necessity to pursue studies in the revelation of managerial decision behaviour.
Chapter Three - A Review of the Literature on Opportunity Costs
In Chapter Three the results of a review of the literature regarding economics, 
accounting, and management fields will be presented to show that the concept 
of opportunity costs, despite its being advocated by many economists and 
accountants for its relevance in decision making, has not been systematically 
analysed and presented in most textbooks of these disciplines. The unrivalled 
phenomenon of non-existence of systematic discussion about the concept of 
opportunity costs has posted strong evidence to the validity of this research. 
It is suspicious if managers and accountants actually adopt the opportunity 
cost approach in decision practices, when many scholars and authors who are 
supposed to be experts in economics, accounting, and management disciplines 
do not mention and discuss about the concept to the knowledge of readers. 
Thus there is a need to investigate into accounting and management practices 
to identify if the opportunity cost approach is adapted to any significant extent 
in practice.
Chapters Two and Three together thus form the core base of substantiating 
the rationales both in terms of theory and practices, that this research needs to 
be carried out, and that some insights can be obtained from this research
regarding the decision behaviour of managers with respect to their choice of 
costing methods and approaches.
Chapter Four - A Model Establishment for the Framework of Decision Making 
and the Opportunity Cost Concept
The main theme of Chapter Four is to build up the whole research framework
for this research, and to put forward the research hypotheses that are going to
be tested for the purposes of achieving the objectives hereof In this Chapter
the candidate has successfully build up a new research framework on the
bases of the behavioural decision theories, the agency theories, the expectancy
theories, and the concept of opportunity costs. This new research framework
provides insights on how in theory a manager's decision behaviour will be
affected by various factors as proposed in the expectancy decision cost model
through the integration of the above mentioned theories. Research hypotheses
are then proposed and put forward in accordance with the new model for tests
and verification.
Chapter Five - A Field Study of the Decision Behaviour from an Academic 
Perspective
The results of the survey carried out among academics are shown in Chapter 
Five. These results serve two purposes. The first purpose is to identify the 
decision behaviour of academics and assess if academics in general show any
inconsistency between decision behaviour and academic behaviour. That is, 
will academics on the one hand favour the opportunity cost approach in 
decision situations, but on the other hand do not wish to provide a detailed 
analysis in their own publications. The second purpose of this academic 
survey is to treat academics as the control group, so that practising managers' 
decision behaviour can be compared to see if there exists inconsistency in 
perception between academics and practitioners.
Chapter Six - The Adoption of the Opportunity Cost Model
Similar to Chapter Five, results of the researched data regarding accounting 
practitioners and business managers are analysed and interpreted in this 
Chapter. The results shown in this Chapter are crucial to the whole research 
as they collectively demonstrate the circumstances under which accounting 
practitioners and business managers will adopt the opportunity cost model in 
their decision making processes. These results have confirmed the validity of 
the integrated theories as proposed by the candidate, and formed an evidence 
of the managerial decision behaviour with reference to the theoretical 
assertion in the context of Hong Kong. A comparison of the academic 
perception and managerial decision behaviour is also carried out, with results 
thereof indicating a divergence of views and perspectives in the adoption of 
the opportunity cost concept between these two categories of accounting and
business people.
Chapter Seven - The Case of a Chain Supermarket Store
To further substantiate the results gained in Chapters Five and Six in 
confirmation with the theories put forward in this research, a chain 
supermarket store is selected to perform a detailed case study. This detailed 
case study with one of the largest supermarkets in Hong Kong is to provide 
more concrete evidence that the results obtained in Chapter Six actually 
reflect business reality; and that these results are not biased results because of 
any unidentified reason. A detailed study of the management practices in this 
Supermarket Store have reiterated the external validity of the research results 
shown in the previous Chapters, that the opportunity cost concept and 
decision model will only be invoked in the circumstances as indicated by the 
expectancy decision cost model.
Chapter Eight - A Critical Review of the Opportunity Cost Concept
This Chapter summarises all the research findings and based on which, a 
critical review of the opportunity cost concept with special emphasis on its 
applicability to the business circumstances is carried out. Two issues have 
been identified in the critical review and assessment process:
1. The opportunity cost concept has to be interpreted in a dynamic way for it 
to be operative and viable to business applications. The perception of 
highest value from a decision maker's view represents a dynamic process 
of value judgement which is affected by the interactions of many factors. 
Thus, the adoption of cost models, in particular the opportunity cost 
model, in a decision process should be regarded as a process analysis 
instead of a static, point of time analysis, and a value processing model 
such as the Expectancy Decision Cost Model should be established to 
identify the realistic application of the opportunity cost concept in a 
decision process.
2. Disregarding the dynamic process in the alteration of values due to 
changes of contingency factors, there is always a limitation of the concept 
in a sense that the opportunity cost concept becomes undefined in a 
situation when decision alternatives have no defined calculated values. In 
a business context, there are often situations when the degree of 
uncertainty and degree of complexity of the circumstances can render 
calculation of opportunity costs (even by the decision maker himself) a 
very difficult task, and thus the concept of opportunity costs can be 
practically invalidated in such situations, unless the pure form of subjective 
value judgmental process such as the Resourceful, Evaluative Maximising
Model is adopted to release the practical barrier of applying the 
opportunity cost concept.
Suggestions for future research directions are put forward in this Chapter. It is 
hoped that the identified issues and suggested research directions can contribute to 
the research arena in the context of the opportunity cost concept. It is also hoped 
that summarised results could provide an insight to the decision behaviour of 
managers in business decisions, and the factors that would affect the formulation of 
such behaviour.
Definition of Opportunity Costs
Before I start to present the thesis, a discussion of the definition of opportunity costs 
which is to be adopted throughout the thesis would be necessary. Although phrased 
in different notions of wording, the commonly accepted definition of opportunity 
costs is “the highest possible value that has been sacrificed or given up by the 
selection of a particular course of action and reject the other alternative course of 
actions.” (Coase 1938, Schumpeter 1954, Amey 1969, CIMA 1984, Drury 1992). 
This definition of opportunity costs is well accepted by accountants (Neumann & 
Friedman 1978, March 1987, Homgren and Foster 1991, Chenhall & Morris 1991), 
but the fundamental conceptions of the nature of opportunity costs may not have 
attracted much attention (Buchanan 1973, Coase 1990).
According to the definition of opportunity costs, several issues, which are 
fundamental to the concept of opportunity costs, need to be addressed upon. A brief 
discussion of these issues will be made in the following paragraphs, and I will 
proceed with a more detailed analysis of these issues through the various chapters of 
this thesis.
1. The concept of opportunity costs is essentially related to the process of choice.
As stated by Robbins in his article, Remarks Upon Certain Aspects of the Theory 
of Costs (1934),
“The conception of costs in modem economic theory is a conception 
of displaced alternatives. The cost of obtaining anything is what must 
be surrendered in order to get it. The process of valuation is essentially 
a process of choice, and costs are the negative aspect of this process.”
(page 22)
Opportunity costs exist when there are at least two courses of action, and the 
decision maker can select either course of action as his own choice. The value of the 
rejected choice is sacrificed or given up by the decision maker, and this sacrificed 
value is the (opportunity) cost of the choice. Thus, it is not crucial what “accounting 
costs (the calculation of transacted or recorded costs as appeared in the cost 
accounts) are incurred for the selected choice, rather it is crucial to know what value 
has been given up by rejecting other choices (Thirlby 1946).
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2. Opportunity costs involve the calculation of value, which is not necessary equal 
to the general meaning of accounting costs that are represented by the monetary 
units. This fundamental concept is crucial to the determination of opportunity 
costs, because once the value concept is differentiated from the money concept, it 
is immediately identified that the opportunity costs of a particular course of 
decision choice may not be presentable by the mere use of accounting costs. 
Coase in his article (1938) has described the importance of non-monetary factors 
in a decision:
“A businessman may wish at the present time not to buy German or 
Japanese goods quite apart from any considerations relating to their 
price or quality; or his views on the problems of national defence may 
make him desirous of, or averse from, supplying firms in the armament
industries............... The figures of costs and receipts produced by the
accountant are incomplete, and without a knowledge of the preferences 
of the businessman no decision on questions of business policy can be 
reached.” (page 103)
The close relationship between opportunity costs and subjective value judgement
of the decision maker has rendered the calculation of opportunity costs a process
which often involves non-monetaiy considerations, and the subjective valuation
process of the decision maker which may be very difficulty to be communicated
to other people’s knowledge (Buchanan 1973).
3. Opportunity costs are essentially decision costs that are future oriented, and
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related to the expectation of the decision maker about future happenings. In the 
process of making decisions, the decision maker always needs to estimate or 
forecast the expected outcomes of each course of action, or decision alternative. 
He will then make a decision according to his expectation. Whether his 
expectation actually turns out into reality is not important, because the decision 
maker has already made his decision and complete the process of decision 
making. Thus, decision is always affected by expectation rather than fact, 
although the decision maker may wish that the expected outcomes of his selected 
course of choice will subsequently turn into fact (Thirlby 1946).
These fundamental characteristics of the concept of opportunity costs raise doubts to 
the applicability of decision cost models, when most of these cost models are based 
on accounting costs calculations. To verify whether the opportunity cost concept has 
been applied in business decisions, therefore, it is necessary to cany out the present 
research and study under what circumstances accountants and business managers 
will adopt the opportunity cost concept in making decisions.
A Historical Introduction of the Opportunity Cost Concept
With the simple beaver and deer example, Smith (1776) first introduced the concept 
of opportunity cost in the Eighteenth Century. Since then the concept of opportunity 
cost invoked occasional discussions by various scholars (Wieser 1893, Green 1894,
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Marshall 1920). However, the concept did not arouse much debates until the 
Nineteen Thirties, when scholars of the London and Austrian Schools made use of 
this concept to urge and argue that the socialist view was incorrect in arriving at an 
optimal resource solution for society (Buchanan 1973). These London and Austrian 
scholars argued that, in a planned economy, it would be impossible to arrive at any 
optimal social choice calculations, because the choices of actions of people at large 
could not be transformed or transferred to the knowledge of the social planners. 
Individual choices, they argued, were selected based on the concept of opportunity 
costs, which were in essence a value judgement that could not understood or 
transformed to the knowledge of other people. Therefore, the opportunity cost 
concept could be used to prove the impossibility of optimal socialist calculations 
(Hayek 1933,1935).
Originated from the arena of economics and socialism, the opportunity cost concept 
is now advocated to the theoretical perspective of the accounting craft, and becomes 
a key concept of the total decision cost system. However, when we trace back the 
original analysis of the concept of opportunity cost and its theoretical deduction, we 
are immediately faced with a confusion of the applicability of the said concept in the 
present business world in which situations of matrix controllership, acute 
pragmatism, and increasing uncertainty about the future can be observed. These 
changes in the business settings and operating atmosphere have made what we
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perceive today drastically different from decades ago when the scholars of London 
and Austria advocated the opportunity cost concept in decision making processes 
and transferred it to business applications (Edwards 1937, Coase 1938). As a result, 
what was viewed logical and practical previously may now become illogical and 
obsolete. Although the existence of time lag between the identification of 
obsolescence of paradigm and conception and the proposition of new or revised 
concepts and practice can be viewed as a usual phenomenon (Hopwood 1987, Yip 
1990), an explicit review of the relationship between conception and pragmatism can 
nevertheless reduce the painful period of frustration and mis-apprehension of 
practical functionalism to a minimum. By way of reviewing and assessing the current 
accounting practices, and to search for possible ways of improvement to any 
identified deficiencies thereof, the accounting systems and methods can be improved 
in a more efficient way (Yip 1987). Favourably or otherwise, time has changed, and 
thus there is a need to carry out a critical review of the opportunity cost concept, in 
particular its applicability in business decisions under the current contingent setting 
of the business world.
The Role of Opportunity Cost in the Socialist Debate
With the downfall of the (classical) analytical economics in the Nineteenth century, 
people tended to discredit its analytical and predictive function (Neurath 1919). 
Faced with rapid and severe changes in the late Nineteenth Century, people often felt
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that the classical economic theories provided little explanation power for them to 
understand the reasons of the perceived economic changes of the society (Hayek 
1933), and they further suspected that with the uncertainty about the future in mind, 
the well known theories and models of economic analyses could not provide a 
prediction of the possible changes that would be realised in future. Accordingly the 
classical thoughts lost their influence (Hayek 1935). In an attempt to substitute the 
Classical School, the Historical School tried to establish another set of economic 
theories from a different perspective. In accordance with Professor Friedrich von 
Hayek,
"But the abandonment en bloc of analytical economics was mainly due, 
not to the detection of faults in the foundation of concepts but to the 
fact that, just at the time of this revolt, what professed to be a substitute 
method of analytical reasoning offered itself to the more practical- 
minded economist - a method which, from their point of view, had 
none of the objectionable features of the existing body of economics. I 
refer to the methods of the famous Historical School in Economies."
(page 125,1933)
Scholars of the Historical School professed that the economic phenomenon as 
perceived by people about the society at each interval of time was a result of many 
contributing factors acting in an integrated and inter-dependent way among them. 
Since for each particular interval of time there were different contributing factors 
with varying degree of interactions among each and other factor, the observed 
phenomenon at each different interval of time would be dissimilar to any other 
interval of the economic state. Those scholars claimed that by observing the
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interactions of different contributing factors they could describe and explain the 
perceived phenomenon at each particular interval (Ingram 1888, Veblen 1919, 
Mitchell & Scott 1967). However, as the naturalistic composition and interaction of 
factors could not be ascertained beforehand, they also disclaimed the ability to 
predict the future state of economic world as the classical people did before. As a 
corollary, historical economists did not provide any statements of analysis or 
establish any models that suggested hints of how the economic society could be 
improved in future (Landreth & Colander 1994).
An important consequence of the downfall of the classical economic theories and the 
rise of the historical school of economic thoughts was that people in those decades 
thought that the classical economic knowledge could hardly lead them to an 
improved state of better economic world (Hayek 1933). Moreover, the success of 
planned economy during the First World War in Britain and Europe, and the 
confusion of the free world had furthered the growth of socialism and collectivist 
planning. A careful study of the thoughts put forward by different scholars in those 
decades revealed that there are many alternative forms and structures concerning 
how the world could be improved, not all of such to say the truth could be termed 
socialism; and advocates of some particular forms of society even explicitly 
distinguished themselves from the socialists (Webb 1987). However, for the 
purposes of broad classification all these schools of thought about social and
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collectivist planning are called socialism in this thesis. With reference to the War 
experience, socialists claimed that it was possible to dispense with the free market 
system and competition. They argued that a society with central planning was 
superior to a competitive system, and the value and price system which were 
essential to the free market would no longer be required for the successful 
implementation of a central planning system (Neurath 1919).
One of the fascinating objectives claimed by socialists was that by introducing social 
planning, the welfare of the society and its people could be improved and a better 
tomorrow would be expected for. This was a fascinating promise that had never 
been made possible by the classical economists nor the historians. Classical 
economists viewed the market place as a complex mechanism bringing together 
individual behaviour to form a social choice, in which an equilibrium state could be 
obtained (Smith 1776). However, the equilibrium state of market behaviour was not 
necessarily an optimal state of economic affairs for all its participants, nor even could 
a Pareto optimal situation be claimed. Albeit economists among themselves viewed 
the market mechanism as a comparatively perfect tool for allocating economic 
resources, the same view was not generally held by people in the early Twenties 
(Hayek 1935). By referring to the simple classical model of demand analysis, 
socialists were able to point out that producers often determined and set output levels 
at some inefficient level, when the average costs of production were not at a
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m in im u m . These and other demonstrations of social wastage because of 
competition, and the emphasis of individual benefits rather than social benefits had 
allowed socialists to proclaim that the free market mechanism advocated by 
economists actually did not bring to any better future to the society as a whole, and 
only by way of collectivist planning could the welfare of a society and state by 
improved (Neurath 1919). The Western economists, on the other hand, sought to 
rebut the ideas of socialist planning. In order to demonstrate that the socialists' 
advocate was erroneous and to restore the functional role of economic thought, the 
scholars of the London and Austrian schools put forward the opportunity cost 
concept to explain and argue about the fundamental concept of value and cost, and to 
clarify the vast conceptual incompatibilities between the market economy and the 
planned institutional settings. The domain of argument put forward by the London 
scholars laid on the assertion that cost was essentially related to the process of 
choice, of give up and take, which was necessarily a personal process that was hard 
to be communicated and agreed by other persons except the choice maker himself 
(Robbins 1938). Given that human perceptions were heterogeneous and personal 
perception of value and choice was impossible to be communicated and transferred 
among people in a planned society, economists of the London School furthered their 
argument on the impossibility of socialist calculation, by saying that no person could 
in the absence of knowledge of other people's perceptions of value and cost execute 
a social plan which could benefit the society as a whole (Hayek 1935), or accredited
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as a functional and "optimal" plan in any meaningful sense.
The Concept of Individualism
An important issue of the basic nature of human beings has to be clarified here. In 
the process of decision making, the concept of true individualism places significant 
weight on the process of thinking and selection of alternatives and the subsequent 
results that arise from the selection of choices. Under this concept of individualism, 
a person is distinctive from other persons, and is entitled to five in his own way and 
make decisions in his own right. Thus a person is free to make his own choice of 
action in a decision case, even though his choice is a sub-optimal or erroneous one. 
If the person is not allowed to make any free choice of actions and has to be abode 
by regulations and wishes of the society (or its ruling party), then the identity of the 
person is lost. In the measurement of personal consumption and enjoyment, there is 
always a relative scale that can be used to differentiate the better from the good, the 
happier from the less happy, and the greater utility from the less. However, there is 
often an absence of measurement for the collective consumption and enjoyment, 
which is sometimes referred as the right from the wrong. Since from the collective 
economic view, right or wrong is a concept of relativity that is reflected by some 
other scales as mentioned above. If the collective actions can be differentiated as 
right or wrong, then it is possible for a small group of people to tell the majority of 
what should be done and what should not, in order that social benefits can be
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maximised. In this respect socialist calculation is made possible and the opportunity 
cost concept has to be completely revised to include the social perspective of choices 
and actions. The assertion of freedom of choice and action is to support the basic 
rationale against the advocate of socialism and socialist calculations. Thus the true 
individualism concept is crucial in the support of the argument about the 
impossibility of transformation of utility measurement among individuals, as reflected 
in the calculation and determination of opportunity costs.
A practical application of the concept of individualism in terms of individual choices 
is that whether a person is regarded as a rational person who would make his own 
choice of action in an economically rational way. With reference to modem 
management theory and behavioural science, it is now recognised that a person can 
be multi-purposed, taking decisions and actions from a variety of concerns apart 
from the pure economic motive only (Jensen & Meckling 1994). Thus a person 
often makes decisions that are not economically optimal in order that he achieves 
some other purposes that are not economic in nature (Drucker 1990). Moreover, 
with the interpretation of individualism a person often makes irrational decisions 
because of impulse and other irrational motives. If a person makes irrational 
decisions for himself, then it is possible that he makes decisions for other people in 
the same irrational way. However, there is little evidence which can demonstrate 
how in practice people handle these kinds of decisions situations involving rationality
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of decisions and its consequence to the impact of other people. The major 
consequence of this uncertain situation is that, in the consideration of the opportunity 
costs of decision, it is uncertain if a decision maker will take into account other 
people’s benefits. Although Jensen & Meckling have proposed that people do take 
every thing into account in making decisions (1994), the true individualism concept 
still casts a doubt on decision behaviour and the way that a decision maker adopts 
the opportunity cost approach in making decisions.
Accounting Application of the Opportunity Cost Concept
Given that the opportunity cost concept is essentially related to the process of 
individual choices, it is inadequately transferred to the accounting perspective, in 
view of its subjectivity and the heterogeneity of human perception (Buchanan 1973).
It is because that the original notion of the opportunity cost is essentially a value 
concept, which includes elements that may not be represented by the monetary units. 
On the other hand, accounting is essentially a craft that uses monetary measurement 
as its basic tool in the compilation of accounting reports, and thus some of the 
individual value calculations may be unable to be presented in the accounting 
statements. In applying the concept in business and accounting applications, 
therefore, the subjective notion of value has to be changed to the objective notion of 
monetary measurement or its equivalent. By adopting the monetary measurement 
system an implicit connotation is that people are in essence economic oriented, that
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they always prefer more money to less, so that as long as profit maximisation can be 
regarded as a prime objective of a businessman, the process of substituting utility 
measurement scale with the monetary measurement scale is perfectly logical without 
necessarily invalidating the underlying economic theories (Edwards 1937). As a 
corollary of this substitution process, the opportunity cost concept in the accounting 
perspective with respect to decision is still related to choice. Accordingly, based on 
the theory of choice only the cost data that can influence policy should be 
considered, and costs and receipts which will remain unchanged whatever decision is 
taken can be ignored (Coase 1938, Homgren 1986). Since World War II the 
opportunity cost concept had been gradually recognised and adopted by accountants; 
and scholars and authors in writing their books also advocates its correctness and 
superiority in decision situations (Homgren 1977, Kaplan 1982), although some 
writers have pointed out its incompatibility with reporting and performance 
evaluation situations (Drury 1988). Notwithstanding the wide acceptance of the 
opportunity cost concept, however, we know very little about whether the concept in 
practice has been adopted by the professional managers who manage and control a 
firm on behalf of the shareholders of the firm; and more than that we might doubt the 
validity of applying the concept to the business world which is drastically different 
from fifty years ago when the opportunity cost concept was first rigorously put 
forward in the Nineteen Thirties.
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Background of the Current Research
It is more than fifty years since the re-introduction of the concept of opportunity cost, 
and there have been substantial changes in many aspects of the business 
environment. These changes have caused the world, notably the business world, to 
produce a situation that is quite distinctive, if not completely different, from the 
world that appeared to be in decades ago when Edwards and Coase asserted the 
possibility of transformation of the opportunity cost concept to a business 
application. As accounting concepts, paradigms, and models of calculation are 
developed and applied to an environmental perspective (Yip 1987), when there are 
substantial changes in the business world, the existing cost concepts may not be 
applicable in the new environment, and either new concepts are developed and 
applied to the business situations, or the existing concepts are modified to suit the 
new environment. Because there have been substantial changes of the business 
world (Pollard 1983), the applicability of the concept of opportunity cost in the 
present world needs to be reviewed. To clarify the uncertainty of the current 
application of the concept, a closer look into the various aspects of changes occurred 
during these decades is taken.
-23-
Changes in the Business and Organisational Context
Since the end of World War II rigorous changes have been experienced by the 
business world in many different ways. The size of organisations, the remoteness of 
ownership control, the ever increasing degree of interactions and interdependency 
among organisational units and environmental factors, and the advancement in 
technology all produce a resultant business context that is drastically different from 
what has been forty years ago. The impacts of these changes are discussed in below.
One of the fundamental changes of the business world is the emergence of the giant 
firms and international conglomerates. With the emergence of the modem concept 
of marketing and the philosophy of competitive edge, organisations are trying to 
build up sustainable competitiveness over other firms in order to generate greater 
profitability and lesser business risks (Kotler 1994). One of the major methods 
commonly used to build up competitive edge is to increase the size and resources of 
a firm. By expanding the size and asset value of the firm, management has more 
available resources to satisfy different strategic requirements and gain access to 
various possible ways of successful establishment of competitive edge. There are 
also other reasons for the emergence of giant firms and international conglomerates. 
For example, to cope with national barriers to imported goods many firms prefer to 
establish local production plants in a foreign market so that goods produced can be 
directly sold in the local market and avoid many problems for imported goods (Otley
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et al 1990). Disregarding for the reasons, the mere fact that the size and geographic 
dispersion of firms, both national and international, have been increased to an extent 
that is completely out of consideration decades ago results in the following effects to 
the decision making theories and practices, including the choice of adoption of the 
opportunity cost concept:
The Separation of Ownership Control from Management
Unlike previous times when the owner and shareholder of a firm could exercise 
personal supervision over the running and management of firm which was relatively 
smaller in size, the increase in size in terms of asset value and staff number, and 
diversity of geographical regions of operating plants and administrative units are 
keeping the shareholders more and more remote from the management of the firm 
they have placed their investments thereto, in a sense that they have to rely on more 
indirect mode of observation and control rather than the direct, physical supervision 
as before (Porter 1986, Mouritsen 1995) . To these giant firms the share holdings of 
individuals or even family groups become relatively smaller, and many shares are 
held by minority shareholders who have no practical right to participate in the 
management of the firm (Pollard 1983). These minority shareholders have to rely on 
the management objectives and the management skills of the professional managers 
who manage the daily operations of the firm. In order that professional managers act 
for the best interests of the shareholders of the firm, the shareholders have to inform
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the professional managers of their wishes and objectives. To facilitate this 
communication process of informing the managers about the shareholders’ wishes, 
both the shareholders and the professional managers have to establish a common 
system of performance measurement for the ascertainment whether performance of 
the firm meets the objectives of its shareholders (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). 
However, once the separation of ownership and management exists, there is a 
suspicion if the shareholders’ wishes can be correctly communicated to the 
managers’ knowledge, because it has been repeated argued that the value cost 
consideration is essentially a process of personal choice, which can hardly be 
transferred and communicated to the knowledge of another person (Hayek 1933, 
Buchanan 1973). If it is assumed that the pure profit maximisation objective is the 
sole objective of all individual shareholders, it would be feasible for managers and 
shareholders to select a measurement model that can incorporate the criteria for 
decision making, and indicate the optimal choices that should be selected by the 
professional managers who are assumed to act in the interests of the shareholders 
(Buchanan 1973). This profit maximisation concept can also be expressed in another 
way, when the prime objective of a company is to maximise the market value of its 
shares. By maximising the market value of the shares, shareholders can obtain 
maximum returns for their investments (Copeland & Weston 1983). However, both 
the profit maximisation and the share value maximisation objectives are still based 
on the assumption that shareholders are primarily economic motivated in making
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investment in shares, and it has been proved already that such assumption may not 
be true in many cases (Drucker 1964, Kreitner 1989). When it is accepted that 
people may have multiple objectives in making investments, including some of the 
objectives that are not economic in nature, then the measurement model that could be 
adopted in measuring profitability or market value of shares are not appropriately to 
be used as the common measurement model for the ascertainment of whether 
performance of the firm meets the objectives of the shareholders. In the absence of 
these kinds of decision and performance evaluation criteria, professional managers 
will find it difficult in making correct decisions through the application of the 
opportunity cost approach, as they would not know how opportunity costs are 
viewed and calculated by the shareholders concerned.
Neo-classical economists assert that the market price mechanism can still be 
functional in the sense that if the managers are running the firm in a sub-optimal way, 
shareholders will sell their shares to bring the price down, eventually forcing the 
management to improve their performance at the satisfaction of the shareholders, or 
they will be removed from their office and substituted by a new team of managers. 
Thus through the process of market mechanism managers will know about the 
wishes of the shareholders and act to their wishes accordingly. However, this 
assertion can only be valid in a perfect market, or in a market atmosphere where 
strong form of market efficiency can be observed. In a perfect market, it is supposed
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that all information are available to all people, and thus shareholders are able to 
judge whether managers are optimising their benefits. However, in an inefficient 
market, it is unlikely that individual shareholders can obtain all the required 
information in evaluating the performance of the managers. Moreover, with 
reference to the agency theory, agents (professional managers) are supposed to have 
more and better information than the principal (the shareholders), and agents will try 
to maximise their own benefits as far as possible, even at the expenses of the 
principal (Jensen & Meckling 1976, Baiman 1990). Although agency theorists 
propose the use of either some form of control and monitor system, or reward 
system, or both, to minimise or eliminate the possible negative impacts of agency 
behaviour, and to induce the agent to act in the best benefits of the principal, recent 
researches have indicated that it is suspicious if the negative agency behaviour can 
be minimised, because the problem of information asymmetry is hard to be solved 
(Dejong et al 1985, Walker 1989). Given the ambiguity of the profit maximisation 
concept, the separation of owner and management, and the possible existence of the 
agency effect, there is an uncertainty whether the opportunity cost concept has ever 
been applied in practice. The uncertainty in the application of the opportunity cost 
concept in practice thus supports the need to carry out the present research.
The Increase in Complexity and Interdependency of Organisational Structure
As the size and geographical dispersion of firms increase, the simple form of
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functional organisations are found to be inappropriate to many giant firms. To cope 
with the size and geographical expansion, more complicated structures have been 
developed for organisations to deal with these changes. It is now well recognised of 
the different types of organisational structure including, inter aha, divisional 
structure, matrix structure, and the establishment of strategic business units (punning
1993). These more complex organisational structures impose further complications 
for managers running the organisations and making decisions. Some of the 
complications relate to the transfer of capital and resources (Hymer 1968, Aliber 
1970), impact on the ownership benefits (Johnson 1970, Kumar 1990), and the 
diversification of risks (Rugman 1979, Lessard 1982). These issues and aspects of 
these concerns have all contributed to a resultant situation of complex interaction and 
interdependency among people, organisations and the environment (Burchell et al 
1980). As the degree of complication and interdependency among organisational 
units and managers increase to a greater extent, the applicability of the opportunity 
cost approach in a complex decision situation becomes more remote and uncertain. 
The main reason of the remoteness in the application of the concept of opportunity 
cost is that the concept requires a measurement model which is simple and clear 
enough to reflect the economic rationality as mentioned by Coase (1938), where 
decision cost models primarily deals with the variation in costs and receipts. Such 
simple and clear model would be diminished in a situation of vast complexity and 
interdependency among units of concern, when results arrived at by most decision
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cost models are restricted in terms of accuracy and prediction power in identifying 
the best decision alternative.
Purposes and Contribution of the Research
In view of the changes in the business and organisational context that have been 
observed during these decades, and with reference to the social and behavioural 
theories of accounting, there is a need to identify the present practice of how 
business people and managers make decisions in an observed situation of complex 
interactions and interdependency of intertwining factors, and in particular whether 
the opportunity cost concept and approach, which is much advocated by the neo­
classical economists, is still applicable and being adopted by business managers in 
making decisions. The main purpose of this research is therefore:
To identify how business managers make decisions under different 
circumstances, and indicate under what circumstances do managers 
invoke or abandon the opportunity cost approach in business 
decisions.
Specific to the main theme of the research, various selected decision variables and 
moderating variables will be studied to investigate their possible effects to a 
manager’s decision making behaviour, and the adoption or abandonment of the 
opportunity cost concept throughout the decision process. In accordance with the
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analysis of decision behaviour of business managers through the proposed 
expectancy decision cost model, which is presented in the subsequent chapters, it 
will be demonstrated that certain factors exert more influence to a business 
manager’s choice of selection of decision cost models in making decisions. 
Identification of this cluster of important factors and attributes and how these factors 
interact under different circumstances thus form the core concern of this research.
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CHAPTER 2
DECISION PROCESS AND THE THEORY OF OPPORTUNITY COST
A Stepwise Analysis of the Decision Process
The decision process, by its very nature, consists of various stages and 
procedures from the ascertainment of the decision objective to the 
implementation of decision choice. Throughout the decision process, both 
external and internal factors interact with the decision model as represented by 
Figure 1 below:
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Figure 1: A General Model of Decision Analysis
SELECT PREFERRED ALTERNATIVES
CONSTRUCT ALTERNATIVE SET
A DECISION NEED IS IDENTIFIED
COLLECTDATA
IMPLEMENT ALTERNATIVE
DETERMINE DECISION OBJECTIVE
POST IMPLEMENTA TION REVIEW
INTERNAL
VARIABLES
EXTERNAL
VARIABLES ASSESS ALTERNA UVE
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The Role of the Decision Objective
The starting point of a decision process is when a manager is aware of some need 
to make a decision in response to the situation as composed by both the internal 
and external variables. A manager can initiate his own needs to make a decision, 
or he is compelled to do so by the circumstances or other external forces. In the 
latter case the decision maker has to decide the objective of making decisions, 
that is, what he would expect from the decision and selected choice of action. 
The determination of decision objective exerts much influence to subsequent 
steps and procedures of the process, from the collection of data to post 
implementation review of a selected course of actions.
From a utility perspective, the decision objective of a decision maker in general 
is to maximise his expected utility arisen from the decision, subject to the 
constraints that exist in the decision case. Because a decision maker may assign 
disutility values to some unfavourable actions or choices, such as making effort 
to obtain certain information that is not readily available, he may accept a less 
than optimal result in accordance with the maximising utility principle.
F(Decision) = Max E(U) [ choices, constraints ]
Max [ E(U) - E(E) - E(C) ]
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Where,
E(U) = expected utility of a particular decision choice
E(E) = expected disutility of the effort in executing the decision 
choice, and
E(C) = expected disutility of the effort in reducing or eliminating 
constraints
In the calculation of expected utility of each decision alternative, the decision 
maker will pay attention to two aspects, which refer to the level of positive 
utilities brought by the alternative, and the level of disutility incurred by spending 
efforts to carry out the alternative. Thus there is often a trade off between results 
and efforts, and a decision maker will always maximise the net utility in each 
case. Moreover, as constraints are reduced, more alternatives are available and 
greater utilities may be obtained from these additional alternatives. But, again, 
effort is required to reduce or eliminate constraints. Therefore, it is another trade 
off consideration between improved results and additional efforts. Because of 
the possible disutilities arisen from effort consumption, the subjective utility 
judgement of a decision maker affects the amount and quality of data that are 
going to be collected, the tool and model that are used to assess different 
alternatives, and the ranking process of alternatives. If a decision maker 
considers it too costly to obtain useful information, he will rather lower his 
expectation and accept a less than optimal outcome. This utility judgement then
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renders decision data that are originally important to become irrelevant, and in 
turn decision alternatives that are originally distinctively ranked become 
indifferent to one another.
Although in theory it can be easily proved that people are maximising then- 
expected utilities in decision processes, however, it is very difficult to prove that 
people are actually taking such economically plausible actions. The perceived 
decision behaviour, in many cases, confuses an observer as it seems that the 
decision maker is taking some choices of actions which do not maximise his 
utilities. One of the possible reasons can be explained by the utility formula 
shown in the previous discussion. As the negative utilities of efforts are usually 
unobservable in practice, it is very difficult for an observer to decide the negative 
impacts of efforts and judge that the decision maker is actually maximising his 
utilities in taking a particular course of action. However, there is a lack of 
evidence according to research results to prove that people do maximise 
expected utilities in making decisions, and what factors will affect the 
effectiveness of carrying this utility maximising activities. These factors may 
include exogenous variables, endogenous variables, and the decision 
characteristics of the decision maker. A decision maker in determining the 
decision objective probably has paid due regard to the internal and external
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factors which specify a situation within which certain constraints exist. Within 
the context of decision theories, the actual process taken by a decision maker in 
achieving his decision objective with respect to the endogenous and exogenous 
variables is an interesting and important issue which is going to be tested and 
analysed in this research.
Assessment of Alternatives and the Selection of the Preferred Alternative
From a functional perspective of the decision process, the crucial stages lie in the 
assessment of decision alternatives with respect to the collected data, and the 
selection of preferred alternative among the set of feasible alternatives that is 
perceived to be the best alternative in satisfying and achieving the desired 
objective of the decision maker. To ensure that all available alternatives are 
identified and properly assessed, data relating to those alternatives must be 
collected and compiled in some meaningful way. Thus, the importance of the 
procedure of data collection should not be overlooked, since it is clear that the 
set of collected data has direct influence on the subsequent assessment of 
alternatives. An alternative set of collected data can render the assessment and 
ranking of alternatives resulting in a completely different result, as all assessment 
tasks are only based on the available set of collected data. Therefore, the level of 
information collection forms part of the decision problem. There is often a
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possibility that a decision maker, knowing the important effect of this data 
collection procedure, tries to collect only those data that are biased towards 
certain preferred alternative. In this way the assessment process becomes a 
rationalisational machine aiming at justifying why a particular alternative is 
selected and course of action taken (Burchell et al 1980). However, disregarding 
the impact of data collection, the assessment of decision alternatives is still the 
crucial procedure to determine which alternative best achieves the decision 
objective. This procedure of selecting the ’’best” alternative among others may 
be concluded with an absolutely preferred choice, in which case there exists a 
stochastically dominant alternative that overweighs all other alternatives in every 
aspect. When this absolutely preferred alternative is identified, the decision 
maker inevitably will take the choice and satisfy his decision objective in a 
perfect way. However, in the absence of such an absolutely preferred 
alternative, the assessment procedure inevitably invokes at the outset a 
comparison and ranking process among different alternatives in terms of then- 
expected values, so that the decision maker understands and visualises which 
alternative produces the greatest benefits to him and assists him in achieving his 
desired objective. The comparison and ranking process based on the perceived 
value can only be fully functional and operative if two conditions can be 
satisfied. The first condition relates to an appropriate determination of the value
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concept, and the second condition is that there must exist of a measurement tool 
that can allow for the proper measurement of the values of different alternatives 
in accordance with the prescribed concept of value judgement. It is argued that 
when either of the stated conditions cannot be satisfied any comparison and 
ranking process would not produce satisfactory results in enabling the decision 
maker in an attempt to pick up the "best" alternative (Coase 1938, Coase 1990, 
Hogarth 1991).
In order to ascertain the impacts of different decision alternatives, a set of criteria 
has to be established in the first place so as to identify what elements 
differentiate them. Since the process of making decision is to achieve some 
desired objectives, such achievement will be fulfilled with the increase in 
satisfaction level of the decision maker through the perceived increase in the 
endowment of value as attached to the physical ownership of commodities, as 
most people will favour more goods (or their money equivalent) than less, despite 
the rate of increase in marginal utility may be decreasing; or in the absence of 
such increases in physical ownership, the increase in the abstract state of mental 
enjoyment (such as more leisure time). In order to “calculate” the increase in 
satisfaction level through the ownership of physical commodities or mental 
enjoyment, there must exists a measurement and transformation model to convert
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them into some value scales. Only when the resulting values of each alternative 
can be calculated and ascertained, could the alternatives be ranked in a preferred 
order. Therefore, determination of value of each alternative will be crucial to the 
selection of the "best” alternative.
The Theory of Value
The value of a commodity, or an abstract state of mental satisfaction, can be 
subject to different identification and interpretation. With reference to the value 
of a physical commodity, the identification of this can be described in most cases 
as a relative comparison process, either through the subjective judgement of 
individual persons, or through the external process of some observed 
measurement scale of value judgement.
The absolute value of a commodity, as the term proposes, refers to the subjective 
valuation of the commodity by its owner, who regards this commodity as 
valuable to a degree that he will never wish to give it away in exchange for any 
other commodities. This is an extreme situation when the owner no longer wish 
to compare the value of this commodity with other commodities, as he regards 
the commodity as most precious and no other commodity will be of the same 
value. When a person precludes a comparison process, the value of the
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commodity will be definitive and absolute. However, it is argued that the 
absolute value of a commodity practically does not exist (Jensen & Meckling
1994). Moreover, when a decision maker precludes any comparison process, 
then the process of choice and selection will be eliminated, and there is no 
decision which needs to be made. The concept of opportunity costs in this case 
is not needed at all (Robbins 1934). Thus, a decision only needs to be made 
when the relative value of a commodity is concerned.
With reference to the relative concept the value, the value of a commodity is 
essentially an expression of the exchange value between that commodity and any 
other commodity. Its value is relatively depending upon the values of other 
commodities that also exist in the exchange market. As a result, the relative 
value of commodities can be subject to change from time to time, depending on 
the market situation of supply and demand, and other conditions such as 
consumer preference. Whether the market price of a commodity is equal to its 
value, however, depends on the state of market demand and supply conditions 
(e.g. the existence of consumer surplus). Because of the relativity in value 
determination among commodities, the process of choice and decision will need 
to be repeated each time the relative value judgement of these commodities is 
altered by whatever reasons, and the decision that is made will be contingent to
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when it is made, and under what conditions it is made. Thus, it is clear that both 
the time factor and the decision variables may have significant impact on the 
decision process. More detailed analysis of the factors that will play a significant 
role in the decision process will be made in Chapter Four, when the framework 
for decision analysis is established.
The Labour Cost Theory of Value
According to the labour cost theory of value, value of a commodity is expressed 
as a relative measurement based on the amount of labour quantity spent on the 
production of that commodity. This can be traced back to Smith's example of the 
value between the beaver and the deer, although he also put forward other 
theories of value including the cost theory (Smith 1776). Based on his theory, 
the natural value of a commodity in exchange will be depending upon the 
required costs of production for the production of a unit of such commodity, 
relative to utilising the same magnitude of costs of production to produce other 
commodities. In the simplest form of economic society in which land and capital 
are not used, or in which both land and capital are free, and the determining 
factor of production is labour time, then relative costs of production can be 
substituted for by a measurement of the relative labour time required for the 
production of the products. Accordingly labour quantity becomes an invariant
-42-
standard of measurement by which variations in value of different commodities 
can be ascertained and ranking of commodities according to attached values 
made feasible. The rationale of the theory, that was developed through the 
Eighteenth Century when production labour was the prime and primitive factor of 
production (in the absence of substantial autonomous production mechanisms), 
can be expressed in its simplest form that since labour quantity is a scarce factor 
of production which ultimately governs the choice of production of commodities, 
the value of a commodity must be greater if people are willing to spend more 
time to produce that commodity. Thus, by the comparison of production 
preference patterns, the values of different commodities would be ascertained. In 
this interpretation of the relative choices of production, the classical theory 
embodies the notion of opportunity cost. To utilise productive time to produce 
one commodity means giving up the possible production of another commodity 
by utilising the same productive time, and thus the opportunity cost of producing 
one commodity is the value that can be brought about by the production of 
another commodity, if the productive time is used to produce that commodity 
(Smith 1776, page 47).
Several points of clarification have to be made regarding the labour cost theory 
of value. It is always argued that the labour cost theory is unrealistic or at least
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incomprehensive, ignoring the fact that there are other factors of production (land 
and capital) which are, from time to time and under different situations, also 
scarce in quantity. Therefore, for an effective analysis of the value of 
commodities under the labour cost theory, it has to be assumed either labour is 
the only factor of production that is scarce in supply, or that labour factor 
contributes to the majority of the ultimate value determination of such 
commodities, so that labour quantity can be a good approximation throughout the 
range of analysis. Smith and later, Ricardo, tried to reduce the complexity of 
multiple factor analysis by proposing that heterogeneous units of input were 
measured in terms of money prices established in the factor market (Ricardo 
1953). However, the above opposition to the labour cost theory does not 
materially affect the analysis of the dichotomy in the opportunity cost concept, 
since it is compatible to include the general set of production factors into 
analysis, if the labour cost is proportionate to the final price of the products. In 
this situation although the price of a product includes various factors of 
production of labour, land, and capital, labour can still be used as an indication of 
the relative prices of the products and commodities. Moreover, the concept of 
opportunity costs is related to the process of choice in the determination of 
productive resources are utilised, and thus so long as there exists some 
measurement models which can calculate the relative values of utilising different
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components of productive resources to produce various kinds of commodities, 
the process of a choice and selection still applies (Edwards 1937). The technical 
inconsistency of variation in labour quality (which includes the differential period 
of required training, etc.) as opposed to the assumption of simple, unvaried 
labour quantity forms another argument against the theory. Smith recognised this 
argument and he had suggested that the relative value of a commodity could be 
determined by the relative wages paid to the labour instead of counting the clock 
hours. However, Ricardo disagreed with Smith and argued that:
“ The value of a commodity .... depends on the relative quantity of 
labour which is necessary for its production, and not on the greater 
or less compensation which is paid for that labour.” (1953, page 11)
It is not intended here to go into further details of the economic analysis of the 
possible difficulties that are encountered by the labour cost theory of value. 
Rather the relationship between the labour cost theory and the analysis of the 
opportunity cost concept will be looked upon. The crucial concern of the labour 
cost theory which has a significant impact to the analysis of the opportunity cost 
concept is the determination of commodity price which is different from the 
"value" as arrived at by the theory. Economists like Ricardo who advocated the 
labour quantity theory did admit that the observed price of a commodity was a 
resultant settlement of the intertwining forces of demand and supply and thus
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incompatible with the labour theory which determined the normal exchange value 
of a commodity by quantity of labour embodied (Schumpeter 1954), although it 
was also argued that the two prices would become the same in the long run 
equilibrium state. Moreover, although the normal exchange value of a 
commodity can be determined with reference to its realised costs of production, 
realised exchange value can and does diverge from realised costs, because 
demand patterns of the commodity are not determinable by costs (Buchanan 
1969). Referring to the beaver and deer example, hunters will have killed 
beavers and deer according to their personal preference, although they may find 
it indifferent in killing one beaver or two deer in a particular day. The total 
supply of beavers and deer then depends on the collective behaviour of the 
hunters. On the other hand, if demand for deer in that particular day suddenly 
shifts upwards, then the realised exchange value of deer will rise, and those 
hunters who select to kill beaver on that day will conclude that mistakes were 
made. Despite this possible error that may be committed by a particular hunter 
(who happens to decide to kill the animals that have a lower exchange value), the 
labour cost theory makes a clear demonstration of the opportunity cost concept in 
the decision making process. The decision of a hunter to kill beaver or deer on a 
particular day is a sole personal preference, based on his expectation that the 
realised price of the beaver and deer will be the same. Thus the decision is based
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on some value judgement which is not necessarily related to the monetary 
concern of the prices of the commodities. Moreover, the decision is based on an 
expectation of the realised prices of the commodities, which indicates that in the 
consideration of opportunity costs, value determination and future expectation 
are closely related.
The Utility Theory of Value
With the contributions made by Jevons, Menger, and other utility theorists, the 
value theory developed into two paradigms in the late Nineteenth century. These 
theorists considered costs of production occupied much less importance in 
explaining exchange value of a commodity. The value of a commodity, from a 
utility perspective, connotes quite different meaning from that of a predictive 
market perspective as stated in the classical analysis. From the utility 
perspective, value of a commodity comes from the satisfaction in enjoying that 
commodity, the perceived benefits obtained from ownership and / or 
consumption of that commodity becomes the core basis in determining its value. 
If a person perceives that he will obtain greater satisfaction in consuming product 
A than product B, then the value of product A to that person must be greater than 
product B. The degree of utility of each product of consumption depends upon 
the marginal utility that can be obtained through the consumption process, and
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thus exchange value of a commodity is mainly determined by the marginal utility 
that carries with it. With reference to the water and diamond example as put 
forward by Smith, he suggested that the value in use of a commodity is often 
different from its value in exchange. However, Smith did not consider that 
although the total value of water is greater than diamond, its abundance in 
quantity virtually allows people to have sufficient quantity of consumption in 
most cases. The marginal utility of obtaining one more unit of water is thus very 
low as perceived by many people. On the other hand, because of the scarce in 
supply, the marginal utility of obtaining one more unit of diamond can be very 
high, and thus people are willing to pay for much more money to buy an 
additional unit of diamond than water. In this interpretation, thus, the marginal 
utility theorists can explain the dilemma of the diamond and water case (Landreth 
& Colander 1994).
Like the Labour Cost Theory and based on the same reasons, the value concept 
discussed in this paragraph also refers to the relative concept of value, that utility 
measurement has to be determined according to the comparison process amount 
different perception of enjoying various products and services. However, the 
utility theory of value differs from the labour quantity theory in two main aspects. 
The marginal utility economics is often assigned the description of " subjective-
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value" economics, as marginal utility must refer to personal perception which is 
subjective by nature, and thus it may not be possible to carry out empirical 
verification. In this interpretation of the utility theory, these two value concepts 
are initiated from the opposite ends of the line. The labour cost theory proposes 
to calculate value from the beginning, when production pattern is determined 
according to value judgement; the utility theory, on the other hand, proposes to 
calculate value after the ultimate consumption would have taken place. There is 
no possibility of compatibility between, unless one situation which is regarded as 
practically impossible does really occur, that personal satisfaction in the 
ownership and consumption of a commodity is completely identical to the 
amount of labour quantity input for the production of that commodity. If the 
utilities and satisfaction that are brought about by commodities are directly 
proportionate or equal to the relative input of the labour quantity for their 
production, then the resultant production schedule and price pattern will be the 
same irrespective of which value concept is being adopted. The closest 
approximation to their mutual compatibility may he in a perfect and complete 
economy, where information regarding user utility and supplier preferences are 
fiilly available to all the parties involved in the economic activities. In this 
situation, because the suppliers have perfect and complete information about user 
utility and other suppliers’ production preferences, each producer can select to
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produce the kinds and quantity of commodities in the optimal manner. 
However, even in a perfect and complete economy, the assigned value of a 
commodity can still be two fold in terms of both absolute value and relative 
value, for only the ranks or ordinal preferences of all commodities will be 
identical under both perspectives, but the same does not necessarily apply to 
their respective measurement scale. Therefore based on whatever arguments, it 
seems inevitably that only one of the two value concepts can be accepted as 
"correct" while the other concept needs to be placed in a less significant role in 
the determination of commodity value.
The other major difference between the utility theory as against the labour 
quantity theory lies in the theory of demand and supply, which has been 
recognised as providing a mechanism in reflecting the relative values of different 
commodities. Marginal utilities are recognised to be dependent upon quantity, 
and for the whole group of consumers, the total supply in the market. Therefore 
to determine the marginal utilities of a product, which in turn determines the 
realised exchange values, both the demand and supply information must be 
available; and these two factors of analysis are intertwining with each other. On 
the demand side the realised exchange value represents the willingness of 
consumers and users to give up their own wealth (to pay the price) for the
-50-
exchange of a particular commodity. With knowledge of the respective demands 
at each realised exchange value level, a demand curve can be construct to 
indicate the relative value of the commodity. A commodity with a demand curve 
that is positioned at the right and outer part of another commodity's demand 
curve denotes that the former commodity is generally perceived at a higher value 
than the latter one, although this is not necessarily true for a particular individual. 
Thus price is a perfect reflection of the relative values of different commodities. 
From the supply side, the supply curve represents the willingness of the 
suppliers to produce commodities at each given level of price or the perceived 
benefits of production to them. Determination of production schedule is not 
solely based on the relative input of the labour quantity (or even expanded to 
include all production factors), but rather on the expectation of possible utility 
that can be brought about to the suppliers by the production (and thus sales) 
process. If the relative price of a commodity increases, more producers are 
willing to produce that commodity because the marginal utility brought by the 
production of an additional unit of that commodity will be higher. Therefore the 
relative values of commodities are fully compatible with the marginal utility 
theory thereof. In a perfect market where both demand and supply information 
are available to all participants, the market price of a commodity reflects the 
choices of actions that are taken by the collective consumers, and therefore
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represents the opportunity cost of giving up the consumption of alternative 
products.
The Theory of Value and the Opportunity Cost Concept
With an understanding of the theory of value from both the labour quantity 
perspective and the marginal utility perspective, it is obvious that the price 
mechanism plays a crucial role in the process of identifying the validity of the 
value concepts. The labour theory, advocating the determination of value 
according to the relative contribution of the labour factor, or its composite 
alternative, asserts that cost of a commodity is the displaced market value of the 
alternative product, thus relating the ascertainment of opportunity costs with the 
factor market and the alternative product markets. However, it does not indicate 
direct relationship between the costs of production with the commodity price, or 
the realised exchange value thereof, which inevitably takes into account demand 
analysis. Therefore it is subject to the criticism of being unable to explain the 
existence and operations of the price mechanism. The utility theory, by 
providing an explanation with regard to both demand and supply, relates the 
determination of cost of a commodity to the marginal utility it carries with 
reference to the demand and supply conditions, which in turn directly relates to 
the price mechanism, successfully demonstrates its theoretical validity of
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equating relative value judgements with relative prices. However, the utility 
theorists have never tried to explain that in an imperfect and incomplete 
economy, where prices do not exist for some commodities or prices are not 
determined according to perfect information, how should the value of these 
commodities be ascertained in an objective and measurable way, and whether 
any observed price as provided by the price mechanism represent the value of 
these commodities.
On the other hand, with reference to the labour cost theory, the labour factor or 
other factors of production are more feasibly adopted to physical measurement 
and therefore even in the absence of the price mechanism the relative values of 
individual commodities may still be able to be measured and ascertained. If one 
hunter kills two deers and the other hunter kills a beaver, and both hunters spend 
the same quantity of labour time, then they can initiate exchange of goods on a 
relative value basis, such that each hunter will have half a beaver and a deer. 
However, the utility theory builds up its value concept from the perception of 
utility satisfaction, which is a mental process of individual consumers, and thus 
cannot be measured unless by way of physical transformation system (here the 
price mechanism), and in the absence of such there will no longer be a viable 
system that links up individual value perception with the value of commodities.
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If a hunter favours beaver to deer, he may not agree to give up half of a beaver in 
exchange for a deer, although in terms of labour quantity input he would not have 
any loss in value. Thus, based on the utility theory production of commodities 
without available market prices would result in a confused pattern, and will in 
general not be commensurate with the consumption preferences of consumers. 
Thus the validity of the utility theory of value essentially links with the presence 
of the price mechanism or similar functional mechanisms that can transform 
mental judgmental processes into an observable and measurable scale system. 
With reference to the arguments put forward in the previous chapter regarding 
the controversy between social objective and individual objectives, it is obvious 
that in the fulfilment of a social objective, where individual preferences may be 
placed in a less significant role, the market price mechanism is more dispensable; 
while in considering the theory of choices applicable to individuals, the market 
price mechanism which indicates the marginal change of the relative values of 
commodities at each price level becomes an absolute necessity for the effective 
application of the marginal utility theories.
Having analysed the theory of value from its economic orientation, the 
characteristics of the opportunity cost concept become more transparent and 
surmountable to analysis. When the opportunity cost concept was put forward
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by the London and Austrian scholars in the Nineteen Thirties, it was a decade 
when the social theory and the idea of planned economy were wide spread and 
advocated by many politicians as well as distinguished scholars, who gained their 
support from the experience during the World War I, when Britain made use of 
planned economic activities to monitor and control the consumption and 
distribution of economic resources to the survival and victory of the country. 
Experience as shown during World War I had provided a successful picture to 
the socialists that it was a tenable possibility that a planned economy could 
provide better economic result than a free market economy (Pollard 1983). 
Moreover, after the War people who bitterly suffered damages from the war 
affairs wished very much to have ideas that could restore the economy of the 
country, and guide them through the way to a better economic life. However, 
both the classical economic thoughts and the propositions of the historians were 
unable to provide any viable propositions in the improvement and restoration of 
the economy from the tragedy of war damages. This inability of the classical 
economists and the historians to provide required economic policies magnified 
the impact of the then sustainable theories of the socialist thoughts, turning the 
situation into an era of social and collectivist planning (Hayek 1935). Socialists 
attacked free market economists on the ground that the price mechanism, 
although claimed to reflect relative value of commodities, did in fact drive
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producers to produce at the most profitable level, even against the general wishes 
of the people, and it could only be feasible to provide a better welfare to people 
by substituting the price mechanism and the free market economy with a central 
planning system (Neurath 1919). Hoping to restore the confidence previously 
held by people of economic theories and the free competitive market mechanism, 
the London and Austrian scholars put forward the opportunity cost concept to 
demonstrate and argue that the socialists were erroneous in determining social 
value from the labour cost theory perspective, in trying to calculate an compatible 
equilibrium between individual satisfaction and institutional planning without 
reference to any viable transformation systems, and in developing a social choice 
system that is impossible to measure and substantiate (Hayek 1935, Buchanan 
1973). Based on the generally accepted view that the function of economics is to 
enable optimal allocation and utilisation of scarce economic resources in the 
fulfilment of human needs, the London scholars argued that fulfilment of human 
needs could only be justified by the increase in satisfaction level of individuals. 
However, because individual utilities would not be reflected in a central planning 
system, as the central planner would not know about the opportunity cost 
concerns of individual persons among different choices of economic activities, 
the London scholars argued that the socialist planning process could only result 
in a situation where it is uncertain if human needs were fulfilled (Pierson 1935).
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The opportunity cost concept interpreted in the utility theory perspective was 
hence advocated by the London scholars.
Based on the definition of the opportunity cost concept that is stated in Chapter 
One, the opportunity cost concept will be critically reviewed with respect to the 
utility theory perspective. This is not to say that opportunity cost concept does 
not exist in the socialist theory, or is incompatible with the labour cost theory. 
Quite the contrary, opportunity cost can equally well be applied within the realm 
of socialist theories, the critical difference lies only on the definition and 
interpretation of the concept.1 Human satisfaction and utility obtained through 
the consumption of physical commodities or services are in the original sense 
abstract process of mind, the exact process of which cannot be perfectly 
visualised by another person (the solipsistic view) (Ijiii 1981). In order to 
understand this mental decision process in an objective and viable situation there 
must exist some measurement tool which possesses the characteristics of 
reflecting such mental process in a way accepted by the majority of people. 
Based on this criterion of reflecting mental process, any measurement and
1 When the labour theory is taken for granted, opportunity cost is the amount (quantity) 
of alternative commodities that has to give up in the determination o f making use of 
that same quantity o f factor inputs in the production o f selected commodities. Here 
opportunity cost is measured in terms o f some physically measurable units, so that 
even though the price mechanism or other similar tools does not exist, one can still 
draft an optimal plan in accordance with an ordinal production preference list based 
on the (socialist) opportunity cost model.
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judgement process about commodity value must be aided with such a 
measurement tool. Otherwise it has to be admitted that the objective 
measurement criterion is dispensable because there is no available tool to 
measurement mental process.
The Situation Since World War II
Before the end of World War II business organisations were mostly small and 
medium size firms with the sole proprietor or dominant shareholder being 
involved in the management of their businesses (Pollard 1983). When these 
capital providers were personally involved in the daily operation and 
management of their businesses, it did not matter what business objectives were 
held by them, and whether such objectives could be objectively measurable or 
not. They could make decisions which would lead to optimal achievement of 
their desired business objectives through their own mental process of mind, such 
process being unnecessary to be known by other people who did not have 
participating interests to the business. However, since the decades after World 
War II business structures and management practices were changed radically or 
otherwise from small and medium size firms to more and more national and 
international giant firms. The number of shareholders were ever increasing and 
the relative interests of one single shareholder or group of related shareholders
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(such as family members) were diluted into a less significant position as 
compared to the Pre-War periods (Pollard 1983). Most of the shareholders of 
these giant firms did not have control and would not participate in the daily 
management of the company, and thus they did not thoroughly appreciate what 
was going on in the company and whether their economic benefits had been fully 
looked after. The case became more complicated with the emergence of the 
professional managers who were not shareholders of the firm but were only 
"employed" to run the business on behalf of the shareholders. These professional 
managers were recruited to achieve business objectives for the shareholders, thus 
although they were decision makers in operations they were not the ultimate 
beneficiaries. Therefore they had to know not only about the objectives of the 
shareholders but also the tools to measure their decision consequences with 
respect to such prescribed objectives. Problems and conflicts arose here.
If the shareholders who are remote from running and controlling the company's 
business hold a simple objective that is economic oriented and can be 
represented by the mere measurement of the change in monetary wealth, then 
management who are assumed to look after the interests of the shareholders takes 
the simple task of running the business with profit maximisation in mind, so that 
for all decisions the impact on cash flow induced by each alternative can be
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measured and assessed to determine which alternative can best achieve the 
corporate objective. In this respect the concept of opportunity cost which is a 
value based concept arouses no problem to the business firm (Edwards 1937, 
Coase 1938). However, when shareholders hold a set of multiple objectives part 
of which is not economic oriented and cannot be represented by some economic 
measurement tool, then (albeit the agency problem can be put aside at this stage) 
the manager who is supposed to make decisions and act for the benefits of the 
shareholders will have no idea at all how they can act to achieve the 
shareholders’ objective, unless the manager can safely ignore all the non­
economic objectives of the shareholders, as usually assumed in the finance 
objective applying the Fisher separation theorem (Fisher 1930) or similar 
arguments.
Taking a simple example, suppose X Company is a private company with four 
shareholders who are all economic oriented and wish to obtain maximum profit 
from the business. The manager of X Company, who is not a shareholder, will 
stick to this profit objective to make business decisions. In one case he has to 
decide which model of a passenger lift would be installed in the company’s 
building. He has obtained the following information regarding different models 
of passenger lift all of which comply with the Statutory safety rules:
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Lift A Lift B Lift C
Cost of Installation $360,000 $600,000 $850,000
Annual Operating Costs 25,000 40,000 60,000
Safety Indexes 75 85 95
Passenger Loading Same Same Same
The safety index is an estimation of possible malfunction of the passenger lift that 
may cause injury to the passengers, such that for lift A there is a 25% chance that 
the lift might be erroneously operated and causes personal injury. Given that all 
lifts comply with Statutory safety rule, and shareholders wish to maximise 
profitability, the manager, acting in the interests of the shareholders, will 
inevitably select to install lift A in the company's building (assuming all other 
costs being constant). On the other hand, if the shareholders consider that 
personal safety is the utmost important rule of the company, that any additional 
expenditure would be worthwhile in improving safety measures, the manager will 
most probably select Lift C (it is noted that in this special case personal safety is 
supposed to be measurable by way of the safety index). However, what happens 
if the shareholders wish to maintain both profit motive and personal safety as 
dual prime objectives of the company? The manager will then be much confused 
in determining which lift should be installed, because in this case the
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measurement tool for profit motives and safety objective is hard to be 
transformed between one another, and the manager will have no idea how to 
"trade off' increased costs with increased safety and ascertain the opportunity 
costs of each alternative to "optimise" the shareholders' desired objectives. Of 
course mathematically it is possible to calculate that the safety index can be 
improved by 10 units for $240,000, but the manager cannot tell if the 
shareholders consider this additional expenditure a worthy expenditure in this 
regard, unless he presents the figures to the shareholders and seek their views 
about which lift should be installed.
To solve the problem of multiple and conflicting objectives as perceived by the 
manager, there are several general solutions that can be adopted. The first 
solution as indicated above is to inform the shareholders and seek their consent 
as to the preferred choice of action. But this is not real solution for solving the 
problem of non-transformation of value judgement, as effectively the 
shareholders are now the decision maker instead of the manager himself, thus the 
shareholders must know their own view on each particular choice of action. 
Another perceived solution is to set up some conditions for decision process, 
such as setting up a minimum safety index and/or a minimum required profit 
level. This kind of conditional solution will lead to a constrained situation where
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one or more of the original objectives will no longer be regarded as an objective, 
but rather a constraint or condition in achieving the remaining objectives. 
Moreover, the setting of acceptable and feasible margin for each conflicting 
objective only narrows the feasible set of alternatives, and a clear solution does 
not necessarily exist by the establishment of such conditions, unless a combined 
utility function is also established to enable the calculation of optimal solution by 
way of mathematical analysis such as linear programming.
The above simple example will become more complicated if one or more of the 
objectives cannot be represented by quantitative data, and thus there is no 
measurement model for that objective. In that case it is impossible to build up 
any transformation process between the measurement tools of two (or more) 
objectives, since one (or more) of the measurement tools is not available to 
facilitate the transformation process.
With the recognition of multiple objectives in modem day management (in 
contrast with the simple profit motive objective in the traditional sense), the 
applicability of opportunity cost concept for decision making process has to be 
questioned as its original construction is contradictory to the situation where the 
decision maker is not the beneficiary. Based on the discussions that have been
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made in the previous sections, it is suspicious if the current management practice 
in a firm where the managers are separated from the shareholders will be in line 
with the neo-classical theory of opportunity cost and the utility theory of value, 
because they may be unable to carry out business decisions which maximise the 
shareholders utilities (other than the simple profit motive assumption). In view of 
this conceptual incompatibility as described by Robbins (1934) and Coase 
(1938), therefore, this research investigates how managers make business 
decisions under the present context of business, social and political 
environments; and discusses in what way these managers are affected by 
contingent decision variables in applying the opportunity cost concept in making 
decisions.
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CHAPTER 3
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON OPPORTUNITY COSTS
The Opportunity Cost Concept from a Management Perspective
Before field research is carried out to identify management practice and decision 
acts, a research and review of the opinions and ideas from the academia would 
provide a reference for subsequent field analysis and form a core foundation in 
critically reviewing the conceptual validity of the opportunity cost concept. In 
view of the involvement in the multi-discipline aspects of knowledge, the 
literature review process will be separated into three sections. In each section 
the views of the economists, the accountants, and the business managers will be 
surveyed and analysed. The reason of selecting management, accounting, and 
economic literature to study and analyse is because this are the three major 
disciplines which are related to the use of the opportunity cost concept. Because 
the core issue of this research is to discover the managerial practices in the 
business context regarding decision making processes, thus it is crucial to 
identify if there is any prescription or description of the management decision 
process in the management texts. Based on the same argument, because the 
opportunity cost concept is originated in the economic context, and is being 
applied in the accounting practices, therefore, a search and review of the
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accounting and economic literature is essential and useful. The first part of this 
literature review process will be a critical review of the management literature to 
identify what the management writers say in getting through the decision process.
The views of the accountants and the economists are then reviewed. At the end 
of this chapter an integrated analysis will be made to reveal the inference from 
the literature in the adoption of the opportunity cost concept in a decision making 
process.
To find out whether management writers mention about the opportunity cost 
concept, 25 management texts written between 1960 an 1991 are randomly 
selected. The time frame is set between 1960 and 1991 is to ensure that the 
books are more related to modem management theories and practices. These 
books are scrutinised in general including the subject reference part at the end of 
each of the books; and where decision making processes are discussed, a more 
in-depth review will be made. Through this process of scrutiny and selective in- 
depth review of the randomly selected management books, it is found that the 
concept of opportunity cost is not mentioned in most books, as the cost term does 
not appear anywhere in the contents part or in the subject reference section, 
although the management decision process is inevitably mentioned in almost all 
books within the sample. A summary of the findings is presented in Table 1:
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Table 1: Selected Topics Included in the Management Books
VALUE
CONCEPT
OPPORTUNITY 
COST CONCEPT
DECISION
PROCESS
BUSINESS
OBJECTIVES
BOOKS
MENTIONED
2 2 25 25
BOOKS NOT 
MENTIONED
23 23 0 0
From table 1 only two out of the twenty-five books under study have mentioned 
about the concept of value and the opportunity concept. However, even in these 
two books (Beer 1966, Marshall 1975) very brief discussion about the value 
concept and the opportunity cost concept are found, as the authors spend a few 
lines only to discuss these concepts. These findings serve to indicate that 
management writers, in the process of describing and prescribing management 
theories and practices, do not pay serious attention to the concept of value and 
the correct approach to the decision making process. However, as discussion of 
business objectives and decision process has been mentioned in every studied 
textbook, the opinion of these management writers are worth being analysed to 
identify the conflicting issue between economists, accountants and managers. 
Since the concept of opportunity cost is essentially related to decisions, which 
must be made in view of some business objectives, an understanding of the
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discussion of business objectives will facilitate the research of how business 
managers make decisions, and whether they would adopt the opportunity cost 
concept in making such decisions.
Existence of Multiple and Conflicting Objectives
As discussed in the previous chapter, opportunity cost is the highest value 
foregone in making a decision and selecting a particular alternative. If the 
calculation of decision value is based on a single objective, the process of 
calculation will be relatively simple. However, with respect to the discussion of 
business objectives, the existence of multiple objectives within an organisation 
has already been recognised by most writers during these thirty years (Drucker 
1964, Kreitner 1989). They unanimously put forward the argument that as the 
business atmosphere is becoming more complex and involving more and more 
people of different interests, a simple, univariate definition of business objective 
will no longer be appropriate to the modem business world. Specifically the 
traditional advocation that profit maximisation is the primary business objective 
is challenged by these writers with the following common arguments :
1. There is no available tool that can provide accurate measurement and 
calculative techniques for maximising profitability, given the uncertainty of
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event occurrence in the real world. Since whether profit can be maximised 
by any action is subject to risk and uncertainty from both the ex ante and 
ex post perspective, it is hard to rationalise the selection of profit 
maximisation as corporate objective (Beer 1966, Ijiri 1981, Heirs 1986).
2. Many factors that would otherwise affect profitability might not be 
quantifiable and included in any calculation model. Although the bounded 
rationality concept as proposed by Simon (1957) can be applied by 
business managers who will just do the best they can, this is not 
recognised as a profit maximisation concept accordingly. Thus, when 
there exist a large number of qualitative factors that affect the calculation 
of maximised profits, it is very difficult to maintain the profit maximisation 
objective (Kreitner 1989, Anthony et al 1989).
3. Whenever there exists more than one business objectives, profit 
maximisation will no longer be regarded as an acceptable objective, since 
many identified business objectives are contradictory with profit 
maximisation concept. For example, if social responsibility has to be 
looked upon, the price of products would be lowered to ensure that general 
customers can afford to buy these products; and expenditure is incurred for
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the purposes of environmental protection. Both of these actions reflect the 
company's commitment to social responsibility, but these actions will 
surely reduce the level of attainable profits. It is admitted that a company 
must earn profits to survive. However, once multiple objectives are 
simultaneously held, as in the example of social responsibility mentioned 
above, it is clear that no "maximised" profits can be earned (Dale 1978).
Many writers have proposed that with regard to profit objectives managers (and 
owners of course) may have already adopted a modified objective of obtaining a 
satisfactory return on investment fund instead of trying to "optimise" profits 
(Simon 1957, Dale 1978, Anthony et al 1989). As proposed by Simon, 
shareholders and business managers would adopt a satisfying concept in running 
businesses, because they have realised that with respect to the many constraints 
that are faced by them, it is more realistic to adopt a satisfying objective than the 
profit maximisation objective. Apart from observing the changes happened in 
setting business objectives, these writers also advocate this "new" profit 
objective a good substitute to the profit maximisation concept as many challenges 
to the maximisation concept will not apply to the satisfying concept.
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Once the satisfying profit concept is adopted, the application of opportunity cost 
concept would become more feasible as in this case profit motive counts as a 
constraint rather than a prime objective in the feasible profit region, so that other 
objectives can then be looked upon and satisfied, no matter what it is and 
whether it is quantifiable or not. Both management and shareholders are satisfied 
and thus no problem would be arisen from the decision process. Therefore the 
proposal of satisfying profit objective substituting profit maximisation objective 
will be compatible with one of the suggested solutions put forward in the 
previous chapter. However, apart from Simon’s research (1957), there is very 
few empirical research that provides concrete evidence about shareholders and 
managers’ view on satisfying profit concept, thus it is not totally confident in 
saying that the satisfying profit concept is widely practised by business 
managers.
Because the opportunity cost concept can be applied more satisfactorily to the 
single objective situations, where a uniform measurement scale can be used to 
assess opportunity costs (Edwards 1937, Coase 1937), the existence of multiple 
business objectives with the possible adoption of the satisfying profit concept 
may distort the application of the opportunity cost concept to business decisions. 
To clarify the situation, a study of how management writers describe the
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business decision making processes is essential.
Use of Judgement in Making Decisions
Most writers of the management texts devote considerable space to the 
discussion of management decision making process. The normal pattern of 
discussion is to begin with a description of the decision process in general, and 
the factors that need to be considered in each decision procedure. Emphasis is, 
however, unanimously made by all writers about the importance of judgmental 
process in selecting preferred alternative. All writers have considered 
management judgement as the crucial attribute for a successful decision, although 
they have put forward different reasons to apply judgement in the decision 
process, such as the existence of multiple objectives (Drucker 1964, Benton 
1973, Kreitner 1989), and the assertion that decision process is an art, not a 
science (Heirs 1986). On the other hand, although all writers within the sample 
advocate the importance of [personal] judgement, not a single book thereof has 
ever mentioned about how the judgmental process is carried out, and it is 
virtually left as a black box of how business managers perform the judgmental 
process. In this respect every writer simply tells the reader to make judgements, 
but no writer tells the reader "how" to make judgement in the correct way. It is 
questionable whether there can be communicable erudition about the correct
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process of judgement, or the reality is that judgement is an art of purely personal 
choice where conceptual perfection is either non-existent or disregarded, so that 
no specific guidelines can be given whatsoever in the description of the 
judgemental process (Heirs 1986). No matter what the reason is, if judgement is 
an important attribute in the decision making process and no concrete guidelines 
are provided for it, it is a corollary that the ultimate decision as arrived at through 
judgement would be idiosyncratic involving some form of mental process that 
cannot be communicated to the comprehension of other people who get involved 
in the process. In this respect the observed phenomenon is compatible with the 
criticism that opportunity cost concept cannot be applied in a business world 
where the manager is distinguished from the shareholders. If the shareholders 
run the company by themselves, they will make decisions according to their own 
judgements. However, when they delegate the managerial authority to 
professional managers who are not shareholders, these managers will then make 
decisions according to their judgements, which are not necessarily similar to the 
judgements that would have been made by the shareholders (Hayek 1935, 
Buchanan 1973). Both judgemental processes would be similar only if there 
exists available guidelines that are observed by both the shareholders and the 
managers, such as using profitability measurement as the prime concern in 
making decisions (Coase 1937). Therefore, in a business context where multiple
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business objectives exist, the judgmental process becomes more complicate, and 
it is difficult to provide any simple guidelines of how to make "correct 
judgements". As mentioned above, the lack of some concrete guidelines of how 
to make correct judgements in the sampled books support this proposition.
Discussion of The Opportunity Cost Concept
As shown in Table 1 the opportunity cost concept only appears in two out of the 
twenty-five books, and even within these two books the concept is only 
mentioned in a few lines and does not attract any material attention. Also 
discussions about value, both from a labour quantity or marginal utility 
perspective, do not occupy any notable position in all these management texts. 
From this survey it is obvious that the concept of opportunity cost does not 
receive much attention from the management writers. Because these authors of 
management texts will surely include the topics that are considered crucial or 
important managerial practices in their books, it is logical to question if they 
consider the opportunity cost concept is an essential concept for business 
decisions. Moreover, as these authors are either experienced managers or 
scholars, their perception may also reflect to some extent the business practices. 
Thus it is a logical proposition that managers, in making decisions, do not always 
invoke the opportunity cost concept and apply the concept in practice. Research
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interests thus arise here to visualise and ascertain management practices today 
regarding decision making processes, with a particular reference to whether 
managers adopt the opportunity cost concept in making decisions.
As a matter of interests, authors of management texts adopt a management 
perspective in describing managerial functions, including decision making. They 
seldom mention the relationship between managers and shareholders and the fact 
that managers in terms of corporate ownership actually act in the capacity of 
agents and discharge managerial functions on behalf of the shareholders (albeit 
the agency theory was no longer a new theory in the 1980s). Discussions and 
prescriptions are made simply in the sense that managers discharge managerial 
functions just for the sake of the managers themselves, as if they do not need to 
think about the wishes of the shareholders in discharging their duties (Spriegel 
1960, Dale 1973). Perhaps the reason is because the authors unanimously take 
the corporate objective as simply given and ascertained, be it single minded or 
multiple. Any alteration or change of business objectives is beyond the authority 
and responsibility of the managers, so long as they can safely wait until the 
prescribed corporate objectives are officially amended. Moreover, since in many 
large organisations the directors are normally nominated by shareholders who 
hold a relatively large proportion of issued shares, or these directors hold proxies
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of many small shareholders to enable them to be elected to retain their 
directorship and managerial control of the organisations, thus effectively they 
would have some ideas about the wishes of the majority shareholders (Spriegel 
1960, Pollard 1983). Based on this assertion managerial functions can be 
restricted within the company, and external communication with remote 
shareholders will be regarded as unnecessary and ineffective. The geographical 
dispersion of small shareholders across a country or even across countries (such 
as multinational firms) often deter them to participate and vote in the annual 
general meetings and express their opinions of the managerial effectiveness of the 
organisation. It is also argued that many small shareholders do not really care 
about the management of a company, as long as they can receive a satisfactory 
dividend, and the shares can attain a satisfactory capital appreciation (Dopuch & 
Sunder 1980, Dunning 1993). Despite the arguments made above, however, 
there is a lack of discussion in the sampled books of what should the managers 
do if the corporate objective is not ascertained and officially announced. I have 
also found little discussion about the dynamic process of determination of 
business objectives. Business objectives are not necessarily static objectives that 
are not changed over years. It is admitted that business objectives can be subject 
to constant and instant changes. In this respect managers have to assure 
themselves that the corporate objective is a valid one in the course of a major
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project decision and strategic plan. Almost every management text in the sample 
emphasises on the discharging of managerial functions with respect to system 
and environment, but too few discussions have been found for the discharging of 
managerial duties from an owner-manager perspective. From the owner manager 
perspective, the manager either works for the benefits of the owners 
(shareholders), or they do not. If it is presumed that a manager behaves for the 
benefits of the shareholders, based on the arguments just made it is uncertain if a 
manager can be sure that he is acting for the optimal benefits of the shareholders, 
because he may not fully visualise their business objectives. On the other hand, 
if the agency theory applies and managers do not act for the benefits of 
shareholders, then they do not necessarily make optimal decisions on the 
shareholders' behalf (Jensen & Meckling 1976, Baiman 1982). Both situations 
indicate that the opportunity cost concept may not be invoked for the purposes of 
making decisions. Unfortunately a comprehensive discussion on this part of the 
arena is not provided in most management texts, thus it is necessary to carry out 
a research study to investigate the situation.
Before turning attention to the accountants and economists' view of the 
opportunity cost concept, two questions can be asked here. The first question is 
that, when managers are employed to run the business for and on behalf of the
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shareholders, would they take care of the shareholders’ benefits? The second 
question is that, in case the answer for the first question is in the affirmative, do 
existing management techniques and systems as described and prescribed in the 
available management texts really serve to allow for the managers to fully 
discharge their duties? Given that the opportunity cost concept is rarely 
mentioned in the management texts, there is uncertainty as to how managers 
make business decisions with respect to the theory of choices which inevitably 
involve the ranking process of the assigned values of alternatives and the 
determination of the opportunity costs of these alternatives as discussed in the 
previous chapters.
The Opportunity Cost Concept from an Accounting Perspective
The views held by the professional accountants as well as accounting academics 
are regarded most important to this research as the accountants are the people 
primarily responsible for the compilation of the cost statements that will be 
brought by each decision alternative. It is already well recognised that a variety 
of accounting results can be arrived at through the use of different methods and 
calculation models, thus an accountant to a greater or lesser extent can influence 
a manager's decision by selecting a particular method of calculation and rejecting 
other alternatives. Through a study of the accounting texts, it is purposed to
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identify what views are held by the accountants in arriving at decision data which 
affect the ultimate decision choice.
Functions of the Accounting Craft
A major mission of adopting the accounting craft is to provide useful accounting 
data to users who benefit from such data in achieving their objectives (Beaver 
1973, Homgren & Foster 1991). There are numerous groups of users each of 
them having their own peculiar objectives and needs of accounting information 
(Dopuch & Sunder 1980, Drury 1992). For the sake of simplicity we can 
classify the various groups of user into two basic categories, internal users and 
external users. External users are mainly served by published financial 
statements and the objective of financial reporting is "to provide information 
about the financial position, performance and changes in financial position of an 
enterprise that is useful to a wide range of [external] users in making economic 
decisions (IASC 1989, para. 12). However, in order that the financial reports 
can be used by external users in making economic decisions, the data provided in 
the reports must be relevant and useful for decision making purposes. Thus it is 
apparent that decision oriented information is crucial to the usefulness of 
financial [accounting] statements (Zeff 1978). Although there are explicit 
statements of criteria and qualities for the assessment of decision usefulness (e.g.
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SFAC2), they are not taken into further analysis here as they are irrelevant to the 
present study, which is more concerned with the decision process pursued by 
business managers who are regarded as internal users of financial reports. 
Regarding internal users a major mission of adopting the accounting craft is to 
provide useful accounting data to managers who use these accounting data to 
discharge managerial functions in a more effective and efficient way (Homgren 
and Foster 1991). Managerial functions can be broadly classified into different 
categories, namely reporting and stewardship, decision making, and planning and 
control (Drury 1988). Managers are employed by shareholders to run the 
business on their behalf. Since all business activities are initiated by decisions, 
managers have to frequently make decisions of how to cany out business 
activities (Garrison & Noreen 1994). Planning and control functions form a co­
ordinated part of the decision making process, ensuring that better decisions can 
be made. Reporting function is essential to provide information regarding results 
of the business decisions made by the managers, so that shareholders can base on 
the results to assess if managers are acting for their benefits. In order that better 
decisions can be made, managers inevitably need financial information to assist 
them, so that they can visualise the financial impacts of each decision alternative. 
Therefore decision making is one of the crucial functions for the adoption of the 
accounting craft.
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Despite the fact of agreed (or at least accepted among a majority of the 
accountants?) objectives of the accounting craft, there has been no unanimous 
agreement as to what reporting system and data calculation and interpretation 
models can best fulfil the prescribed objectives. The controversy is apparently 
solved by the adoption of the Golden Rule that "for different purposes there are 
different costs" (Clark 1923, Vatter 1950, Homgren 1986). The advantage of 
adopting the Golden Rule is that it provides no constraint nor barrier to the 
development of the accounting craft, that whenever new managerial requirements 
emerge new concepts and models can be innovated to meet these new 
requirements, if it is considered that existing models are not appropriate in this 
respect, thus allowing the accounting craft to continuously serve the society. 
However, such trajectory of development also leads to unfavourable results 
which include coexistence of conflicting models, impossibility in the 
establishment of general theories or the framework of theories, and more 
important to the present study, a possibility of arbitrary choice of accounting 
models.
Because of the Golden Rule, it is always feasible to innovate new accounting 
models in the hope of serving certain business requirements. However, because
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these models are innovated on an ad hoc basis, depending on when new business 
requirements arise, it is unable to call for co-ordinated efforts for a systematic 
development of accounting theories and models for these business requirements, 
which are not emerged in any systematic or sequential order. Therefore, there 
are times when a conflicting model is created to meet some objectives which are 
simply not compatible with the existing business objectives. Moreover, because 
accounting models are innovated to meet ad hoc management requirements, a 
general framework of analysis does not exist. Business objectives reflect the 
wishes of people who either own or operate the business. Since people's wishes 
are so diversified, the development of accounting models must also be 
diversified, to the extent that the degree of diversity has paralysed the 
establishment of a general framework of analysis. As a corollary of the existing 
of various models including conflicting models, and the admitted phenomenon 
that there is no established general framework of analysis, accountants and 
managers have to exercise judgement of the matching of available accounting 
models with the business requirements. Because judgements vary with people 
and unanimous agreement does not exist in many cases, the selection and 
matching process of accounting models with business requirements may fall into 
an arbitrary exercise, where accountants and managers can arbitrarily select 
accounting models in each circumstance, and justify that he has made a correct
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matching decision. As a result, a manager (or an accountant) may arbitrary select 
the opportunity cost model in a decision making process; or he may select 
another cost model which theoretically may not be totally appropriate to be 
adopted for decision purpose. The explanation power is often vested with the 
manager.
The Relevant Cost Concept and the Opportunity Cost Concept
For the purposes of this research study, 3 selected texts (Kaplan & Atkinson 
1989, Homgren & Foster 1991, and Drury 1992), and 22 randomly picked 
accounting texts are studied in terms of contents. The reason of selecting the 
three identified books is because these books are perceived to be widely adopted 
by the accounting academia in Britain, the US, and world wide. A study of these 
books have revealed the fact that all books under study mention the decision 
process and the relevant cost concept:
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Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Selected Accounting Topics
NO. OF BOOKS MENTIONED NOT
MENTIONED
VALUE CONCEPT 2 23
RELEVANT COST CONCEPT 25 0
OPPORTUNITY COST 
CONCEPT
23 2
DECISION PROCESS 25 0
BUSINESS OBJECTIVE 23 2
Note : Value concept refers to the discussion and analysis of different
concepts of value, including the marginal utility theory of value
Both relevant cost concept and opportunity cost concept are defined in 
accordance with the Terminology issued by the Chartered Institute of 
Management Accountants. Reference is also made to the generally 
accepted meanings of these terms as used in many accounting texts.
All 25 books discuss about the decision processes and the relevant cost concept 
that forms the core concept in the calculation of payoffs in each decision 
alternatives (Drury 1988, Kaplan & Atkinson 1989). The relevant cost concept, 
according to one author, refers to "those expected future costs that differ among 
alternative courses of action" (Homgren & Foster 1991). These future expected 
costs are, by the very nature of accounting, quantitative costs that are measurable 
in numeric scales. Almost all authors detail the process to find out the relevant 
costs among alternatives and to calculate their respective consequences in terms
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of profitability (or other criteria such as return on equity basis) to determine 
which alternative should be adopted per calculated results. For example, in the 
book written by Drury, Management and Cost Accounting. 3rd Ed., he has spent 
a full chapter with numerous examples to demonstrate the process of using the 
relevant cost concept in different decision situations. One of the examples used 
by Drury, example 10.3, illustrates a decision situation to sell products at below 
full costs:
A company produces a single product and has budgeted for the production 
of 100,000 units during the next quarter. The cost estimates for the quarter 
are as follows :
(£)
Direct labour 600,000
Direct materials 200,000
Variable overheads 200,000
Fixed overheads 400,000
1,400,000
The company has received orders for 80,000 units for the coming period at
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the generally accepted market price of £18 per unit. It appeared unlikely 
that orders will be received for the remaining 20,000 units at a selling price 
of £18 per unit, but a customer is prepared to purchase them at a selling 
price of £12 per unit. Should the company accept the offer?
(Drury, C, Management and Cost Accounting 3rd. Ed., page 243)
Drury then discusses the example and points out that fixed overhead will not be 
altered irrespective whether the order is received, thus it is an irrelevant cost item 
in the example. He then goes on to show the relevant costs calculation in 
arriving at the decision :
(£)
Additional revenue 240,000
(20,000 units at £12)
Less relevant costs :
Direct materials (£2) 40,000
Direct labour (£2) 40,000 80.000
Excess of relevant revenues 160,000
over relevant costs ======
(Drury, Page 244)
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Similar examples have been used by authors of these accounting texts. This 
measurement of the flow of costs reflects the movement of monetary funds which 
are compatible to the measurement concept of the accounting craft. The relevant 
cost concept attempts to measure real cash flows in future rather than the change 
in value perception. On the other hand, contrary to the relevant cost concept, the 
opportunity cost concept receives much less attention from the authors. Most 
authors just mention the concept with a few lines of general discussion, and only 
two authors have included in their books working examples of using opportunity 
cost approach in decision making process (Homgren & Foster 1991). Moreover, 
only one author has discussed about the limitation and defects of the opportunity 
cost concept. This finding arouses a suspicion about whether the opportunity 
cost concept is viewed as a prominent concept for decision among accounting 
authors. If an author does not talk much on the concept, and provides no 
working example or demonstration to its application (in contrary to the treatment 
of the relevant cost concept), it is perfectly logical to conclude that the author 
holds the view that internal accounting reports need not be produced using the 
opportunity cost approach in assisting the manager in arriving at his decision. 
The fact that opportunity costs are seldom incorporated into formal accounting 
system which only records what is accepted rather than what has been rejected
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bears some relationship to this observation. Normally the internal accounting 
system are maintained either on actual costs or standard costs basis, with both 
costing systems largely relate to transaction costs occurred by the organisation. 
As accountants usually need to justify the accounting data in terms of their 
objectivity and reliability, the design of the accounting systems is often geared to 
transaction bases, which must relate to actions and activities accepted by the 
organisation. On the other hand, those proposed activities that are rejected will 
not be carried out, and thus they do not form actual transactions and part of the 
accounting records. Opportunity costs, by definition, often relate to the process 
of value judgement that is not necessarily based on transactions. Therefore it is 
more difficult to calculate and justify the magnitude of opportunity costs. This is 
perhaps one of the main reasons that opportunity costs are seldom incorporated 
into the formal accounting system. However, apart from this observation, it is 
uncertain as to the main reasons why authors of accounting texts do not provide 
any thorough discussion of the concept (Homgren & Foster 1987, 1991). For the 
purpose of investigating the application of the opportunity cost concept from an 
accounting perspective, discussion in the next section may provide some hints to 
the answer.
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The Classification of Costs
Unlike management authors and economists, accounting authors have provided 
lengthy discussions in the accounting literature about the classification of costs 
under different situations. Until the turn of this century, the calculation and 
ascertainment of costs (which were mainly production costs) were based on a 
single cost concept (Edwards 1937). The calculation of production costs was 
essentially of the total costs approach, including the allocation of fixed 
overheads, in all situations. Most accountants in that time held the view that the 
total costs approach should be used for all decision situation, because only by 
way of this approach could total costs be recovered. Although the view that "for 
different purposes there are different costs" was first put forward as early as in 
the Twenties (Clark 1923), this view was not widely adopted and few authors 
continued to further the view in their publications (Edwards 1937). To the 
authors who had put forward similar views as that of Clark (Vatter 1950), they 
still found it quite difficult to persuade others to accept the view (Homgren 
1986). However, since its gradual acceptance by accountants in the Fifties, the 
asserted view has now become a golden rule among accountants and authors, 
who support the view that when the costing situation has changed, different cost 
concepts and calculation models may be needed to provide relevant and useful 
accounting information to users (Kaplan 1982, Drury 1992, Garrison & Noreen
-89-
1994).
Based on the golden rule, classification models of costs are developed to meet 
with different managerial requirements. With respect to the classification model 
of classifying costs according their purposes of cost ascertainment, costs are 
basically classified as reporting costs, decision costs, and planning and control 
costs. This classification model is based on the general classification of 
managerial functions of reporting and stewardship, decision making, and 
planning and control, as discussed in the previous sections (Drury 1992). Within 
this classification model, each category of costs holds a different conceptual 
rationale and owns a different perspective of calculation approach. Reporting 
costs refer to record costs of past transactions that are used for preparation of 
accounting reports. It is more related to the stewardship function of the 
accounting craft. As reporting costs are mainly actual transaction costs (subject 
to certain accounting treatments such as depreciation adjustments and stock 
valuations), there is less normative concern in respect of the calculation model in 
domain, and judgement is largely restricted to the selection of agreed accounting 
practices. These costs in the sense of economics resemble choice determined 
costs, as in essence these are the costs incurred after a particular decision is 
made and activities are carried out.
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Planning and control costs reflect the views of management about the level of 
normal costs. Management controls the magnitude of actually incurred costs by 
prescribing the normal cost level that is expected to be occurred under the 
forecasted situations. Staff within the organisation will then aware of this normal 
cost level, and whenever actual costs are possibly deviated from the normal cost 
levels, responsible staff will take actions to prevent over spending of costs, or to 
minimise any adverse effects that may be happened. The ascertainment of these 
costs can be based on past transactions with modifications, or ingenious 
conjecture by management. Subsequent management performance is then 
compared with these controlled standards to arrive at an opinion about whether 
managers are managing in an effective manner. Planning and control costs are 
normative in concept, although a positive approach can be adopted for their 
mathematical derivations.
Decision costs, on the other hand, adapt the concept of choice and opportunity in 
a way that only costs which are affected by decision choices will be counted, 
whereas costs that are not affected otherwise will be excluded. Both the relevant 
cost concept and the opportunity cost concept resemble the concept of choice. 
Thus decision costs are choice determining costs.
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The explicit recognition of different paradigms of costs in the accounting 
literature bears important consequences for the recognition and ascertainment of 
the cost concept. Unlike economic literature, there is no argument in the 
accounting literature that cost concept is best; or which cost concept should be 
regarded as the ultimate concept. The spirit of the accounting craft is to identify 
and ascertain the most appropriate cost value in the particular circumstances, and 
cost values become a relative concept subject to change and alteration in 
accordance with the factors that are prevalent in each particular circumstances 
(Clark 1923, Otley 1980). Moreover, there is unanimous consent among 
accountants that cost values as arrived at under different purposes and with 
respect to different circumstances do not bear direct relationship to one another, 
so that reporting costs often are not equal to decision costs, and in turn decisions 
costs often are not equal to control costs (Edwards 1937, Homgren 1986). The 
variability of cost values has promoted the flexibility of accounting applications 
in the identification and ascertainment of costs and values in the business 
context; however, it has also restricted the possibility of searching for a single, 
ultimate conception of cost. With reference to the golden belief, the opportunity 
cost concept can be invoked to the extent that accountants consider appropriate 
in business applications. Thus the relevant cost concept, which can be regarded
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as a subset of the opportunity cost concept because of its resemblance to the true 
opportunity cost concept (but not the nominal opportunity cost concept), is 
favoured in decision processes in the accounting literature, whereas the original 
concept of the opportunity cost is generally avoided or intentionally omitted from 
the publications. The advantage of this practice is that accountants can select to 
employ an accounting system which they are more confident of, and exclude 
what they cannot do with the accounting craft. Economists, in a less flexible 
way, have to find out an answer that may not even exist.
Irrelevance of the Accountants* Approach
Comparing the contents of the accounting texts with the management texts, and 
referring to the discussion of the previous sections, it is clear that methods 
contained in the accounting literature mentioning about the processes of arriving 
at a decision choice do not reflect the actual situation. This is not to say that the 
accounting reports are totally invalid, or useless; but the fact is that the 
accounting reports alone often cannot lead to any meaningful decisions at all. 
Three reasons have led to this proposition:
1. Impact of the Business Objectives
Similar to the survey of the management texts, nearly all accounting texts
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under survey carry a discussion of the business objectives, and the core of 
discussion lies around the profit maximisation concept. However, most of 
the books (20 out of 25 books) adapt the profit maximisation objective as 
given and agreed in the business environment. There is little discussion 
about the appropriateness of the maximisation concept and the existence of 
multiple business objectives in the modem business world (Burchell et al 
1980, Pollard 1983). For the writers who have mentioned multiple 
business objectives, they do accept that the profit maximisation concept 
can be a suitable substitute in discharging managerial functions (Drury
1988). As a result the sheer volume of discussion of the appropriateness 
of profit maximisation concept and their alternatives in the management 
texts do not find their place in the accounting texts. However, it is already 
well recognised that business objectives in the modem world can no longer 
be represented by any simple economic goal, and contemporary 
management accounting researches have become more primarily 
emphasised the positive and empirical aspects of professional practices 
(Ashton et al 1991). In the light of these apparent movements in both 
practices and researches, it is very doubtful if the contents of general 
accounting textbooks are still appropriate in providing adequate 
accounting knowledge for the benefits of accountants and managers.
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2. The Problem of Quantification
The inherent characteristics of the accounting craft induce many basic 
defects that cannot be totally eliminated or avoided. These defects include 
the problem of source information, the problem of time constraints, and 
others. With particular reference to managers’ requirements and 
accountability, the problem of quantification has accounted for a greater 
degree of ineffectiveness in the application of accounting outputs for 
decision making.
The basic characteristics of the accounting craft require that there must be 
quantitative, numerically measured data for a particular aspect of factor of 
analysis be included in the decision model and the calculation process. If 
any factor falls into the category of qualitative factor and its "value" is not 
measurable and presentable in terms of financially viable data, such factor 
is bound to be rejected from the decision model by an accountant in 
arriving at his calculated results. The best thing an accountant can do is to 
mention in his accounting report about the existence of some qualitative 
data that have not been included in the calculations, and this is also the 
usual practice of the accounting text writers to state in their books. It is 
abundantly found in many accounting paper examinations held by both
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academic institutes and professional bodies which ask candidates to state 
"further concerns or other considerations that are needed to be made 
before the final decision is taken”, and the answers to these questions are a 
list of the qualitative data that should be taken into consideration other 
than the quantitative, calculated results. Regrettably, however, not in a 
single case can a quantified answer can be found in the "model answers" 
of these questions; and there has not been any discussion at all, either in 
these examinations or in the accounting texts, of how should an accountant 
make a balance between quantitative results with qualitative data (Drury 
1988, Ashton 1991, Hanson 1993). It is thus either assumed that any 
"competent" accountant should know how to strike a balance between the 
known and the unknown, or that the accountants have no responsibility at 
all in striking such a balance.
It is admitted that continuing efforts are made to quantify qualitative data 
as far as possible, and there are successful examples about these 
conversion exercises (such as capitalisation of future revenues brought 
about by a good customer relationship). However, to date there are still 
too many qualitative concerns that cannot be successfully converted into 
quantitative models for incorporation into the accounting system.
-96-
Unfortunately opportunity costs in many cases fall onto the side of 
qualitative concerns because firstly opportunity costs seldom form part of 
the normal accounting system which lead to an absence of available 
quantitative data (Homgren & Foster 1991), and secondly there are cases 
when opportunity costs refer to the giving up of other alternatives that are 
really qualitative in nature (Buchanan 1973). Referred to the simple 
example of lift installation quoted in the previous chapter (pp 60-61), the 
opportunity cost of selecting to install lift C would be $490,000 (being the 
difference between the cost of lift C and lift A); but the opportunity cost of 
selecting to install lift A would be uncertain, as personal safety is very 
hard, if not impossible, to be quantified at the moment of making a 
decision. Thus application of the opportunity cost concept in accounting 
calculations inevitably commits the basic defect of the problem of 
quantification, which leads to the impossibility of providing an accounting 
report which presents meaningful comparison among decision alternatives 
other than a mere presentation of the available data. If the opportunity 
cost concept is considered a core concept in the decision making process, 
it is hardly conceivable that the accounting report can provide any 
meaningful analysis in a comprehensive sense. The adoption of the 
relevant cost concept may minimise the adverse effect thereof, but it can
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never totally eliminate the defects brought about by the exclusion of the 
opportunity cost concept.
3. Discussion of Decision Judgement
Unlike the management texts that advocate the judgmental process in 
selecting a preferred alternative, there is a complete absence of discussion 
about management judgement in arriving at a decision in the accounting 
literature. Quite the contrary, most authors of accounting texts either 
explicitly or implicitly advocate the conclusiveness of the calculated 
results, and recommendations on management choices of action are 
primarily based on these results (e.g. Hanson 1993). These observed 
phenomena are understandable by relating them to the adoption of the 
profit maximisation objective. If the profit maximisation objective is the 
only prime concern, calculated consequence of each individual alternative 
in terms of profitability can actually be taken as the determining factor in 
the selection of decision choices, and the domain of concern is how to 
accurately calculate these consequences and present them in a way to 
demonstrate the differential effect of them. It is not surprising to find that 
the accounting texts in this respect devote much discussion of how to 
modify the calculation models in each situation, when some quantitative
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factors have changed in another aspect (Dearden 1988, DeCoster et al 
1988, Homgren & Foster 1991), to a degree similar to the management 
authors devoting their effort to the discussion of the judgmental process in 
making decisions.
The Economists* View - Where the Differences Are 
Absence of the Business Context
Since the concept of opportunity cost is originated from an economic 
perspective, it is quite reasonable to assume at the outset that the cost concept 
must have been mentioned by the economic authors. However, although 
economists like Sir Edwards and Coase have asserted the possibility of 
transforming economic concepts into business application, most economists do 
not regard themselves having any close relationship with the business context. 
Thus it is also a realistic assumption that economic authors will not mention 
about business application of the economic concepts in their texts. A review and 
study of 25 basic and introductory economic books written between the Sixties 
and Nineties supports this proposition as most sampled textbooks do not take 
into account business application of the economic theories. Rather the fact is 
that little about the business context has been mentioned by these sampled books.
-99-
Results of the findings are shown in Table 3:
Table 3: Frequency Distribution of Selected Economic Topics
VALUE
CONCEPT
OPPORTUNITY 
COST CONCEPT
DECISION
PROCESS
BUSINESS
OBJECTIVE
MENTIONED 25 25 25 5
NOT
MENTIONED
0 0 0 20
As revealed from Table 3 discussion of the business objectives are not widely 
made among the economists (Albrecht & Zember 1985). When business 
objectives are mentioned about, all writers inevitably advocate the profit 
maximisation concept as the starting point for discussion (Bach 1987). This is 
understandable, as economists must initiate discussion from the economic 
perspective. It is only surprising that economists seldom talk about the 
indeterministic nature of the maximising concept. Contrary to the management 
writers there are very few criticisms found in the economic texts about the 
uncertainties in measuring "maximised" profits. Perhaps the upheld of 
maximisation concept among economists is inherited from the basic advocacy 
that economics is to "maximise" benefits obtainable from scarce resources, and 
most economists observe this rule without any intention or courage to hold a
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second look on its validity. Thus the widely mentioned "satisfying profitability" 
concept among the management writers is hardly discussed about among the 
economists. Moreover, only one writer devotes more space to the discussion of 
the existence of multiple objectives in business organisations and the 
impossibilities of developing measurement systems in such complicate situations 
(Baumol 1988). However, as stated in his book, Baumol explicitly mentions that:
"it is not the economist's job to tell what the business goal should 
be. He only helps to achieve the goal given it is known." (1982, pp 
378)
With the absence of discussion of alternative business objectives and the 
supposition of Baumol's statement as representing the economists' view, it is 
tentatively concluded that economists, being bound by their own discipline of 
learning, take regard the profit maximisation motive as the prime business motive 
for the firm; and in case of contrary situation economists will then disclaim the 
functional responsibility in the assistance of objective setting processes. If the 
above tentative conclusion can be upheld, then it is questionable if economic 
theories can be satisfactory applied in the business context, since it has already 
been recognised that the modem business world is no more as simple before, 
when a single economic motive can be regarded a prime objective for most of the 
firms. The situation does not vary much even if textbooks of managerial
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economics are taken into concern. Managerial economics make special 
references to the business entities, and thus with a simple random survey of ten 
books out of a collection of 81 books reveals that all these ten books discuss 
about business objectives. However, out of them only one book provide much 
discussion on the appropriateness of the profit maximisation concept and the 
possible substitution of the satisfying concept (Milgrom & Roberts 1992); and 
for the others the profit maximisation objective is either simply taken for granted, 
or asserted as the prime objective of business entities even in a world of 
multiplications (Farris & Happel 1987).
The Economic Perspective in the Decision Making Process
All the books under survey devote considerable volume of context to the 
discussion of the decision making process. Unlike the managers and the 
accountants, economists unanimously assert that the essence of making decisions 
is to maximise utilities of human beings. This utility maximisation theory forms 
the core analysis of the decision process irrespective whether business 
applications have been discussed about. Not withstanding of the vast volume of 
discussion, there is however a complete lacking of any description of the decision 
making process in general, which is contrary to the practice of the management 
and accounting authors. Rather authors of economics literature spread discussion
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of the topic in different sectors of analysis. They have provided considerable 
discussions as how to maximise profits in individual decision situations, 
including the particular decision models and equations that are applicable to the 
situation concerned.
Regarding the cost concept that are advocated in the calculation and 
measurement of payoffs among alternatives, the relevant cost concept, which is 
primarily mentioned in the accounting texts, completely disappear in all the basic 
economics texts under survey, and appears only in two out of the ten managerial 
economics texts (Mulligan 1989, Pappas & Hirschey 1987). Most econoomic 
textbooks adopt the marginal utility approach and provide detailed discussions of 
marginal cost analysis. Authors of these economic texts also provide a variety of 
discussions about the opportunity cost concept. Similar to the discussion of 
decision models, however, not more than a single page thereof can be found in 
nearly all the studied books. For example, in the book written by Schumpeter, 
History of Economic Analysis (1954), discussion of the concept of opportunity 
costs can only be found in four pages (page 917, 1044, 1051-2), and the concept 
only occupies less than a few lines in each of these pages. On the other hand, the 
discussion of marginal utility can be found in Schumpeter’s book in more than 30 
pages. As in Schumpeter’s book, in most books that are under reviewed the
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concept is again mentioned in part under each individual topic of analysis, and it 
is not uncommon that discussion of the concept and its application is absent in a 
particular topic. To this phenomenon perhaps Buchanan has provided a possible 
answer:
“One reason per haps lies in the fact that the critique of orthodoxy is too 
fundamental; to accept fully the implications of the theory of opportunity
cost requires the modem economists to throw overboard too much
of his invested intellectual capital. How can we write the elementary 
textbooks and teach the elementary course if we cannot draw the 
standard cost curves? How can we carry out benefit-cost analysis and 
pretend that we are assisting in social decision-making?” (1973, page 13)
The consequence is that there is no collective general discussion about the 
application of the opportunity cost concept, and when it is applied, the 
importance of such can be easily overlooked. Such non-existence of direct 
reference to the opportunity cost concept in decision choices can also be 
observed even in classical economics literature, such as Marshall's Principles of 
Economics (eighth edition, 1920). In the analysis of demand and supply 
equilibrium, Marshall elaborated the expenses of production and the 
determination of supply price (pp 343), how equilibrium price could be arrived at
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between supply and demand (pp 345), and how values of a commodity were 
affected by demand and supply with respect to time period (pp 348). But 
throughout the analysis, Marshall has not mentioned the term “opportunity cost 
concept” (although in his analysis marginal costs of production equal to the 
opportunity costs.)
A Comparison of the Views
Based on the findings from the survey of texts, the following issues regarding the 
rationale and application of the concept of opportunity costs are identified:
1. The confusion about Business Objectives
Economists have long regarded profit maximisation as a prime business 
objective, and accountants to a large extent follow the view. However, 
managers hold a different view and recognise more about the 
multiplication of business objectives and the conflicts that may arise in the 
fulfilment of these multiple objectives. Thus in terms of business 
applications there exist a confusion between accountants and managers of 
how should the issue of business objectives which affects the 
determination of the kinds of information required in discharging 
managerial functions be treated upon, and the accounting information
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system that is best fit into the company for the acquisition of such 
information. This confusion in the determination of business objectives is 
related to the discipline of learning and training between the economists, 
the accountants, and the managers. Accountants, by the very nature of 
accounting, are trained to make use of quantitative (accounting and 
financial) data to aid in discharging managerial functions. Although it has 
been recognised by some accountants that the business world is ever more 
complex in nature, and the functions of the accounting craft must be re­
examined and expanded to cope with the complex world (Burchell et al 
1980, Hopwood 1987), these pioneered views do not really reconstruct the 
heritage of the accounting practice and the views of the majority of 
accountants (Drury 1992). It is still a harsh consideration if accountants in 
general should give up what can be calculated upon and slide into a space 
of imagination and judgement, where the traditional merits of objectivity 
and reliability of the accounting craft can hardly be held any longer (IASC
1989). Accountants exercise judgement, of course. But in most cases 
judgement are either exercised for the selection of the quantitative model 
that should be used, or the interpretation of calculated result (rather than 
the interpretation of the problem situation which includes factors that have 
not been merged into the quantitative model) arisen from the selected
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model. As a corollary, accountants favour a corporate objective that 
facilitate the selection of the accounting information system, and try to 
avoid maintaining a system that involves complex information processing 
which include qualitative factors as well. Thus accountants always cling 
to reduce the complexity of reality to a simpler, economic oriented 
business world with simple economic business objectives.
Managers, on the other hand, are trained to adopt complex business 
objectives without restriction to the quantitative side of analysis, and are 
thus claimed to exercise total judgement instead of partial judgement 
arisen there from. Managers therefore require more information than an 
accountant can provide. It is not uncommon to hear of a manager 
neglecting an accounting report simply because of the more important 
qualitative considerations that step in to reflect the reality of the 
multiplication of business objectives. The inconsistency of business 
perceptions between accountants and managers thus leads to a diversity of 
distinctive orientation of the approaches used to analyse and solve 
managerial problems.
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2. Controversy of the Cost Concept
A major barrier in harmonising the views among the economists, 
accountants, and managers lies on the controversial issue of the concept of 
cost. Both managers and economists have not provided any detailed 
analysis of the fundamental nature of the cost concept, and neither have 
they provided any categorisation about the cost paradigm comparable to 
that of accounting classification. As a result, there exists a confusion 
whether the nature of cost is understandable in the same sense between the 
professional managers and the economists. On the other hand, 
accountants generally adopt the view that for different purposes there are 
different costs. Thus, they will and do always alter and change the 
calculation models to suit different circumstances. Disregarding whether 
this multivariate cost concept is perfectly logical, the practice in itself has 
made many managers lost in the myth of the accounting craft. Without 
thorough training in the accounting process, managers often find 
themselves unable to tell if the report submitted by accountants are true 
and correct with respect to the circumstances, and they are confused by 
what constitutes the nature of costs. The divergence in the understanding 
of the cost concept has thus led to a controversy of how should a cost be 
defined, and how should it be measured and ascertained. Given the
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controversy in the understanding of the cost concept, therefore, it is not 
surprising that there are diversions of model constructions and cost 
calculations. In cases of decision making, the situation is disappointing as 
well.
3. Inconsistency of Application of Decision Costs Concept
Scholars of all the three disciplines unanimously regard cost benefit 
analysis as a prime concern for decision making and the determination of 
the preferred choice. However, in the process of cost recognition and 
ascertainment, diverged opinions are expressed by different interesting 
groups. Authors of management texts do not explicitly express any 
favourite choice of the concept of decision costs; whereas the accountants 
in majority favour the relevant cost concept which represents prospective 
cash flow analysis of available alternatives, and the economists base on the 
domain of marginal utility concept in their analysis. It is apparently 
evident that the opportunity cost concept is different from the relevant cost 
concept as one refers to value judgement but the other refers to 
prospective cash flow analysis. Thus there is inconsistency among the 
managers, the accountants, and the economists of which concept is more 
theoretically sound or practically functional in applying to decision
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analysis. By applying the relevant cost concept, accountants inevitably 
calculate the differential cash flows in each alternative in an inhuman 
manner. As a corollary, different decision makers should arrive at the 
same conclusion and preferred choice of action. By contrast, economists 
apply the marginal utility analysis in many cases to determine the final 
preferred choice of alternative; and thus albeit with the same differential 
analysis in cash flows, different decision makers still have their own 
preferred choice. Managers, most likely trained to acquire both 
accounting and economics knowledge, do not explicitly specify which cost 
concept constitutes the prime basis of analysis in the decision process. 
Therefore they are more flexible to shift between different concepts in 
making various decisions. In any case, as economists do not care much on 
business applications of economic concepts; accountants do not regard the 
opportunity cost concept as a prime concern; and managers say nothing 
more than the importance of judgement, there is no evidence that the 
opportunity cost concept is applied in business decisions.
4. The Role of Judgement
In arriving at decisions, management literature proclaims the importance of 
judgement while accounting and economics literature assert the importance
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of system-specified calculations and analysis. The divergence of reliance 
on different approaches at the crucial stage of the decision process once 
again demonstrates the incompatibility of the learning and training 
processes between managers and accountants (and economists as well). 
Management practice, by its very nature, depends in essence the 
intelligence of the manager who handles the situation; but in contrast 
thereto economic and accounting analysis are substantially built up on 
models and theories that exist on their own irrespective of who handles the 
situation. The generally inhuman nature of accounting and economic 
models has led to the consequence that judgement be relatively viewed as 
a less than necessary process.
There is no intention to propose that economists and accountants 
completely disregard the importance of judgement, and no argument would 
be made on whether model specified analysis is more important than 
managerial judgement. However, the absence of any detailed discussion 
of merging the two approaches together into a single process to arrive at 
better decisions does create a knowledge gap between information 
provision and decision analysis. As revealed from the management 
literature, judgmental process is a black box and an unexplained process
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that is unable to be represented by any formal modelling analysis. Thus 
there is always a possibility that judgmental opinion deviates from model 
representations. But can there be some general analysis or guiding 
theories as how to solve such conflicting situations? Should a manager 
sticks to his own judgement, or should he sticks to the model implications? 
Moreover, this knowledge gap probably has deepen the confusion in the 
application of the opportunity cost approach in the decision making 
process.
5. The Opportunity Cost Concept - A Common Omission
Despite the identified differences in various aspects of analysis, there is 
however a common consensus among the three parties to omit, or neglect, 
the discussion and the concept and application of the opportunity cost 
concept in decision analysis. Referring to the results of scrutiny of texts in 
these disciplines, it is found that the opportunity cost concept has been 
placed on an inferior degree of attention by the authors, and management 
authors even simply ignore its existence. Such omission or neglect must 
be an intentional act, which reflect the views of the authors collectively.
The reasons led to the omission or neglect of the opportunity cost concept
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are not known, as the authors have not been interviewed or questioned 
about. However, one issue is ascertained. To these authors, whether a 
management writer, an accountant, or an economist, the opportunity cost 
concept is either a disposable concept or a concept that can hardly be 
touched must be beyond doubt, otherwise majority of authors would have 
already included the topic in their books. Disposable concept here 
indicates that either the concept is not regarded conceptually valid and 
useful, or the authors believe that the concept is not being widely practised 
in the business world, and such phenomenon of non-practice is not viewed 
as unacceptable. To find out the real implication, the views of 
practitioners are sought and analysed.
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CHAPTER 4
A MODEL ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE FRAMEWORK OF 
DECISION MAKING AND THE OPPORTUNITY COST CONCEPT
Given that little evidence can be found from the literature, especially from 
textbooks, that are able to describe the decision behaviour in actual practices 
with particular reference to the adoption of costing approaches and models in the 
business environment, it is suspicious about the actual decision behaviour of 
business people, and whether they adopt the opportunity cost concept in making 
decisions. Some early researches have placed doubt on the application of the 
opportunity cost approach in decision cases (Becker & Ronen 1974), whereas 
later researches demonstrate that managers include opportunity costs for concern 
(Neumann & Friedman 1978), especially when these opportunity costs are 
explicitly provided or made available to the managers (Friedman & Neumann 
1980, Northcraft & Neale 1986). However, March (1987) has indicated that 
managers often do not have knowledge of decision alternatives which constitute 
the calculation of opportunity costs, and decision uncertainty is a major barrier to 
the adoption of the opportunity cost approach in decision making processes. 
Despite the researches mentioned here, there is still a lack of concrete evidence 
to explain managerial decision behaviour of using the opportunity cost approach 
in decision processes, and how do they select to accept the cost concept under
-114-
different situations (Chenhall & Morris 1991). To explore this arena of 
knowledge and practice, therefore, a framework of analysis is proposed for 
research and tests to be carried out in the identification and insights of the 
unknowns. Since the purpose of this research is to identify the decision 
behaviour of business managers under the present context of environments, 
context of the behavioural decision theories, the agency theories, and the 
expectancy theory are invoked in the establishment of the research framework 
and subsequent analyses.
The Behavioural Decision Theories
Within the arena of behavioural decision theories, studies are carried out to 
identify how people make decisions, and in general what factors would affect or 
constrain the decision behaviour of people (Demski & Swieringa 1981). 
Different models of analysis and schools of thoughts have been proposed by 
researchers in explaining why people behave in a certain way and make 
particular decisions. In general, most theories try to explain the interactions 
among external factors, internal factors, and the decision characteristics (Einhom 
& Hogarth 1981).
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The Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximising Model
For the purposes of studying people's decision behaviour, it is essential to arrive 
at a definitive set of human nature, which can be based upon to analyse and 
explain human behaviour and decisions. Regrettably, there is substantial 
controversy among scholars of different disciplines, or even among scholars of 
the same discipline, about the nature of human beings (Maslow 1970, McGregor 
1960, Ouchi 1979, Jensen & Meckling 1994). Because of the differences in the 
perceived human nature, various models are developed in different directions, 
each pertaining to its own assumptions and inference of human behaviour 
including decision behaviour. For the purposes of this research, the Resourceful, 
Evaluation, Maximising Model (REMM) as proposed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1994) is adopted as the base model for the analysis of human behaviour. 
According to the REMM, the following postulates are put forward:
Postulate I : Every individual cares : he or she is an evaluator 
Postulate I I : Each individual's wants are unlimited 
Postulate I I I : Each individual is a maximiser 
Postulate IV : The individual is resourceful 
(Jensen and Meckling 1994, Page 4 and 5)
Based on the REMM, every individual is a utility maximiser. The major
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difference between a REMM person and an economic person is that the REMM 
person does not calculate total utility purely on economic terms. He cares other 
things be they economic, sociological, psychological, and ethical. This 
proposition is more compatible with the contemporary management theories, as it 
has been demonstrated that human beings have multiple goals and are willing to 
trade off economic benefits for qualitative rewards. Another important postulate 
of the REMM model is that the individual is resourceful. Thus the individual can 
always react to the changes of circumstances and identify new opportunities in 
maximising total utilities. This resourceful characteristics will thus enable the 
individual to change his decision behaviour and adopt a new decision approach 
under different circumstances in order that he can maximise his total utilities in 
every case, rather than sticking to one or just a few "programmed” behaviour that 
cannot provide optimal results to a variety of uncontrolled circumstances.
The adoption of the REMM model enables this research to be carried out 
according to the proposed theoretical framework:
1. The research is carried out with an emphasis of individuals, rather than 
individuals as a group, or even from a social approach as proposed by 
many sociological models. This is crucial because models used to test
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decision behaviour from an individual perspective are distinctive from 
those used to test decision behaviour from a social perspective, which 
emphasise the social impact of individual decisions, and how individuals 
observe the social constraints in making decisions. Adopting the REMM 
allows the test of decision behaviour from the individual perspective, 
which is the core concern in this research.
2. The adoption of the REMM model as a base model allows different 
predictions to be made about decision behaviour, and incorporates non­
economic factors in the analysis to make it more close to reality.
Attributes of Decision Behaviour
Although the candidate has suggested a basic model in the formulation of the 
basic nature of human beings, it is admitted that the REMM model is only 
concerned with the broad based issues in human nature, and divergence in 
behaviour will certainly be observed among different persons although their 
behaviour are all compatible with the REMM model. This divergence in 
behaviour is observed among people in each of the stages throughout the 
decision process in arriving at the ultimate decision. Starting from the 
information gathering stage, people would demonstrate different behaviour and
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attitude in collecting data that are required. It is always recognised that perfect 
information cannot be obtained in most cases, and thus there is always a decision 
of how much information should be obtained before the decision can be made, 
and what constitutes the acquired set of information. The collection and 
acquisition of information consumes resources that include time, effort, and 
monetary expenses. According to the costs and benefits criteria, the benefits 
brought by the information must exceed the total costs in acquiring the 
information. However, the calculation of costs and benefits inevitably involves 
judgement in most cases. Thus either the cost benefit analysis is not effectively 
carried out, or it involves subjective judgement that cannot be transmitted to the 
knowledge of the others (Einhom & Hogarth 1981). A possible solution is the 
bounded rationality approach in making decisions (Simon 1957, 1976). 
However, if the costs of effort (which constitute pain costs) are taken into 
concern, perhaps the bounded rationality concept which relates more to the 
satisficing approach is incorrect, as the decision maker considers himself making 
an optimal decision in maximising utilities (Einhom & Hogarth 1981, Jensen & 
Meckling 1994). The same situation repeats in each subsequent stage as detailed 
in the paper by Einhom and Hogarth (1981), and thus it is not intended to restate 
here to avoid tautological repetition.
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Apart from viewing different behaviour at each stage of the decision process, 
previous researches have demonstrated possible interactions of external and 
endogenous factors with decision behaviour, including organisation structure and 
system specification (Hopwood 1972, Otley 1980), organisational culture 
(Soeters & Schreuder 1988), and communication symbols (Dent 1991). 
Personality and cognitive style of decision makers also constitute an important 
area of study in decision behaviour (Gul 1984). Despite a handful of research 
literature is available for the behavioural decision theories, most research is 
aimed at providing explanations in specific settings without an attempt to 
establish an integrated framework, from an accounting perspective, for a 
complete analysis of how managers employ different accounting concepts and 
models in decision making processes and whether they have invoked these 
accounting models and concepts functionally or otherwise. More recent 
application of the behavioural decision theories is found in research in the 
auditing areas (Hogarth 1991). But even in these research the essence of 
theoretical base are borrowed from previous research in other disciplines such as 
sociology. This lack of an integrated framework between decision behaviour 
and accounting information context has lead to an uncertainty of how accounting 
craft can be used effectively and functionally in assisting managers in making 
business decisions, given the postulate that he will try to maximise total utilities
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under the circumstances. Thus there is a need to put forward a model of analysis 
to bridge the gap.
The Agency Theories
The agency theories in dealing with the relationship between an agent and his 
principal accept the general proposition that the agent will maximise his own 
benefits even at the expenses of the principal. This is compatible with the 
REMM model, which also signifies that an individual will always behave to 
obtain maximum utilities. The agency theories have put forward certain further 
assumptions about the circumstances that have important impacts to the 
behaviour of both the principal and the agent:
1. An agent is effort adverse. Thus if he can spend less effort in doing his job 
without affecting his subsequent rewards, the agent will not work any 
harder to finish his assigned job (by the principal) in any better way.
2. The agent possesses asymmetric advantages over the principal. That is, 
either the agent possesses some information that is not obtainable by the 
principal, or the agent has acquired certain knowledge (technical or 
otherwise) which the principal is lacked of.
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3. As a corollary of point 2 above, or because of other constraints such as 
geographical or location constraints, the principal cannot observe and 
assess the amount of effort provided by the agent. Rather the principal 
only observes the results of the agent to determine whether the agent has 
done a satisfactory job in fulfilment of his requirements.
Given the basic presumption that an agent will work for his own benefits, and the 
three assumptions about the principal agent relationship, it is suggested that an 
agent may act in such a way that his own benefits are maximised while the 
principal’s benefits are not. This outcome is of course contradictory to the 
intention of the principal, who engages the agent to work for the benefits of the 
principal. Undesirable behaviour such as adverse selection or moral hazards are 
mentioned in literature, with an expectation of making use of some form of 
arrangements to get rid of such undesirable behaviour from the agent (Baiman 
1982). With the development of different branches of the agency literature, 
proposed solutions also diverge into different aspects of analysis, and distinctive 
methods and models are put forward to solve the agency problems (Baiman 
1990). However, despite the agency literature represents one of the major 
research domains since the 1970s, most researches are emphasised on the design
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of various reward and compensation models, or control and monitoring models, 
that can avoid or minimise the negative impacts brought about by the possible 
undesirable behaviour of the agent. Hardly is there a paper in the agency 
literature which investigate the application of the theory into analysis of actual 
decision behaviour of an agent through the adoption of different cost models in 
maximising his own benefits.
Combining the behavioural decision theory with the agency theory, with the 
REMM model being bear in mind, some initial postulates can be formed 
regarding the managerial decision behaviour of a business manager, who is 
supposed to be an agent of either his senior officers, or that of the shareholders:
1. A business manager will try to maximise his own benefits. If there is 
incompatibility between his self-benefits and the benefits of the company 
(or its shareholders), the manager probably behaves in a way to maximise 
his benefits at the expenses of the company.
2. Because the manager as the agent often possesses asymmetric advantages 
(information or knowledge) over his principal, and the manager is 
resourceful, he can always adopt a particular mode of decision behaviour
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in accordance with different decision circumstances that may not be easily 
challenged by the principal.
3. Given the accumulation of cost data and the use of a particular cost model 
reflects to certain extent asymmetric characteristics, the manager can often 
shift his preference of using a particular cost model in arriving at 
managerial decisions, and justify his selection choice of costing models in 
a way easily acceptable by the principal.
These propositions taking together have demonstrated the fact that despite the 
opportunity cost accounting model is regarded as the preferred model that should 
be used for decision making, in practice this is not necessarily the case. A 
manager will only employ the opportunity cost model if this model can bring to 
him maximised benefits. Because the manager needs to project expected results 
of the adoption or otherwise of the opportunity cost model, therefore, the 
expectancy theory is also regarded important in the formulation of a 
comprehensive framework for decision behaviour analysis.
The Expectancy Theory
In his original formulation, Vroom (1964) tried to explain the pattern of human
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behaviour with the expectancy theory. According to the theory it is presumed 
that people in the absence of coercive force behave in a way to obtain personal 
benefits. The intention of obtaining personal benefits directs people in 
formulating certain behaviour patterns, which are affected by certain factors and 
valence, through the perceived expectations of people. According to this 
proposition, human behaviour is a resultant expectation among three variables, 
that include the self perception of effort (E), a perceived or expected relationship 
between the magnitude of effort and its resulting performance (a factor P, such 
that E --> P), and a perceived or expected relationship between the expected 
performance that will be achieved given certain effort is provided and the 
possible reward or value (V) that will be obtained by the person in achieving 
such performance (P ~> V). This proposed relationship can be expressed as a 
function:
Behaviour = f  (E, P, V )------------------  (1)
In a symbolic context, expectancy theory suggests that a person will try to 
behave in a particular way or pattern that can maximise his own expected total 
value brought by the interactions of these factors, such that:
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Max Behaviour = IE + IP + IV, (2)
Where, IE = intrinsic value that is brought about by the 
utilisation of effort in achieving some task and 
performance
IP = intrinsic value that is brought about by the relative 
achievement of task performance, and
IV = intrinsic value that is associated with the possible 
rewards brought about by the achievement of task 
performance
Note: The term intrinsic value is used to denote that value
calculation and judgement are performed purely by the 
decision maker, and represent personal views that may not 
be objectively justifiable in any way
The intrinsic value that is brought about by the utilisation of effort can be positive 
or negative. In a more general interpretation most people view effort as an 
undesirable input, as also proposed in the agency theory, so that the more effort 
is needed, the greater the negative value is assigned thereto. However, to people 
who are fond of work (as in extreme cases the workaholics) the provision of 
effort can be positive, such that they will gain enjoyment through the work 
process in itself without any necessity of achieving some targeted result. The 
intrinsic value of performance is usually positive, its magnitude being dependent
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upon the relative perception of the degree of achievement with respect to the 
provision of effort. The intrinsic value associated with the rewards brought about 
from successful task performance is also positive. Of course there can be 
negative rewards such as disciplinary actions or penalties for unsuccessful 
performance, which provide negative values to the decision maker. One of the 
suggested solutions in the agency literature is the institution of negative reward 
systems to deter managers (agents) from performing in a sub-optimal way 
(Baiman 1982). Thus, it should be noted that the additive sign in this formula is 
a symbolic sign rather than a precise mathematical sign.
In the simple case of certainty, if a person can be sure of the relationship between 
effort and performance, the relationship between performance and reward, and 
the values associated therewith, then he can easily calculate how much effort he 
should provide in achieving a certain level of task performance and receive the 
associated rewards brought by such level of performance. For example, suppose 
a student knows that he can get an A grade in a certain subject if he studies six 
hours a day, or a B grade if he studies four hours a day. It is further supposed 
that the student's father has promised him that he will be given a model aeroplane 
if he gets a B grade, or a bicycle if he can even get an A grade. Then the student 
can simply plan to study either four hours a day or six hours a day, depending on
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whether he wishes to have a model aeroplane or a bicycle. In other words, if the 
student is already satisfied with a model aeroplane, then he will not spend six 
hours a day to his studies, given the assumption that he views study time as a 
negative factor and would like to spend as less study time as possible in 
obtaining his desired rewards.
As the intrinsic value associated with effort is a very personalised factor, which 
is not subject to control and manipulation (except by using cultural control and 
related mechanisms), the domain of research in the expectancy theory lies on the 
setting and design of the performance and reward mechanisms so that these 
settings would induce people to behave in a certain desired pattern. Referring to 
the simple example of model aeroplane and the bicycle, if the father knows that 
the child does not like cycling and only wishes to obtain the aeroplane which is 
his favourite toy, then he can manipulate the reward structure by saying that no 
gift can be obtained for a B grade result, and a model aeroplane will be given as 
an award for an A grade. In this way the child would be induced to study harder 
for an A grade, which is desired by his father. The essence of motivation as 
demonstrated in this simple example is the clear demonstration of the relationship 
between performance and reward, and the setting of an appropriate reward 
structure. The crucial success in the application of the expectancy theory is the
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ability to formulate the perceived relationship between effort and performance, 
and in turn between performance and reward, so that ultimately there is a 
perceived relationship between effort and reward.
Based on the expectancy model, two situations will destroy the whole process of 
determination of behaviour pattern. The first situation is that there is a clear 
breakdown of the relationship among the factors of concern. If the person who is 
going to act and behave cannot identify any existence of relationship between 
effort and performance, or between performance and reward, then he is only left 
to act in the least way to save effort and minimise the negative impact thereof. 
For example, if a person considers that he can never achieve the task no matter 
how much effort he wishes to provide (such as achieving an ideal level of 
budgeted performance), which leads to a result that he can never obtain any 
rewards (salaries or bonus) associated with such task performance, then he will 
choose to provide minimal effort in his job, disregarding if the resulting 
performance is worse or not. The same behaviour will be observed if the person 
finds out no matter how good his performance is, he will only be paid a basic 
salary which is fixed irrespective of any improvement in performance. In these 
conditions the expectancy model still applies, but the problem is that the value 
assignment to the latter two factors becomes zero:
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Behaviour = Min E + IP + IV 
Where P = 0, V = 0
An exception to this situation applies to those people who are fond of work or 
even workaholics, since these people enjoy work in itself. Also in order to 
restore the expectancy relationship, coercive forces and / or penalties for failed 
task performance are proposed by many organisational theorists where situations 
warrants. With the use of coercive forces or penalties, a negative value is 
assigned to performance and reward factors, so that people although gaining 
nothing by their positive behaviour, but are nevertheless forced to behave in a 
way to avoid negative results. These coercive forces and subsequent penalties 
can either be a physical measurement (such as a tough and close supervision), or 
they can be applied through the use of accounting and other informational system 
controls. The use of accounting controls in the context of expectancy theory as a 
motivational device or a controlling device has been proved to be successful in 
different circumstances (Ronen and Livingstone 1975, Otley et al 1990).
The second situation that will distort the application of the expectancy model in 
identifying behavioural patterns is the remoteness of perceived relationship
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between the factors due to uncontrollable variables such as event uncertainty or 
data inaccessibility. In a world of imperfect information and asymmetric 
distribution of information, the simple case of certainty usually does not apply to 
most of the decision and action situations in practice. Since there is uncertainty 
about the performance or reward factors, the decision is unable to calculate a 
single value for his expected effort. Rather there will be different possible results 
arising from his expected effort, which lead to different values as judged by the 
decision maker on each possibility. Therefore, the possible outcomes of 
performance and reward have to be represented by some statistical models of 
analysis that provide a cluster of event payoff probabilities for people to 
consider. When the factor of uncertainty is introduced, the expectancy model 
will be framed in a different way:
Behaviour -  IE + £  Ri IP + £  Ri R2IV ----------  (3)
Where Ri = probability that task performance is observed,
R2 = probability that performance leads to reward
In a business context, a manager can often determine how much effort is to be 
provided, because his principal may not observe and determine whether he is
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contributing enough effort to his assigned duties. However, based on his effort, 
there may be different possible outcomes of performance, each level of 
performance having a probability of turning into occurred performance. Because 
the manager will probably assign different intrinsic values to the various levels of 
performance, he will find that the actual satisfaction level depends on which 
performance level is realised by his effort. For the purpose of arriving at an 
estimation or expectation of his realised values, the manager has to make use of 
certain method to determine the aggregate value of possible outcomes given his 
effort. Moreover, if given a level of performance is observed, there are different 
possible rewards that may be obtained by the manager, then the manager again 
has to make use of some method to determine the aggregate value of possible 
rewards given a particular performance. The resultant behavioural pattern will 
depend on under what methods the manager accounts for the aggregate values of 
performance and the aggregate values of rewards. No matter which method is 
used, however, the calculated values become more and more remote and 
indeterministic as the probability occurrence of performance and reward become 
more and more uncertain and unpredictable, to the extreme when probability 
distribution is completely unavailable, the relationship among the factors breaks 
down as if there is no relationship whatsoever among these factors. Thus in 
order to withhold the expected relationship among these factors, the probability
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distribution of different possible events must be established in some acceptable 
way as perceived by the business manager. With reference thereto it is proposed 
that people will try to take actions to reduce the degree of uncertainty and 
increase the degree of predictability in order that he can construct his own 
behavioural pattern according to his value perception and expectations.
Moreover, as proposed in the agency literature, the principal cannot observe the 
effort of the agent in many cases. Thus there are cases where a manager can 
provide less effort and arrive at a sub-optimal performance without affecting his 
predetermined rewards. Combining the agency literature with the expectancy 
model, it is obvious that a manager will, based on the corporate rewards system 
and other observed benefits (monetary or otherwise), calculate the possible 
expected outcomes of his behaviour pattern with reference to efforts and 
performance, to arrive at an optimal decision choice that will grant him maximum 
utilities in expectation. And because the manager is resourceful, he can often 
shift his decision choices even if the rewards and other systems change for the 
purposes of invoking desirable behaviour as advocated in the agency literature, 
so that his expected total utilities are still maximised under the new and revised 
circumstances.
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The Framework of Decision Behaviour 
And the Adoption of the Opportunity Cost Approach
With the context of the behavioural decision theory, the agency theory, and the 
expectancy theory, a framework of decision making behaviour is constructed for 
tests and verification. Before the proposed model is put up for substantiation, 
certain issues have to be clarified. As stated by Hogarth (1991), researchers 
looking at the decision making behaviour focus their work on three questions:
1. How well do people perform particular mental tasks?
2. How do people perform particular [decision] tasks? And
3. How can you help people perform better? (page 278).
Although the above three issues are core concerns and deserve much effort in 
providing insights thereof, it is impossible to incorporate all these three issues in 
a single research study, and thus this research study will only emphasise on the 
second issue to gain an insight of how do people make use of different 
accounting models to perform decision tasks.
How Well do People Make Decisions
In the process of decision making, people will go through the processes of 
information processing, identifying the possible alternative actions and their
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relative consequences, and assessing the risks that have to be borne in the light of 
possible errors in making judgement. People under normal circumstances which 
allow them to maximise their expected utility, are expected to select a particular 
choice of action that gives the highest likelihood to achieve their perceived 
objective in making the decision. Although it is impossible to directly observe 
the cognitive process of human beings in making decisions (Buchanan 1973), 
cognitive researches in auditing has demonstrated that it is possible to assess how 
well a decision has been made in a retrospective mode, when a comparison is 
made to test how close the chosen decision and action are in achieving the 
expected results (e.g., Ashton & Ashton 1988). However, since these research 
studies mainly focus on the arena of auditing tasks, it is uncertain if any results 
and conclusions arising from such research studies can be applied to other tasks 
specific situations, because different task representations may affect the 
behaviour of the decision makers (Hogarth 1991). With regarding to the general 
business environment, there is a lack of sizeable volume of literature that can 
provide any concrete insights of how well business decisions have been made by 
managers (Jensen & Mackling 1994, Hammer & Champy 1995).
Apart from the lack of sufficient reference literature in pursuing a study of how 
well managers make decisions in the business environment, the following issues
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also lead to a deferment by the candidate of such studies to a later stage, not until 
the issue of how people make decisions has been thoroughly studied and 
understood in the cognitive decision researches. These issues include:
1. The impossibility of assessing the validity of a decision in an integrated,
retrospective sense.
2. The uncertainty of whether decision makers in fact always aim at making
optimal decisions
3. The difficulty in the calculation of error parameter in making sub-optimal
decisions
The Impossibility of Assessing Integrated Decision Validity
As proposed by some researchers (e.g., Ashton & Ashton 1988), it is possible to 
assess how well a decision is made by looking at how close (or how far) the 
actual results brought by this decision and choice of action adheres to the 
expected results. However, the retrospective assessment of decision validity 
only gives an illusion of the whole situation. In this kind of validation process, 
only the selected course of action is checked to see if it really hits the target, or
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how far this chosen action misses the desired objective. However, the possible 
outcomes of other alternatives that originally can be chosen are discarded and 
have not been taken into consideration. There is a possibility that some of these 
discarded alternatives actually provide a better result than the chosen action, but 
this situation will not be known, because these discarded alternatives are not 
tested in any way to see if they achieve the desired objective more effectively. 
Since the discarded alternatives are not retrospectively tested and compared with 
the chosen action, a person can never know how well he has made a decision by 
selecting a particular choice of action and giving up all other alternatives. Once 
the alternatives are discarded, the actual results (which are possibly different 
from their calculated or expected results) that would be brought by the adoption 
of such alternatives then disappear and would never be known to any one else. 
This irrevocability of decision making process thus leads to the situation that the 
decision maker can only observe the results of the chosen alternative, and thus 
form a partial judgement as to how well the decision has been made (Ijiri 1981).
To provide a comprehensive measurement and analysis of how well a person 
makes decision, the only possible way is to go back to the original situation and 
look at the actual outcomes by selecting other alternatives. Since this mode of 
comprehensive analysis is virtually impossible, therefore the retrospective
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assessment of decision validity is usually adopted. I am not saying that assessing 
the partial validity of decision judgement is completely useless, rather continuous 
improvement of decision judgement in the partial sense enables the decision 
maker to make better decisions and obtain greater benefits. I just wish to point 
out the inherent limitations in the work of measuring and assessing how well do 
people perform mental tasks and make decisions, which can be solved only if the 
REMM model is proved to be valid in the explanation of decision behaviour. 
Thus, the present research study can provide a support to the future research 
studies of assessing decision validity.
The Uncertainty of Decision Objectives
Not withstanding the inability in measuring and assessing the comprehensive 
validity of decision process, these measurements have to be based on the 
presumption that the decision maker wants to make "good" decisions. As 
interpreted in the partial sense in above, a possible way to measure how well a 
decision has been made is to look at how close the actual results of the selected 
alternative adhere to the expected results. To ensure that a comparison process 
can made between expected results and actual results, it is crucial that the 
decision objective and the perceived expected results are calculated and 
ascertained at the time of decision. However, unless otherwise clearly
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announced by the decision maker, it is difficult for an observer to determine what 
is the real objective of the decision maker in making decisions, and this in turn 
leads to an uncertainty of what constitutes expected results. In the absence of a 
clear indication of a decision objective and of expectations, it is vary hard, if not 
impossible, to measure and assess how well a decision has been made, and how 
well do people perform decisions. It is clear that whether a decision is good or 
bad can only be determined by the decision maker himself / herself, because only 
he / she really knows about the objective and the desired results in making the 
decision.
Even if the decision objective and expected results are made known to the 
observer other than the decision maker himself, the studies of how well people 
perform mental judgmental process and decision making choices still face the 
problem of ordinal comparison as a constraint to the determination of decision 
fitness. An assessment of fitness involves the abstract conception of value 
judgement and interpretation, which is unable to be analysed and presented in a 
simple, cardinal scale. It is safe to conclude that a decision that leads to an 
achievement of 90% of the original expected result is better than its alternative 
which can only achieve 80% of the expected result. But it is very hard to provide 
a satisfactory answer in stating how far the first alternative is '’better" than the
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second one, other than a simple, superficial response of stating that the first 
alternative earns 10% more. The problem emerges here is that a cardinal scale 
system is often used to represent an ordinal ranking process, which leads to a 
trap of misinterpreting the ordinal results in a cardinal sense. If the decision 
objective is to fill up a bag with 100 units of commodities, then an alternative 
that brings in 150 units is as good as another alternative that brings in 200 units. 
The quantitative difference in this case between the two alternatives does not 
bring in any ranking difference in the ordinal sense, and thus any proposed 
discrimination between the two alternatives is inappropriate, other things being 
constant.
Moreover, there is not sufficient evidence that people always want to make 
"good" decisions. Although in the classical economic context people are always 
assumed to act in a rational way, modem management literature has already 
abandoned this presumption and recognised that there are times when people 
make irrational decisions and perform judgement without any wish of obtaining 
rational or desired results (Rowe et al 1994). In these circumstances, an attempt 
to measure "how well" a decision has been made will result in a total loss. For if 
a decision is made for some irrational objective, it is arguable if a decision that 
achieves such irrational decision objective can be regarded as a "good" decision
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from the general view. One may argue that the decision is still a good decision if 
it can help to achieve the objective of the decision maker, be it a rational or 
irrational objective (Hayek 1935). However, from the theoretical perspective 
only decisions that can improve the welfare and benefit of the decision maker can 
be regarded as good decisions, and in most cases an irrational decision objective 
will invoke actions that reduce the benefits obtainable by the decision maker to a 
greater or lesser extent. The controversy in the definition of good decisions 
under these circumstances thus renders a measurement and assessment of how 
well people perform mental decision process falling into a mist of uncertainty 
(Hogarth 1991).
The Difficulty in the Calculation of Error Parameter
Another restriction to the study of how well a decision has been made relates to 
the difficulty in calculating the error parameter of the decision alternatives. 
Although ideally it is in the people's best interests if people can always make best 
decisions. In practice, however, it is unrealistic to imagine that any person can 
make best decision in every single case. It is also proposed that in many cases a 
person does not need to make the best decision (Toda 1962). Decisions, in many 
cases, are not isolated actions but rather part of a series of decision chains that 
interact with each other in building up a chain effect of ultimate results. There
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are many cases when an apparent isolated decision choice subsequently proves to 
have significant impact to the decision maker and the environment and affect 
other decision choice consequences unexpected by the decision maker. The 
existence of this kind of unexpected chain effects in the decision processes brings 
out the issue of when to determine whether a decision is erroneous and how great 
is the committed error (Einhom and Hogarth 1981).
The first problem in measuring the error parameter is the fact that a decision that 
is optimal in itself does not necessarily bring to optimal results for subsequent 
decisions, and vice versa. If one can successfully calculate all the chain effects 
of individual decision choices, then he can safely assess the resultant opportunity 
profits and losses of the whole series of decision chains and select the best 
combination of decision choices in arriving at the best results in the total and 
ultimate sense. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, a person may 
not even aware of the possible chain effects that could have possibly arisen, so 
that the potential opportunity costs are not taken into calculation at all. Thus in 
the presence of potential opportunity costs and the reversibility of decision 
effects, a choice has to be made if decisions are assessed at the time when it is 
made and with respect to its direct consequences under the principle of bounded 
rationality (Simon 1957), or if the assessment are continuously revised as and
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when new impacts are identified, until the time when it is certain that the chain 
effects of the original decision have ended? The second alternative of course 
would result in an impossibility of calculation of decision value and error 
parameter in most of the decision cases. In fact it can be argued that application 
of the bounded rationality principle in a decision case is the only feasible way in 
arriving at the best decision compatible with the general decision theories. But 
the problem of adopting this approach is that a manager may give up any concern 
of what would happen in the long run by hiding behind the bounded rationality 
principle. It is well understood that as the time frame of concern extends farther 
into the future, more and more uncertainties and potential opportunities will 
appear, making the calculation of the chain effects of any immediate decision 
choices more difficult. Thus a consideration of long run effects by its inherent 
nature must involve risks and uncertainty, and a higher degree of magnitude in 
the error of judgement. Given a consideration of long run is regarded as desired 
in the business environment (Drucker 1991), the calculation of error parameter 
among decision alternatives in the presence of unidentified chain of effects seems 
to be an inevitable problem in assessing how well a decision has been made.
A closely related problem in the measurement of the error parameter is that since 
people do not always need to make best decisions, sub-optimal decisions are not
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necessarily dysfunctional. Repeating the same simple example in the previous 
section, if the decision maker only aims at filling up a box which requires 100 
units to fill it up, then an alternative of getting 150 units is as good as another 
alternative that brings in 200 units, since both alternatives can meet the decision 
objective. Based on the task orientation argument people will view it perfectly 
functional to take the alternative and obtain 150 units, even though the other 
alternative of obtaining 200 units is also well known to the decision maker. The 
problem here is whether the alternative of obtaining 150 units only should be 
regarded as a sub-optimal solution with errors committed in the sense that 50 
units less have been obtained. One may argue that the 150 units alternative is an 
erroneous choice because although in the present situation only 100 units are 
required, the decision maker should nevertheless get 200 units now and leave 
100 units for future uses if all other concerns are indifferent between these two 
alternatives. This argument emphasises the results of the decision alternatives by 
themselves, and assumes that people always favour more endowment than less; 
but it disregards the basic issue of a person's need to make decisions.
How do People Perform Mental Decision Processes
Because of the issues and problems stated in the previous section, it is suggested 
that research effort should be focused on the more basic question of how do
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people perform mental decision processes. I of course admits that it is very 
important to identify how well are decisions being made. The problem is what 
we should know is not equivalent to what we can find out and know about. 
Moreover, it is strongly argued that unless and until sufficient evidence have 
been obtained for a thorough understanding of how people make decisions, it is 
rarely fruitful to jump one step and assess how well people have made decisions. 
To substantiate this argument, the following reasons are put forward:
1. A Study of Fact must Precede A Study of Rationale
Although to date research, notably in the auditing profession, has been 
carried out in identifying the process of judgement and decision making by 
the decision maker [auditor], most of these researches have been focused 
on some restricted tasks that are isolated from the more general and 
complex environment in which judgement and decisions are made 
(Hogarth 1991). Thus there still lacks a comprehensive and thorough 
understanding of how people perform the decision and judgmental process 
in different environments. However, it is a priori crucial concern for a 
person's decision behaviour be observed and studied before an assessment 
of how well such decision has been made. With the presumption that 
people make judgement and decisions based on some predetermined
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objectives, there are three possible circumstances that are needed to be 
clarified upon:
A. Given people have determined to achieve an objective, they will 
make the same decision and take the same action disregarding the 
changes of circumstances.
B. People change their decision and behaviour under different 
circumstances in order to achieve the same predetermined objective.
C. People modify or change their decision objective when the 
circumstances have changed, and in turn people modify their 
judgement and decision behaviour to suit for the new decision 
objective.
To enable any assessment of decision behaviour, it is crucial in the first 
place to have a thorough understanding about how people behave in 
respect to different circumstances and the reasons and rationale that induce 
them to behave in such a way. In light of the environmental factors and 
their impacts, a decision maker will decide to go ahead with his decision
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and act in the predetermined manner if he considers that the circumstances 
have not contravened his opportunity for success with the chosen actions. 
He may select to change his decision behaviour if given the circumstances 
he considers that only by modifying his behaviour can he have a chance to 
achieve his predetermined objective. The decision maker can also find 
that the circumstances are in such a situation that he will not have any 
chance to achieve the original objective, so that he has to modify his 
original objective to suit the circumstances. However, there is little 
knowledge about what factors would constitute the circumstantial 
perception of the decision maker, and how he would be affected by the 
different compositions of these factors either in a mutually independent 
state of occurrence or interacting together in a matrix context.
2. How Managers Act is More Important
It is recognised that an understanding of the rationale of behaviour is 
important in the study of decision behaviour. However, from a functional 
perspective and in the role of the observer, an understanding of how 
managers actually behave assumes a more direct and important role in the 
prediction and adjustment of decision behaviour. From a positive view 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1990), it is not necessary for a researcher to
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understand the underlying rationale of a person's decision behaviour, rather 
it is more important if the research can accurately predict how the person 
under study will behave in different moderated situations. As long as 
decision behaviour can be observed and predicted, decision consequences 
can more easily be calculated and predicted, so that moderating actions, if 
needed, can be implemented well before to safeguard the occurrence of 
desired behaviour. By taking the positive approach, it is not necessary if 
people would have the same common belief or shared values. If people 
can arrived at some agreed behaviour which provide benefits to all parties 
concerned in the achievement of their respective objectives, then they will 
observe this agreed behaviour and act accordingly. Behavioural 
congruence can thus be formed for the mutual benefits of the parties 
concerned.
To operationalise the study of decision behaviour in the understanding of 
circumstantial factors, a theoretical framework which is called the Expectancy 
Decision Processing Model, and which is constructed with reference to the 
decision behaviour theories, the REMM model, the agency theories, and the 
adoption of the opportunity cost concept in different decision situations is 
proposed herewith and illustrated in Figure 2.
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The Expectancy Decision Processing Model is constructed with the aids of the 
REMM model, the Expectancy Theory, the Behavioural Decision Theories, and 
the Theory of Choice which constitute the comer stone for the concept of 
opportunity costs. The basic framework of analysis for the model is as follows. 
With the presumption that the decision maker has in mind a certain 
predetermined or modified decision objective, it is argued that the decision maker 
would either modify the state of existence of the factors under concern, or modify 
his selection choice of decision behaviour, or both, in order that he can have a 
greater chance of achieving his desired objective. With reference to the adoption 
of the opportunity cost approach in the decision making process, it is understood 
that the opportunity cost approach is just one of the many costing approaches 
that can be invoked and used by the decision maker. It is also well known that 
different costing approaches will arrive at different results (Clark 1923, Homgren 
1986). These cost results then act as an indication for the ranking of preference 
orders among different decision alternatives, in a way that different cost models 
give a different preferential ranking list with alternatives placed in different 
positions. An alternative that ranks first in respect to one model may rank in a 
much lower position if another cost model is adopted. Thus the adoption of a 
particular cost model and cost approach affects the final selection and adoption 
of a particular decision alternative and the taking of certain decision behaviour by
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the decision maker. As a corollary a decision maker will only adopts the 
opportunity cost approach if he finds out that the opportunity cost model would 
give him a desired calculation and ranking process that points to his desired 
behaviour in the achievement of the predetermined decision objectives. 
However, as discussed in the previous sections, a decision maker may or may not 
adjust his decision behaviour or even decision objectives (which would again 
lead to an adjustment of behaviour) under different circumstances, thus there is a 
possibility that a decision maker would select the opportunity cost approach to 
aid him in the decision process in one situation of circumstances, but alter to 
select another cost approach when the conditions change. Previous research has 
proposed that decision behaviour is a function of task characteristics, decision 
maker characteristics, and the interaction between the two (Hogarth 1993, Peters 
1993). However, it is argued that other factors also contribute to the explanation 
of decision behaviour in a commercial environment apart from task 
characteristics and decision maker characteristics. With reference to the 
expectancy theory, it is also argued that perceived reward structure also forms an 
important factor in the determination of decision behaviour. Therefore, in order 
to have a clearer understanding of how people perform decision and judgement, 
and under what circumstances would they select the opportunity cost accounting 
model and approach, research is to be carried out to identify the factors that
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would affect the decision maker's choice in the selection of the opportunity cost 
model in the decision process. At the initial analysis, it is proposed in the first 
place that certain factors exert more influence to the decision maker's behaviour 
in the decision making process.
The Organisation Setting
A manager makes decision in a particular organisational setting. Every 
individual organisation has its own peculiar settings. These organisations differ 
in many aspects, such as the nature of business, the corporate culture and the 
management philosophy, and size of the firm, the background of its staff team, 
the accounting information system that is adopted, and performance evaluation 
and reward calculation system, and many others. All these factors when acting 
together form a peculiar organisational setting within which a manager is to make 
decisions. Some of the factors that contribute to the particular mode of 
organisational setting may be adjustable by the manager within a short period. 
However, other factors may not be adjustable unless and until a complete 
restructuring of the organisation is undertaken. The peculiarity of individual 
organisation in its setting often forms a constraint or boundary for a manager to 
restrict his choice of actions in different situations, and in some cases it can even 
modify the behaviour of its staff (Hofstede et al 1990). Disregarding the
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socialisation process of organisational setting, at least it is argued that 
organisational setting will affect the attitude and behaviour of a manager in 
making decisions, because except in rare cases a manager cannot make any 
decision that is completely contradictory to the established setting of his 
organisation. Among the different factors that contribute to the organisational 
setting, two factors are particularly viewed as more influential to the manager's 
decision behaviour:
1. Accounting Information System
According to law every limited company, private or public, must maintain 
a full set of financial books for the recording of the transactions and affairs 
of the company (Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, Chapter 32). This set 
of financial books will enable the directors (accountants) of the firm to 
prepare the set of financial statements including the balance sheet, the 
profit and loss accounts, and other statements to be presented to the 
shareholders of the firm at the annual general meeting. Moreover, the 
Companies Ordinance has laid down some prescriptions and guidelines as 
to the kind of information that have to be presented to the knowledge of 
the shareholders.
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However, with respect to internal operations, there has not been any 
prescription in the Regulations that a company must maintain any set of 
cost and managerial accounts, and thus the maintenance of a management 
accounting system is purely at the discretion of the management of the 
firm. As a corollary, some companies maintain a cost and management 
accounting system, while other firms do not. And to the companies that 
maintain a management accounting system, the format and context of this 
system vary according to the perceived requirements of individual 
managers. Because of the variety in the design and operations of a 
management accounting system by different firms, different information 
will be provided accordingly. The core concern is that in most cases a 
financial accounting system general prescribed in Hong Kong does not 
provide opportunity cost information, and neither do many management 
accounting system. In the absence of an accounting system or database 
that can provide opportunity costs for decision making purposes, managers 
will find it very difficult to apply the approach, and the application of such 
an opportunity cost approach may well enhance the degree of uncertainty 
in the process. Although ad hoc opportunity cost information may be 
searched for and obtained by the manager, such search processes increase 
the level of required effort which contribute to a greater level of negative
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value as asserted in the expectancy value model, and thus managers are 
unwilling to do so unless there is concrete evidence that the positive values 
generated by the decision using such opportunity cost approach well 
exceed the additional effort required for such. Accordingly it is proposed 
that unless a company has maintained a management accounting system or 
database that is capable of providing opportunity cost data, otherwise in its 
absence managers of the company will obtain opportunity cost information 
in decision making processes less frequently. Parallel to this argument, the 
adoption of the opportunity cost model and approach requires in general an 
advanced management accounting system that is capable of providing 
sophisticated accounting information including the opportunity cost 
information. Moreover, maintenance of an advanced management 
accounting system reflects the level of sophistication of management of the 
firm, which is required in the use of the opportunity cost model for 
analysis. Thus it is hypothesised that the adoption rate of the opportunity 
cost model would depend on the degree of advancement of the 
management accounting system maintained by the company:
HI: The more advanced a management accounting system is
maintained the higher will be the adoption rate of the 
Opportunity Cost Model in decision cases.
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The Reward and Compensation System
Managers usually receive reward and other compensation packages in 
accordance with prescribed criteria, such as a fixed monthly salary plus a 
bonus that is based on a certain relationship with managerial or corporate 
performance. As advocated by many researchers and scholars, the 
rewards of managers must be related, to a greater or lesser extent, either to 
his personal performance or to the departmental performance concerned 
(Flower 1971, Watts & Zimmerman 1990). When rewards are related to 
performance, the system of reward calculation may have a direct effect to 
the final determination of the level of performance of the manager and the 
amount of rewards he is going to receive. To maximise his personal 
reward in a certain period, a manager is often tempted to perform in such a 
way that would maximise his own rewards in accordance with the 
prescribed rewarding system, even though it is not in the company's 
interests (Moizer & Pratt 1988). Because of the specification of the 
reward system, attitudes to perform in a way to maximise required 
performance would even be encouraged by top management, albeit such 
biased performance will probably lead to some unfavourable results in 
other aspects. A problem usually arises here, however, that optimal
decision performance is often distinctive from perceived performance as 
reflected by the normal accounting reports, thus initiating a conflict 
between a choice of selecting optimal decision choice or the sub-optimal 
choice that maximises reporting performance, at least in the short run 
(Anthony et al 1984).
To enable a reward to be calculated on some objective basis, the formulae 
of calculation is often linked to some form of accounting profitability or to 
investment return. These kinds of accounting related formula are 
inevitably suffered from two defects. The first issue is that since 
accounting calculations are subject to arbitrary selection of accounting 
treatments in numerous items of concern, managers can either select his 
own preferred choice of accounting treatments, or manipulate his personal 
or divisional performance to suit for the prescribed accounting choice. 
The second issue in terms of decision making is that data used for decision 
making is different from the data that are incorporated in the accounting 
report, so that an optimal decision may lead to an unfavourable accounting 
report in the initial accounting periods, and vice versa. Since performance 
evaluation and reward calculation are based on the reporting figures, the 
system will in many cases drive or induce a manager to behave in a way to
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maximise reported performance rather than optimal decision performance 
(Solomons 1965, Flower 1971). Following the logic of these arguments, it 
is immediately apparent that the adoption of opportunity cost concept 
encounters difficulty in the decision making progress, as this concept 
requires data that are not employed and recorded in the normal or routine 
financial and managerial accounting system. Thus the results arrived at 
under the opportunity cost concept are surely to be different from the 
subsequent accounting reports, and unfortunately the magnitude of 
difference is in many cases inversely related, forcing the manager to face 
the dilemma that selecting optimal decision choices [under the opportunity 
cost approach] would mean a deteriorated performance report (at least in 
the initial years). With reference to the arguments of Solomons (1965), 
Flower (1971), and Moizer & Pratt (1988), it is hypothesised that a 
manager will not invoke the opportunity cost concept in decision making 
processes unless the same approach is also used for performance 
evaluation and reward calculation purposes. This argument is also 
compatible with the context of expectancy theory, when the decision 
maker perceives that a particular effort (the act of using the opportunity 
cost approach to make decisions) cannot produce successful task 
performance that carries some forms of reward, or even produces a
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counter effect on the positive values of performance and rewards, he is not 
willing to provide the effort but rather he will select to make use of 
alternative effort in securing his value perception. Based on these 
propositions the second hypothesis is formed:
H2 : The Lesser the Use of the Opportunity Cost Concept in the 
Performance Evaluation and Reward Calculation System, 
the Less Frequent a Manager will invoke the Concept in 
Decision Making Processes.
The Task Characteristics
Task characteristics are long recognised as one of the main factors in affecting 
and modifying decision behaviour (Hogarth 1993, Peters 1993). Two aspects of 
task characteristics are of greater concern here. The first issue in studying task 
characteristics relates to the matching of task characteristics with decision maker 
characteristics. Different decision makers possess different characteristics in 
various aspects such as personal attributes including personality and cognitive 
styles. These differences in personal attributes lead to different perception of 
task characteristics, which in turn lead to different reactions and decision 
behaviour even though the same decision situation is faced by the collective 
decision makers (Gul 1984). The second issue relates to the barriers or 
constraints that are created by the task characteristics. There are often
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constraints in a decision situation that restricts a decision maker's choice of 
actions, and task characteristics form a major source of constraints. From a 
broad base of categorisation, task can be categorised in the following aspects.
Task Difficulty
Task performance can only be achieved with effort. However, the various 
requirements of the level of effort for the accomplishment of a task performance 
contribute to the classification of task difficulty. In general task difficult refers to 
the possibility of fulfilling task requirements in achieving the desired objectives 
of performing the tasks. A task is classified as on low difficulty if it is perceived 
that the task can be accomplished with little effort, and there are no foreseeable 
constraints that will restrict the possibility of completing the task. On the other 
hand, a task is classified as on high difficulty if it is perceived highly unlikely that 
the task can be completed, either because the level of effort required for the task 
is very great, or there are problematic issues that are very hard to be solved, or 
both. For example, the degree of task difficulty in carrying two books from one 
classroom to another classroom is completely different from carrying two cases 
of books between the same venues. Although different people perceive task 
difficulty in a different way, ranging from a strong stimulation to a painful 
deterrent in accomplishing a task, the degree of task difficulty however has direct
- 160-
effect to the probability of achieving task performance.
As stated above, based on the expectancy theory a decision maker's behaviour is 
a function of the efforts, expected performance, and expected rewards. In a 
world of imperfect conditions, the functional relationship between the decision 
maker's behaviour and the factors of concerned is expressed by the formula as 
stipulated before:
Behaviour = IE + £  Ri IP + £  RL R2 IV -----------------  (3)
The degree of task difficulty, among its other impacts, has a direct effect to the 
determination of Ri, which is the probability that a particular level of task 
performance is achieved. Originally there is always a desired relationship 
between the provision of effort and the achievement of task performance, so that 
a person can reasonably calculate how much effort he should provide in 
achieving some desired task performance. However, as a task becomes more 
and more difficult, a person will be less confident of holding the task 
performance with proposed effort, and thus it is also more and more imprecise 
that a particular level of effort will lead to a desired level of task performance. 
This change in perception may be at a greater of slower rate, depending on the
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personal characteristics. However, no matter it is at a faster or slower rate in the 
reduction of the confidence level in accomplishing a task, such deterioration of 
confidence occurs anyway as the task difficulty increases. Thus among others 
the probability, Ri is a function of task difficulty. Moreover, since the 
calculation of expected rewards is affected by the perceived probability of task 
performance, R2 is also indirectly by task difficulty.
Task Uncertainty
Although task uncertainty is one of the main causes contributing to task 
difficulty, I propose to assess task uncertainty in a separate role due to its 
peculiar relationship with the concept of opportunity costs. Task uncertainty 
refers to the remoteness in the linkage between the provision of effort and the 
performance of outcome, such that the decision maker is uncertain of the choice 
of actions and the subsequent event payoffs of these choices. A major reason for 
the occurrence of task uncertainty is the lack of required data. If important data 
regarding choices of actions and / or possible outcomes are lacking, then the 
decision maker is placed in a mist of unidentified directions, wandering around 
the crossover without knowing which way he should go. Another major reason 
for task uncertainty is the cluster of possible outcomes arising from a single 
action or decision. When a decision or action may induce reactions of external
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parties that are totally beyond the control of the decision maker (or his company 
in a broader sense), and the cluster of possible external reactions is more than 
just a few, again achievement of the task performance will be subject to a vast 
degree of uncertainty. In general the greater the degree of task uncertainty, the 
more remote will be the relationship between effort and performance. The 
application of expectancy theory in explaining decision becomes harder in a 
situation of high uncertainty. However, as discussed in previous sections, in 
order to regain the linkage between effort, performance, and reward, action will 
be taken by a decision maker to reduce the degree of uncertainty inherent in the 
circumstances.
A combination of task uncertainty with the adoption of opportunity cost concept 
in a decision making process reveals that task uncertainty is greatly enhanced by 
the concept, which in its original context involve data that are dynamic and 
disconcrete in its very nature. Opportunity costs, unlike transaction costs, do not 
have realised cost data in most cases to justify its existence and magnitude, and 
thus estimation and subjective judgement have to be invoked in arriving at the 
opportunity costs data. Moreover, opportunity costs in an economic context 
involve the highest value foregone by selecting a particular decision alternative, 
where the calculation of value foregone is not necessarily restricted to basic
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accounting calculations. The inclusion of opportunity costs in the decision 
models render the decision maker to face more and more imprecise and uncertain 
data that damage the linkage between foreseen effort and expected performance, 
and thus in accordance with the expectancy theory, a decision maker will try to 
reduce task uncertainty and drop the opportunity cost concept in making 
decisions. Only by so doing can he gain more confidence about his possible 
rewards in making a particular decision choice. Based on these arguments the 
following hypotheses are further proposed:
H3 : The higher the degree of task difficulty in terms of effort
requirement and task complexity, the less likely will the 
opportunity cost concept be invoked in a decision making 
process by the decision maker.
H4 : The higher the degree of task uncertainty, the less likely will
the opportunity cost concept be invoked in a decision making 
process by the decision maker.
Taking the four hypotheses together, it is clear that the adoption or other wise of 
the opportunity cost concept in a decision making process is a function of and 
dependent upon the availability of appropriate information system, the degree of 
task complexity and task uncertainty, and the nature of the reward model which 
relates to expressed performance:
-164-
Decision Model Choice = IEm Ri IP Ri R2 IV
Where, IEm=  intrinsic value of the effort in making use of a
particular cost model
Ri = probability of successful task performance
given a particular cost model, expressed as 
f  (task difficulty, task uncertainty, cost model)
IP = intrinsic value of task performance given the
adoption of a particular cost model
R2 = probability of getting the reward with reference
to the measured task performance given the cost 
model
These four important issues are also compatible with the context of the 
expectancy theory. Although expectancy theory has been verified in many 
specific situations, the application of such in a decision making process with 
special reference to the adoption of the opportunity cost concept, which is 
regarded as a crucial concept and approach in decision theories from an 
economics perspective, still needs to be tested and verified for its possible 
validity in the business context. Tests of the proposed application model 
combining expectancy theory with opportunity cost model will be carried out and 
reported in the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
A FIELD STUDY OF THE DECISION BEHAVIOUR 
FROM AN ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE
To validate and substantiate the proposed framework and hypotheses as stated in 
the previous chapter, field researches are carried out to obtain evidence of how 
people make decisions in a commercial atmosphere. However, before such a 
research is carried out, a control test is first conducted in an academic perspective 
in order to identify if the proposed theories are valid in a controlled mode of 
circumstances. During the control test process a set of questionnaires is distributed 
to selected student groups to collect their views regarding decision behaviour and 
the adoption of the opportunity cost concept in the hypothetical business decision 
situations. The use of students as control groups is acceptable in previous doctoral 
studies performed by students of other institutes (Chan 1993). Moreover, making 
use of student groups as control groups can serve other functions in the validation 
of the proposed framework of theories. Firstly, most students have not got any 
professional and practical experience, and their ideas about decision theories are 
come from teachers and textbooks, that are regarded as more academic in nature.
So the students’ responses can be viewed as an academic perspective for subsequent 
comparison with the practising accountants and managers who may have taken some
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other approaches for decision making according to their real life experiences. 
Secondly, by way of selecting both accounting and non-accounting students for 
study, some insights can be revealed of the possible difference in decision making 
approaches between accounting students and students of other disciplines.
Selection of Student Groups for the Control Test
In the process of selecting students groups for the purposes of this control test, three 
student groups are selected:
1. Full time final year students who are taking undergraduate course of BA 
(Hons) in Accounting. These students have received three years' accountancy 
training and are supposed to have acquired adequate accounting knowledge 
both from an academic or professional perspective. Moreover, the candidate 
has taught this group of students so that the candidate can be sure that this 
student group has learned about the concept and application of the 
opportunity cost concept. To substantiate this assertion, some preliminary 
questions have also been given to the students to ensure that they have 
adequate knowledge about the opportunity cost concept. On the other hand, 
student records have been checked to ascertain that most of the accounting 
students have no working experience at any managerial level in the 
commercial field.
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2. Full time final year students who are taking undergraduate course of 
BA(Hons) in Business Administration. These students have taken two 
modules in management accounting and thus acquired basic knowledge about 
the concept and application of the opportunity costs in business decisions. 
However, as their core studies are management and business administration, 
the content and depth of knowledge regarding the management accounting 
modules are less advanced as those modules designed for accounting 
students. For example, these management students have no idea about the 
potential opportunity cost concept, and know little about the technical details 
in the collection, preparation and presentation of opportunity costs data. 
Another major difference between the management students and the 
accounting students is that about half of the students of this selected group 
have working experience in a commercial context from one year to more than 
three years, although most of them have not held any responsible position 
before taking the management course.
3. Part time first year students taking the master course in finance. These 
students are working in commercial firms during daytime, and only attend 
classes in the evening. The minimum working experience for these master
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students is about three years, with some students already working for over ten 
years. Moreover, many of the master students have already held managerial 
positions, such as financial controller, senior finance manager, senior 
financial analyst, and bank credit managers, and thus these students have had 
experiences in business decision making at the managerial level. Regarding 
knowledge about the concept and application of the opportunity costs in 
business decisions, records show that out of the sample population group only 
two students have taken undergraduate courses in accounting, while other 
students are graduated from courses of economics, business administration 
and finance. To test their knowledge about the opportunity cost concept, the 
same set of preliminary questions are asked, and results indicate that in 
general the master students have not acquired knowledge about the said 
concept at any level beyond those of the management students (the second 
test group).
The purpose of selecting three different groups of students in the control research 
is to ascertain whether results obtained in an academic atmosphere would be 
affected by some exogenous factors including previous teaching in the opportunity 
cost concept and the working status of the students. The accounting student group 
is selected to serve as the main control group. These students being final year
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students have received accountancy training for a few years, and the ways to analyse 
and solve issues in a decision case. In general they are taught to make use of the 
opportunity cost concept in decision cases. Therefore, presumably they are more 
confident than other student groups in applying the opportunity cost concept in 
decision cases. This great degree of confidence would lead them to a more positive 
attitude in the perceived relationship between the selection of the opportunity cost 
approach and the expected performance of a company. Thus with reference to the 
expectancy theories they are more ample in adopting the concept than other student 
groups. Moreover, since these accounting students do not have any commercial 
experience, their decision behaviour should reflect a more academic view as 
influenced by staff of the academia.
The management student group is selected to differentiate between accountancy 
training process and management training process. Although these students also 
receive accountancy training to some extent, since their core studies are 
management subjects, they are more influenced by their management lectureship. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, management writers advocate much on the 
importance of judgement in business decisions, and have rarely discussed about the 
application of the opportunity cost concept, the decision behaviour of management 
students (who are supposed to be influenced to a greater extent by these
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management writers) are probably different from the accounting students. 
Moreover, since these management students also do not have any significant 
working experience in the commercial world, their decision behaviour should 
similarly reflect a more academic view from the management perspective. By 
comparing the views of the accounting student group with the management student 
group, it is possible to identify the enduring influence between accountancy training 
and management training in terms of decision behaviour.
The group of master students, on the other hand, represents a mixed view between 
academics and business practitioners. Because these students have taken various 
courses in their undergraduate studies, they view about decision processes and the 
adoption of the opportunity cost concept do not represent the influence of any 
particular discipline in any collective sense. Moreover, these students being junior 
to middle managers have already accumulated experiences in business decisions 
through their career, and thus their decision behaviour should have been moderated 
by such real time experiences. Given the distinctive characteristics of the master 
students in terms of business experience, their collective view can be used to test the 
moderating effect of practical experiences to academic view regarding the adoption 
of the opportunity cost concept in decision processes.
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To collect data from the students a set of questionnaires is distributed to selected 
samples of the respective student groups. For the accounting students a simple 
random sample is selected, with sample size equal to 50% of the total population. 
Because of the small group size for management students and postgraduate finance 
students questionnaires are sent to all the students concerned. Accordingly 80 
questionnaires are sent to accounting students, 33 questionnaires to management 
students, and 20 questionnaires to the group of master students. Response rate 
ranges from 50% for master students to 35% for accounting students, with a total 
number of 53 questionnaires returned from students. Returned questionnaires are 
categorised and analysed according to group basis.
Organisational Setting
Students are asked in the first place, which proposed objectives are regarded by 
them corporate objectives of business corporations in general. Basically all 
responding students except two regard profit maximisation as either the sole 
business objective or one of the prime objectives of a business corporation. 
Roughly about half of the respondents in each group also regard provision of quality 
services to clients as a prime objective, while the respondents neglect other 
proposed business objectives. Thus in terms of perceived corporate objectives the
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views held by the student groups are very similar. The purpose of asking students' 
perception of corporate objectives is to establish a priori situation that all analyses 
are based on a unanimous view of recognised business objectives. Given the 
opinions of the responding students, the priori situation is confirmed. Students are 
then asked about their opinions regarding the operation and maintenance of 
accounting information systems.
Maintenance of Management Accounting Information System
The opinions of students regarding the operation and maintenance of accounting 
information systems are presented in Table 4 to 6 below. Table 4 lists out the 
respective views about the maintenance of a management accounting system:
Table 4: Maintenance of a Management Accounting System
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Financial system only is 
maintained
1 1 0
An integral system is 
maintained
7 19 14
An interlocking system is 
maintained
2 5 1
No management accounting 
system is maintained
0 3 0
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According to Table 4, most students irrespective of student groups consider it 
worthy to maintain an integral accounting system that includes both financial and 
management accounts. This reflects what has been taught in class and stated in 
textbooks (Drury 1992, Hansen & Mowen 1995). Although it is possible to 
maintain a management accounting system under the interlocking system mode, 
more recent discussions have restricted in the operation of integral accounting 
systems. Also it is surprising to find that, contraiy to the opinions of other student 
groups, three accounting students have opted to reject the maintenance of any 
management accounting system, which means they are in the opinion that the 
maintenance of such a system is not necessary nor functional. Before making 
further comments to the results, students' opinions about the maintenance of 
opportunity cost database is analysed below in Table 5 and 6:
Table 5: Maintenance of Opportunity Cost (OC) Database
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
OC database form part of the 
accounting system
4 13 5
OC database separately 
maintained
2 7 6
OC data only collected on ad 
hoc basis
4 6 3
OC data is not required by 
management in most cases
0 2 1
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Although in general more than half of the students consider it appropriate to 
maintain an opportunity cost database, only a portion of them agree that the 
opportunity cost database should be maintained as part of a management accounting 
system. About 30% of the students consider that ad hoc opportunity cost data can 
be obtained without the necessary maintenance of a formal opportunity cost 
database, or that opportunity cost data is not required by management in most cases.
An interest point here is that with reference to the textbook context and class 
teaching, opportunity cost data is seldom mentioned to be recorded in the normal 
accounting information system. Albeit it is possible to maintain opportunity costs 
data in the accounting routine, rarely can we find demonstrations in the accounting 
texts, as in many cases the opportunity cost data do not meet with the transaction 
judgement, and are hard to fit in with other "routine" accounting data. This possible 
incompatibility of accounting data with opportunity cost data in the normal 
accounting system has been indicated both in textbook and during class 
demonstrations (Drury 1992, Homgren & Foster 1991), thus in the absence of 
practical experience it is amazed at the fact that about half of the responding 
students in each group indicate their preference to include opportunity cost database 
as part of a management accounting information system.
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To clarify the situation, a small sample of accounting students are interviewed and 
asked about their view of including opportunity cost database in a management 
accounting information system. These students do not necessarily fit in with the 
group of students who hold such view, as the identity of the responding students to 
the questionnaires cannot be recognised in accordance with the norm of data 
collection process through questionnaires. However, the interviewed students do 
give some plausible explanations:
1. In examination questions opportunity cost data are given together with other 
accounting data for the calculation of decision payoffs. Thus students have 
the impression that opportunity cost data are maintained simultaneously with 
accounting data.
2. Students are led to realise the expanding role of the management accounting 
craft, which is no longer restricted to a simple technical model. Thus they 
form the view that in modem world a management accounting information 
system may have been designed in a way to incorporate other data which in 
older days were excluded from the old fashioned accounting systems.
176
As there is no question asking about the technical considerations in designing a 
management accounting information system, thus students feel that they only 
express what they think should be done, without any need to consider the feasibility 
or otherwise of their opinions. These kind of “academic” views are further 
enhanced when students are asked about the appropriateness of maintaining 
economic and quantitative data that at the outlook has nothing to do with a normal 
management accounting information system. The set of economic and quantitative 
data are carefully selected with reference to their possible degree of importance to 
a corporation for decision making purposes:
Table 6: Maintenance of Economic and Quantitative Information Database
MSc Accounting Management
Competitors' product price movement 10 28 15
Materials' price movement for main 
products
10 26 14
Relative utilisation rate of labour 9 19 10
General economic data of Hong Kong 6 17 9
General economic data of main export 
country
9 23 14
Product line profitability statistics 10 26 14
Input contribution ratios of company's 
input resources
9 25 9
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From the table it is obvious that students across the groups hold unanimous view 
that the stated economic and quantitative data should be maintained in the 
information database. As predicted these answers are well expected in an academic 
environment, because the problems and costs that are encountered in the 
maintenance of such are usually precluded or avoided in the general accounting texts 
(Kaplan & Atkinson 1989, Drury 1992, Homgren & Foster 1991, Hansen & Mowen 
1995). Students have expressed a view that is desired in an idealistic circumstance, 
so that better decisions are made in the presence of more useful information. 
Although the academic view does not necessarily represent business reality, the 
establishment of such view is crucial in the research for decision behaviour in the 
context of different decision environments and circumstances.
Rewarding System of Managers
The determination of rewards is a crucial element in the expectancy theory, and is 
expected to have significant influence to the decision behaviour of a manager. Thus 
it is inevitable to collect students’ opinion about the appropriate bases and criteria 
in calculating a manager's rewards. Although there are other benefits and rewards 
mechanism which are adopted in special circumstances (such as the share option 
schemes to key executives), basically the majority attention would direct to the way 
of determination of salaries and bonuses of managers. With reference to these two
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basic and universal units of compensation package to all and every business 
manager, students have expressed their opinion as presented in Table 7 and 8 below:
Table 7: Calculation of Salary Scales for Business Managers
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
A fixed scale across managers 
except annual increments (A)
0 4 3
A variable scale based on senior's 
comment on manager's 
performance (B)
4 14 4
A pre-determined scale linked to 
target achievement (C)
5 10 8
Other suitable criteria (B)+(C) 1 0 0
Note: The symbols of (A) to (C) refer to the sequence of proposed answer in the 
questionnaire
The proposed criteria or schemes of calculation of salaries are the common methods 
generally adopted in the commercial and service industries, including even non­
profit making organisations. Although the magnitude of salaries is not the sole 
reflection of achievement, it is however recognised as an indirect reflection of 
position status as well as the degree of perceived achievement within the 
corporation. Therefore virtually every manager would like to have a larger amount
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of salaries payment than others (especially those managers of the same rank and 
level) do. In this respect proposed scheme (A) cannot differentiate managers' ability 
other than their years of service. For proposed scheme (B) which relates manager's 
salaries with his own performance as perceived by senior management, the claimed 
advantage is that the sum of salaries are related to performance, so that managers 
have to perform well and contribute to the company for the return of a greater 
reward. This scheme is in general compatible with the expectancy theory and the 
agency theory. Proposed scheme (C) that relates salary payments with target 
performance achievement has the same advocacy with scheme (B). However, both 
schemes are subject to the technical risk of setting of performance measurement 
systems. The success or failure of a performance related salaries scheme is largely 
depended upon whether the performance measurement system is appropriately 
designed and operated to ensure that managerial performance are truly reflected 
through such a measurement system (Otley et al 1990). Despite the possible risks 
of technical deficiency, performance related salary schemes are advocated in general 
by both academics and practitioners (Hopwood 1974, Otley et al 1990, Drury 
1992). With reference to Table 7 the majority of students in fact follows the norm 
and advocates the performance related schemes for salary determination. Also 
students’ t-tests with unpaired matchings indicate a one tail t-value between 0.12 to 
0.31, showing that there is no significant difference in the opinions among the
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groups of students, although individual groups of students bias towards scheme (B) 
or scheme (C). Before further analyses are carried out at this point, opinions of 
students regarding the determination of bonuses are first looked at in Table 8 below. 
The proposed schemes of calculation are based on descriptions made in textbooks 
and professional articles and are regarded as commonly adopted methods in the 
business sector with majority of companies selecting one or more of the schemes as 
their bonus calculation schemes:
Table 8: Calculation of Bonus Payments for Business Managers
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Manager's own or departmental 
performance
5 15 7
Overall corporate profitability 1 3 6
Departmental performance with 
senior's subjective judgement
2 8 2
A fixed and pre-determined scale 0 1 0
Pure discretion of management 1 1 0
According to Table 8 students in general are still of the opinion that bonus payment 
of managers should also be related to his own performance or reflected in his 
departmental performance, although about one third of the accounting students also
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consider senior management’s judgement should be counted as well. However, an 
interesting finding lies on management students’ opinions, where 6 out of 15 students 
representing nearly 40% of the sample claim that bonus payment should be based 
on overall corporate profitability, and discrepancies in performance among 
individual departments should be disregarded. Less than 20% of the MSc finance 
students and the accounting students submit the same claim. The response of the 
management students in this respect is not totally compatible to their views about 
determination of salary scales (where they advocate much on performance related 
salaries payment schemes). If individual performance does not form the core basis 
for calculation of bonus payments, then there is a possible risk that, in the context 
of both the expectancy theory and the agency theory, managers would be tempted 
to become free riders, hoping that his improved bonus payments are based on others' 
hard working instead of his own contributed efforts. According to the expectancy 
theory, a manager in this situation has not perceived any direct relationship between 
his efforts and his expected rewards, and thus he will probably minimise his own 
efforts in order to maximise his total expected values.
Despite the exceptional view hold by a proportion of the management students, 
when the student views about salaries payment and bonus calculations are combined 
for a closer look, obviously the majority view holds that some form of performance
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related calculation models should be adopted in determining a manager's salaries 
and bonus payments. This is a reiteration of the extrinsic validity of the expectancy 
theory, that performance must be related to reward in order to invoke managers to 
improve their performance. However, despite the constructive validity of the 
expectancy theory, the content validity especially task and environmental constraints 
is still subject to more detailed investigation for a more functional application of the 
concept into practice. For the purposes of getting more understanding about 
decision behaviour, students are further asked more directly about their opinions 
under different decision circumstances.
Cognitive Decision Behaviour within an Academic Atmosphere
To start with an analysis of the cognitive decision behaviour of students within an 
academic atmosphere, where they are trained to follow certain decision traits and 
processes from a more academic and idealistic perspective, the students are first 
asked the basic question about the concept of opportunity cost concept. With 
reference to the accounting and management students it is sure that they have been 
told about the basic definition of the opportunity cost concept, that is, the highest 
value foregone from giving up other alternatives when a particular decision 
alternative is selected. This value displacement concept is explained to the students 
in their management accounting modules with an example which is widely used in
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other accounting courses and examined in professional examinations (such as the 
AICPA examination, 1982). However, surprising results are received from students:
Table 9: Definition of the Opportunity Costs
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Highest value foregone in 
selecting a alternative
9 21 12
Shadow price of input resources 0 2 2
Equal to the relevant cost concept 1 2 0
Cost definition is situational 0 2 0
Uncertain about its definition 0 1 1
Given the results of preliminary questions it is quite apparent that both the MSc 
finance students and the management students have little idea about the concept of 
shadow prices, thus it is within expectation that students of these groups will not 
select proposed answer (B) above as the definition of opportunity costs. The major 
surprise that is revealed from the students' choices is that, there are 7 accounting 
students representing 25% of the total respondents who do not select the told 
definition as their choices. Since the accounting students are the group of students 
who have gone through in-depth and thorough discussions about the concept and 
application of the opportunity cost concept, it is hard to imagine why one fourth of
the accounting students desert the well recognised definition of the opportunity cost 
concept. Bearing in mind the students' perception about the concept of opportunity 
costs, their opinions about decision circumstances are asked to establish the tasks 
and environmental characteristics. With reference to the framework of analysis, 
task characteristics are one of the hypothesised factors that affect the cognitive 
decision behaviour of a decision maker. Since the nature of different decisions 
exerts various degree of information demand and cost characteristics, a decision 
maker will possibly be affected to select different costs data in pursuing the decision 
processes of these decision situations. Table 10 below presents the opinions of the 
students regarding the possible adoption of different costs data under different 
decision situations. The relative frequency is denoted by its average frequency from 
1 to 5, with 1 being referred to in every decision case, and 5 means that the source 
data is not required:
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Table 10; Frequency of Data Sourcing for Different Decision Situations
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Data from Accounting system
Product pricing decisions 1.4 1.93 2.14
Asset replacement decisions 2.1 1.93 2.29
Asset acquisition decisions 2.0 2.39 2.14
Expansion of existing operations 1.6 1.61 2.43
Investment in new business line 1.9 2.14 2.50
Investment in new geographical 
area (excluding China)
2.1 2.18 2.00
Investment in the China market 2.0 2.18 2.14
Data from information 
database
Product pricing decision 1.6 1.89 2.07
Asset replacement decisions 2.2 1.79 2.50
Asset acquisition decisions 2.1 2.18 2.29
Expansion of existing operations 1.6 1.61 1.86
Investment in new business line 1.8 1.75 1.43
Investment in new area 1.8 1.89 1.93
Investment in the China market 1.7 1.64 1.79
Ad Hoc Internal Data
Product pricing decisions 2.4 2.57 2.54
Asset replacement decisions 2.8 2.54 2.46
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Asset acquisition decisions 2.8 2.50 2.46
Expansion of existing operations 1.8 1.89 2.31
Investment in new business line 1.7 2.18 1.92
Investment in new area 1.8 2.29 2.00
Investment in the China market 2.0 2.0 2.31
Ad Hoc External Data
Product pricing decisions 2.3 3.21 2.92
Asset replacement decisions 3.0 2.79 3.08
Asset acquisition decisions 2.9 2.43 2.46
Expansion of existing operations 2.2 2.11 2.23
Investment in new business line 1.7 1.82 1.85
Investment in new area 1.5 1.86 1.69
Investment in China market 1.3 1.71 1.77
Data Provided by Consultants
Product pricing decisions 3.3 3.21 2.79
Asset replacement decisions 3.6 3.29 3.07
Asset acquisition decisions 3.5 3.14 2.64
Expansion of existing operations 2.8 2.64 2.29
Investment in new business line 2.1 2.32 1.43
Investment in new area 1.9 2.07 1.34
Investment in China market 1.7 1.65 1.64
The same set of data is also rearranged with respect to types of decisions to show 
the relative data-retrieving rate of different data source under different decision 
situations:
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Table 11: Relative Data Retrieving Rate for Different Decision Situations
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Product Pricing Decisions
Data from accounting system 1.4 1.93 2.14
Data from information database 1.6 1.89 2.07
Ad hoc internal data 2.4 2.57 2.54
Ad hoc external data 2.3 3.21 2.92
Data provided by consultants 3.3 3.21 2.79
Asset Replacement Decisions
Data from accounting system 2.1 1.93 2.29
Data from information database 2.2 1.79 2.50
Ad hoc internal data 2.8 2.54 2.46
Ad hoc external data 3.0 2.79 3.08
Data provided by consultants 3.6 3.29 3.07
Asset Acquisition Decisions
Data from accounting system 2.0 2.39 2.14
Data from information database 2.1 2.18 1.86
Ad hoc internal data 2.8 2.50 2.46
Ad hoc external data 2.9 2.43 2.46
Data provided by consultants 3.5 3.14 2.64
Expansion in Existing Operations
Data from accounting system 1.6 1.61 2.43
Data from information database 2.2 2.11 2.23
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Table 11: Cont’d
Ad hoc internal data 1.8 1.89 2.31
Ad hoc external data 2.2 2.11 2.23
Data provided by consultants 2.8 2.64 2.29
Investment in New Business Line
Data from accounting system i.y 2. 14 2.SU
Data from information database 1.8 1.75 1.43
Ad hoc internal data 1.7 2.18 1.92
Ad hoc external data 1.7 1.82 1.85
Data provided by consultants 2.1 2.32 1.43
Investment in New Geographical 
Area (Excluding China Market)
Data from accounting system 2.1 2.18 2.00
Data from information database 1.8 1.89 1.93
Ad hoc internal data 1.8 2.29 2.00
Ad hoc external data 1.5 1.86 1.69
Data provided by consultants 1.9 2.07 1.34
Investment in the China Market
Data from accounting system 2.0 2.18 2.14
Data from information database 1.7 1.64 1.79
Ad hoc internal data 2.0 2.0 2.31
Ad hoc external data 1.3 1.71 1.77
Data provided by consultants 1.7 1.65 1.64
Governing from the data as grouped and presented in both tables, a general 
perception can be formed that different sources of data are used in varied frequency 
among alternative types of decisions. The data sources are broadly classified into
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three categories, including routine source data from established accounting and 
information database, non-routine ac hoc data collected from time to time by 
corporate staff in individual cases, and data as well as professional advice obtained 
from external consultants. With a descriptive discriminant analytical approach, the 
shift of data reliance from routine accounting and management data to ac hoc data 
not maintaining by a company and further apart to external professional service 
following the traits of decision characteristics in respect to decision uncertainty and 
complexity. For decisions that are more routine in nature and relatively less 
uncertain and non-complex, routine data are more frequently resorted to in making 
decisions; whereas for decisions involving a higher degree of task uncertainty and 
complexity, the relative degree of importance of ad hoc and external data increase 
substantially to a level that is pari passu and even more important than the routine 
accounting and management data. The descriptive discriminant test is also 
supported by the non-parametric Wilcoxon test. To reveal the statistical relationship 
of various source data under different decision situations, data of different student 
groups are merged together to form a unified test of the academic views. This 
particular treatment will then facilitate subsequent analysis between the academic 
view and the practitioners. The collective view are stated in Table 12 below:
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Table 12: Wilcoxon Test of Data Retrieving Frequency by Decision Type
5% 1%
Product Pricing Decisions
Ad hoc internal data . . . . p=0.0004
Ad hoc external data . . . . p=0.0007
Data provided by consultants . . . . p=0.0000
Asset Replacement Decisions
Ad hoc internal data p=0.0175 . . . .
Ad hoc external data . . . . p=0.0003
Data provided by consultants . . . . p=0.0000
Asset Acquisition Decisions
Data provided by consultants . . . . p=0.0002
Expansion in Existing Operations
Data provided by consultants . . . . p=0.0008
Investment in New Business
Data from information database . . . . p=0.0083
Investment in New Geographical Area
Ad hoc external data p=0.0238 . . . .
Investment in The China Market
Data from information database . . . . p=0.0013
Ad hoc external data . . . . p=0.0044
Data provided by consultants p=0.0196 —
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The table is compiled with the frequency in retrieving of accounting data used as the 
reference set. According to Table 12 it is clear that for product pricing decisions 
and asset replacement decisions, students are of the opinion that in domain data 
from the accounting and information system should be referred to, whereas there is 
seldom need to obtain other ac hoc data or professional advice for decisions of these 
types. These opinions follow the trajectory of academic training; since product 
pricing decisions especially cost plus pricing decisions are largely a matter of 
internal control with costs and revenue data forming the core data of analysis. 
These costs and revenue data are normally available within the routine accounting 
and management information system, and thus it is not unusual for students to 
consider that additional information is rarely required in product pricing decisions. 
The same logic apply to asset replacement decisions, as this type of decisions are 
usually based on an actual need of replacement, which is revealed and disclosed by 
routine accounting and management information systems other than physical 
inspection reports of managers. For asset acquisition decisions and expansion 
decisions, the only significant difference in relative use of data sources is the data 
provided by independent consultants. With reference also to table 11, consultants 
are seldom employed in these two situations. Apart from the infrequent employment 
of consultants, however, both routine and ac hoc data are called for in similar 
frequencies in these types of decisions. The shift in the data range has reflected the
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change in situation characteristics where data normally are not needed for a wise 
decision to be made. Special attention should also be paid to the significant 
difference in the use of external data including professional advice in an investment 
decision in the China market. In making the investment decision, existing 
accounting data is almost the least frequent data that will be called for, rather ac hoc 
external data and data provided by external consultants form the core base of 
information analysis. Although apparently not well recognised by a Western reader, 
the view clearly represent students' understanding about the cultural reality in the 
Chinese business sector, where informal, unofficial data obtainable in domain only 
through personal contact and relationship account for the most important part of 
business decisions. Thus the general perception is that to invest in the China 
market, a business manager must obtain ac hoc external data from sources outside 
the firm, and to seek advice from professionals who have close contact with the 
Chinese officials and businessmen. This difference in cultural perception also 
explains the less frequent calls for professional advice in respect of investment 
decisions in other geographical regions other than China.
To obtain a more thorough analysis about the relative utilisation rate of different 
source data in respect to various types of decisions, non parametric Wilcoxon test 
is also carried out from a data source perspective:
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Table 13: Wilcoxon Test of Data Retrieving Frequency by Data Source
5% 1%
Data from Accounting System
Nil __ . . .
Data from Information System
Asset acquisition decisions p=0.0214 . . . .
Ad Hoc Internal Data
Expansion of existing operations . . . . p=0.0001
Investment in new business line . . . . p=0.0008
Investment in new geographical area . . . . p=0.0031
Investment in the China market p=0.0106 . . . .
Ad Hoc External Data
Asset replacement decisions p=0.0240 . . . .
Expansion of existing operations . . . . 0.0087
Investment in new business line . . . . 0.0001
Investment in new geographical area . . . . 0.0000
Investment in the China market . . . . 0.0000
Data Provided by Consultants
Expansion of existing operations . . . . 0.0069
Investment in new business line . . . . 0.0000
Investment in new geographical area . . . . 0.0000
Investment in the China market ----- 0.0000
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From the perspective of data source, it is revealed in Table 13 that accounting data 
will be called in roughly the same frequency for all selected types of decisions. This 
means that no matter what type of decision making, students in general still regard 
accounting data as a necessary source of reference. The same view is also held with 
respect to data maintained in the information database. However, apart from 
accounting data and information database, the relative utilisation rates for ac hoc 
data and professional advice is significantly different between the decisions. It is 
also interesting to find out that students are of the opinion that for expansion and 
investment decisions, ac hoc data and professional advice should be called for in 
greater frequency than in the more routine pricing and asset replacement decisions, 
as the relative retrieving rates for these data are significantly different.
Based on the findings in table 10 to 13, there is clear evidence that from a more 
theoretical and academic perspective, task and decision characteristics do affect the 
choice of information that are supposed to be used in the decision processes. Since 
different data originated from different sources will lead to a particular choice of 
calculation model for payoffs of decision alternatives, and there is already a general 
recognition that there does not exist a universal accounting model which can 
incorporate different types of cost data without affecting its internal validity 
(Homgren 1986), thus a logical argument can be established to the fact that the
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nature of decision characteristics would affect a decision maker's choice in the 
selection of cost calculation models and the cost data that are going to be used and 
fitted into the selected model. Built from this premise evidence is further sought to 
substantiate and prove the validity of hypotheses 3 and 4.
As proposed in the framework of analysis, task difficulty constitutes a major factor 
in affecting the decision maker's choice and behaviour. Task difficulty, in its own 
turn, will be greatly affected by task uncertainty and task complexity. The more 
uncertain between task effort and task result, the greater is the degree of task 
uncertainty, and the task is viewed as more difficult to accomplish, since the 
decision maker finds a greater risk in going through the processes of 
accomplishment for the said task. Task complexity also leads to the same assertion 
as the more complex a task environment is, the more uncertain will be the 
relationship among task factors and their interactions, and the less will be the 
confidence in getting total control of the processes of accomplishment for the task. 
Task uncertainty and task complexity, from a decision perspective, can be 
interpreted as a lack of sufficient information from the routine information database, 
accounting or otherwise, which allows management to exercise adequate control to 
the decision consequence. With insufficient information on hand, a manager cannot 
carry out satisfactory analyses to identify the best alternative in a decision situation,
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which renders him beginning to realise a higher degree of task uncertainty or task 
complexity as the case may be. To relieve from the quasi controllability of decision 
processes, the decision maker will begin to seek data from other sources, including 
ac hoc data and data from external consultants. The collection of additional data 
other than from internal established sources is thus a clear indication of perceived 
changes in task uncertainty and task difficulty. Therefore, with reference to data 
presented in table 10 to 13, significant differences in the retrieving rate of various 
sources of data also acts as indication of significant differences in the perception of 
degree of task uncertainty and task complexity under various decision situations. 
However, a direct questioning about the perceived degree of task uncertainty and 
task complexity is made to reiterate the proposition:
Table 14: Perceived Variation in Task Uncertainty and Complexity
Decision Complexity Decision Uncertainty
MSc Accounting Management Group
Average
MSc Accounting Management Group
Average
Product
Pricing
3.2 3.43 3.13 3.30 2.6 2.71 2.8 2.72
Asset
Replacement
2.7 2.71 3.13 2.83 2.4 2.25 2.4 2.32
Asset
Acquisition
2.7 2.89 3.33 2.98 2.5 2.39 2.6 2.47
Expansion
Decision
3.5 3.71 3.67 3.66 2.9 3.18 3.6 3.25
Investment in 
Business Line
4.0 4.39 4.27 4.28 3.9 4.07 4.07 4.04
Investment in 
New Area
4.2 4.54 4.4 4.43 4.0 4.07 4.4 4.15
Investment in 
China Market
4.3 4.43 4.13 4.32 4.3 4.25 4.27 4.26
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In Table 14 the perceived data are presented in the range from 1 to 5, where 1 
denotes a perception of very simple decision or a highly certain case; and 5 denotes 
the other extreme of a very complex case or a highly uncertain case. The data 
contained in Table 14 clearly reveal that the perceived degree of decision 
complexity and decision uncertainty for the investment decisions are significantly 
higher than the more routine decisions. The same conclusion is also arrived at by 
a Wilcoxon test of the perceived opinions among the various decision situations with 
respect to decision complexity and decision uncertainty. Based on the Wilcoxon 
test results, the investment decisions have a significantly higher rating on the level 
of complexity and uncertainty over and above product pricing decision and asset 
related decisions at the 1% level of confidence. On the other hand, the asset 
replacement decision is significantly lower in both levels of complexity and 
uncertainty than all other decision situations. This is perfectly compatible with the 
general perception that asset replacement decisions are passively initiated by the 
factual need within a corporation, thus the decision is more certain and more simple 
than other decision alternatives where more choices are available.
However, Table 14 also reveals an interesting point that the average perception 
about the level of complexity is always higher than the average level of uncertainty 
in every decision situation. These observed results indicate a general perception
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across all decision situations that decisions are more complex in nature over and 
above their uncertain characteristics. This fact is further magnified by the Wilcoxon 
tests which show significant difference at 1% level between the perceived level of 
complexity and uncertainty within the routine decision functions, including the 
product pricing decisions, the asset replacement decisions, and the asset acquisition 
decisions. A 2% significance is also observed for expansion decisions (p=0.0103).
Surprisingly, there is no significant difference in the same analysis for all three 
investment type of decisions. These observations are interpreted that for those 
decisions that are highly complex, they are also viewed as highly uncertain; whereas 
moderate complex decisions may give more confidence to the decision makers about 
the predictability of the decision consequence. Apart from the interesting 
observations made about the inter-relationship between level of complexity and 
uncertainty in various types of decisions, the findings have matched with the 
proposition that different decisions possess specific characteristics with respect to 
complexity and uncertainty which affect the decision maker's choice of collection 
of cost data and subsequent employment of cost calculation models.
Hypothetical Case Analyses
With the purposes of testing the students' actual decision behaviour, three
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hypothetical cases have been developed to imitate some commonly observed 
decision situations faced by managers in Hong Kong. These hypothetical cases are 
developed according to the current situation of Hong Kong, its relationship with 
China, and the degree of decision uncertainty and decision complexity as general 
perceived by the business practitioners and entrepreneurs of Hong Kong. Students 
are asked to select particular course of actions in each hypothetical case so that their 
decision behaviour can be detected and understood. The same hypothetical cases 
will be used to identify practising managers' decision behaviour in the subsequent 
field research process to allow for matched comparison of decision behaviour 
between the research group and the control group. As a basic information for the 
analysis of decision behaviour, students are asked to indicate their general 
preference in making decisions:
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Table 15: Perceived Approach o f Students in Making Business Decisions
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Total
Maximising short term 
reporting profitability
4 3 1 8
Maximising total 
reporting project /  task 
profitability
3 2 4 9
Maximising total 
decision profitability
1 4 1 6
Selecting action as it 
sees fit} disregarding 
profitability whatsoever
0 0 1 1
A situational choice, 
depending on 
circumstances
2 19 8 29
From an academic view, the most disappointing finding in Table 15 is that, out of 
53 respondents, only 6 students would commit themselves to maximise the total
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decision profits, even though the optimal decision choice may not bring about 
maximum reporting profitability in the accounting statements. However, this is 
generally what has been taught in the basic management accounting courses, that we 
should make use of decision tools (discounting cash flows, project simulations, etc) 
to find out the alternative that would bring about optimal from a decision 
perspective. Because of the differences that exist between cost calculation systems 
of decision models and accounting reports (Solomons 1965, Flower 1970, Homgren 
1986), the advocacy of decision tools simultaneously mean that in finding the 
optimum solution, reporting profitability should be disregarded. The students’ 
response to this question clearly refutes the advocated decision approach. 
Moreover, 7 out of the 10 master students claim that they will either maximising 
short term reporting profits or total reporting profits, while most accounting and 
management students have selected to recognise the situational characteristics of 
different decision cases and do not commit to indicate any particular choice of 
preferred approach in decision making. Since the part time master students are 
working managers, their opinions demonstrate the perceived importance of reporting 
profitability in the business practice. These students have recognised that no matter 
what the decision characteristics are, the crucial important task is to maximise 
reporting profits, so that an optimal performance accounting statement can be 
presented. The accounting and management students, on the other hand, have little
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practical experience, and are thus unable to recognise the master point of analysis. 
A subsequent interview with a sample of accounting students reveals that, in 
selecting the situational answer, they have actually borne in mind the possibility or 
otherwise of arriving at any plausible calculations in the determination of optimal 
reporting profits or decision profits. Thus they consider that the actual decision 
choice will be largely depended upon the circumstances under which they have to 
make decisions. These interviewees are then further asked about their preferred 
course of actions given the assumption that they can practically calculate both 
reporting profits and decision profits that are different to each other for a certain 
case. Disappointedly, most students state that they have no idea which profitability 
measurement is more important in a real life decision case, but somehow they prefer 
to maximise reporting profits than decision profits.
Based on these understanding about students' perception, the results of the 
hypothetical cases are presented as below:
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Case One: Pricing for Ad Hoc Production Order
This case hypothesises a situation when a company has idle production capacity 
which is well sufficient to entertain an incoming ad hoc order. Cost data and their 
variations are given in the case, so that respondents can easily calculate the total 
costs for the ad hoc order and determine the price level that should be charged to the 
customer. Four questions are asked for this case, each question relating to a 
different condition.
[Please refer to Case One in the Questionnaire for details o f case data]
Question one: At what offered price will you accept the order?
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Only accept offered price at or 
above current selling price
0 5 4
Accept offered price at or above 
total production costs
6 13 7
Accept any offered price above 
the marginal costs of production
4 10 4
2 0 4
Question two: I f  competitors have reduced selling price from $200 /  unit to 
$180 /  unit, at what offered price will you accept the offer?
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Only accept offered price at or 
above current selling price ($200)
0 2 2
Accept offered price at or above 
reduced selling price ($180)
2 6 4
Accept offered price at or above 
total costs of production
6 11 6
Accept offered price at or above 
marginal costs of production
2 9 3
2 0 5
Question 3: I f competitors' price is reduced to $180 per unit, andfuture materials 
price will rise by 50%, then:
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Only accept offered price of $200 
and above
0 9 5
Accept offered price of $180 and 
above
0 1 1
Accept offered price at or above 
revised total costs of production
10 14 8
Accept offered price at or above 
revised marginal production costs
0 4 1
Question four: I f  labour costs are fixed on monthly basis, at what offered price
will you accept the offer?
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Only accept offered price at or 
above current selling price
0 4 2
Accept offered price at or above 
total production costs excluding 
labour costs
3 8 5
Accept offered price at or above 
total production costs
6 13 8
Others 1 3 0
2 0 6
With reference to the idle production capacity specified in the case data, a college 
approach in determining the price level for the ad hoc order is to calculate the 
marginal production costs, and any offered price exceeding that is acceptable. 
However, based on the respondents' answers, less than half of the respondents in 
each group and in total have selected the contribution or opportunity cost approach 
in determining the price level for the order. From the answers to all 4 questions, it 
is obvious that more than 70% of the respondents only accept an offered price at or 
above the total production costs level, which includes fixed production overheads, 
such as the labour costs as stated in Question 4. Since fixed production overhead 
will not alter with production volume, the acceptance of the ad hoc order that 
increases production volume will not lead to any increase in these fixed costs. 
Therefore the fixed production costs are regarded as sunk costs, and are irrelevant 
to the decision from a college view. Perhaps a plausible explanation is that since 
performance related salary and bonus schemes are supposed to be used, there is 
always a tendency to have reported profits in every single business transaction, and 
thus for each situation a price over and above total production costs (which are 
reported costs) is favoured upon than merely getting a price over marginal 
production costs but below total production costs.
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Moreover, students change their answers as additional information come in with a 
surprising direction that less and fewer students adopt the opportunity cost approach 
as more and more information become available to the choice. This is apparently 
contradictory to previous research findings, which propose that managers will tend 
to adopt the opportunity cost approach as more and more cost information are 
readily available to them (Friedman & Neumann 1980, Northcraft & Neale 1986). 
In particular the students' response to question 4 needs special discussions. The 
answers to question 4 has been deliberately set to exclude the alternative of marginal 
contributions, whereas in the previous three questions a choice to adopt the marginal 
contribution approach is provided to students. This special treatment is to test the 
effect of the accounting information system to the students, with an emphasis on the 
provision of decision alternatives. In answering question 4, only one student still 
points out that a marginal contribution approach should be adopted, while all other 
students adopt some form of total cost approach in determining the order price. 
Students in this respect seem to be induced to behave in a way as directed by the 
provision of information. The small samples of students that are interviewed 
subsequently admit this point, saying that they have not carefully considered 
alternatives other than those provided in the answer set. The behaviour of these 
students has partly substantiated the hypothesis that the operation of the accounting 
information system and the provision of information for decision making can affect
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a decision maker’s choice of actions. Applying this situation to the actual decision 
processes, one of the conditions for the adoption of the opportunity cost approach 
will be whether the accounting information can provide the required opportunity 
cost data, which is made available only with an advanced management accounting 
system that caters for a decision database as well. Thus, Hypothesis One is partially 
proved.
Case Two: The China Investment Programme
This case is set to test the respondents' view about the opportunity use of scarce 
resources in an investment decision, and the accounting treatment that would be 
made. Although investment decisions involve complex considerations in general, 
case questions are restricted to the more direct aspects of opportunity cost 
calculations to reduce possible resentment from respondents in completing the 
questionnaire.
[Please refer to Case Two in the Questionnaire for details o f Case Data]
2 0 9
Question one: Treatment o f Financing Interests
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Treat interest on finance as 
expenses in calculating returns
2 11 6
Treat interest on finance as 
capitalised costs
8 15 9
Ignore interest on finance in 
calculating project returns
0 2 0
Question two: Treatment on Benefits Earned from Existing Funds
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Charge current benefits as 
expenses in calculating returns
5 8 11
Include current benefits as 
capitalised costs
4 15 4
Ignore these earned benefits in 
calculating project returns
1 5 0
2 1 0
Question three: Treatment o f Contribution Loss to Existing Branch
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Charge contribution loss as 
expenses in calculating returns
4 11 8
Charge contribution loss as 
capitalised costs
4 14 4
Ignore contribution loss in 
calculating project returns
2 3 3
Question four: Assessment of Project Returns
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Use a common assessment model 
for all projects
2 2 3
Use project geared assessment 
models for each project
3 14 9
Use opportunity cost based 
assessment model
5 12 3
Accept only the highest returned 
project and reject others
0 0 0
In general all students tend to indicate a preference of opportunity cost approach in
making investment decisions, as most students prefer to include the opportunity
costs (e.g. the finance cost in question one, the benefits currently enjoyed by the
2 1 1
company in question two) in the calculation model, and few respondents select to 
ignore these opportunity costs in assessing project returns. However, diverse views 
about the exact accounting treatments for these opportunity costs are found among 
the students (that are, whether these opportunity costs should be treated as expenses 
or capitalised costs). The diverse opinions may be partly attributed by the students' 
lack of knowledge base to handle these accounting treatments, and also partly due 
to their uncertainty of how opportunity costs should be viewed upon. Disregarding 
what is the correct approach in handling opportunity costs in an investment decision, 
the different accounting treatments applied to these costs (as expenses or as 
capitalised costs) will result in the individual projects showing a diverged rate of 
returns, and thus the selection of different accounting and cost calculation models 
obviously affects the subsequent decision choice. Also an important point to note 
in Case two is that, when the students are directly asked about the decision 
approach in investment decisions as set out in question 4, a majority (55%) of 
students selects to compare proposed project returns with hurdle rates geared for 
that type of decision, rather than comparing with the best alternatives of using the 
funds other than investing in the China market. This is an indication that although 
students have some preference to adopt the opportunity cost approach in specific 
items, there is still a lack of a majority consensus in the adoption of the said 
approach from a more general and comprehensive perspective.
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Case Three: Selection of Plant Site
This case is the most difficult one among the three hypothetical cases. The case 
refers to the selection of a city in China to set up a subsidiary. Two cities are 
quoted and only one city can be selected. Case data are deliberately set so that 
respondents have to make their own calculations and judgement before they can 
arrive at a choice of the city. Also, more uncertainties and greater complexity are 
added hereto in order to test the respondents' reaction to a highly uncertain and 
complex decision situation.
[Please refer to Case Three in the Questionnaire for details
of Case Data]
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Question one: Recommendation o f City for New Subsidiary
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Investment in China should be 
deferred
1 3 6
Town One in China should be 
selected for investment
4 2 1
Town Two in China should be 
selected for investment
3 5 5
Decision should be deferred as 
important information are missing
2 18 3
The provision of data in Case Three is actually insufficient from an accountant's 
point of view. Many data are missing, such as the magnitude of production costs, 
the projected time when cost savings would be swallowed by inflation, and the 
barriers to exit. Without these cost data on hand, the calculation of project life 
returns for the two alternative sites are greatly paralysed, and no accurate 
calculations (again, from the accounting perspective) can be arrived at. Thus it 
is reasonable that about 60% of the accounting students select to defer the decision 
until more information are sought for and available. However, 80% of both the 
finance students and the management students have made their choices without
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being affected by the apparent lack of information. The significant difference in 
the preference decision composition acts as an indication that managers in a more 
uncertain and complex situation do not rely on accounting calculations to any 
significant extent. Rather, they will arrive at their decision choices from a more 
judgmental sense. The core issue here is that, however, once detailed accounting 
calculations are dispensed with, there is total uncertainty that the opportunity cost 
approach can be applied in any satisfactory way within the accounting perspective. 
Managers (the master students and the management students) may have applied 
the opportunity cost reasoning approach in selecting their choice of actions. 
However, from an accounting perspective, there is no evidence if such approach 
has been taken, as accounting statements showing its effect is impossibly to be 
presented in this hypothetical case.
Question two in Case Three further magnifies the degree of uncertainty by adding 
hereto a discretionary cost item, entertainment expenses, which do not have direct 
relationship with production function, but which affect the overall operational 
effectiveness of the prospective factory in the supposed Chinese atmosphere. 
However, it must be clarified here that the addition of entertainment expenses 
purely serves as a complication of a hypothetical case, and does not suggest in any 
way a reflection of the current market atmosphere in China.
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Question two: Recommendation given Entertainment Expenses in Mind
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Investment in China should be 
deferred
I 2 5
Town One in China should be 
selected for investment
1 1 2
Town Two in China should be 
selected for investment
6 2 3
Indifferent between Town One and 
Town Two
0 6 3
Decision should be deferred as 
important information are missing
2 17 2
The magnitude of entertainment expenses is set to a level that makes the perceived 
attractiveness of both investment alternatives greatly reduced, so that a revised 
recommendation may be made by the respondents to retain the production base in 
Hong Kong, or to defer the decision until more important information can be sought 
for. For example, the magnitude of entertainment expenses is an average of other 
companies, the case company may wish to obtain its own estimation of the level of 
expenditure for this particular item. This being the case, there is an ex ante 
expectation that more respondents would shift to select to defer the decision.
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However, it is greatly surprised to find that more students consider that they can 
make a decision right at the moment than the situation as stated in question one, and 
also more students consider that production base should be transferred from Hong 
Kong to China, even though there are additional costs for entertainment. The results 
indicate that student respondents favour the situation when entertainment fees can 
facilitate business success, or in a negative sense do not reject the existence of 
such. With all respondents are Chinese students (since the proportion of non 
Chinese students are less than 1%) and the case is hypothesised in the China market, 
the opinions clearly demonstrate the Chinese culture and perception of personal 
relationship, that Chinese people are very much fond of linking business relationship 
with personal relationship, and find their ’’happier" ways through informal discussion 
for business solutions. Of course this issue of personal relationship is unable to be 
explicitly expressed in any formal accounting calculations.
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Question three : Recommendation given Uncertain Labour Mobility Costs
MSc
Students
Accounting
Students
Management
Students
Search for a reasonably accurate 
estimation of labour costs before 
decision
5 19 8
Arbitrarily estimate labour 
mobility costs and proceed with 
investment calculations
3 6 2
Ignore labour mobility costs 2 3 5
Question 3 sets a special cost item (the labour mobility costs) with high degree of
uncertainty to its magnitude. The expected response from a college perspective that
further information should be searched for before a decision should be made is, as
in question one and two, held by a simple majority of students. However, a
significant proportion of the master students and the management students (roughly
occupying 50% of each group of students) select to take an arbitrary approach or
simply the labour mobility costs. These students have indicated some kind of
decision behaviour that is not compatible with the accounting perspective, when
costs (including opportunity costs) should be ascertained in a decision process.
Perhaps they have behaved in accordance with the REMM model as proposed by
Jensen and Meckling, so that they would not bother finding out the “more accurate
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calculations” which require greater efforts.
The responses to these questions, together with students' responses to Case one and 
Case two, are compatible with the findings of previous research findings, that 
managers will only adopt the opportunity cost approach if data are readily made 
available (Friedman & Neumann 1980), and that managers often do not have 
adequate opportunity cost information (March 1987). Despite these reiterations, a 
new finding from this research is that, managers are affected and dominated by the 
setting and operations of the accounting information systems. Managers have no 
initiation to search for opportunity cost data to any significant extent if these cost 
data are not readily available. They will make decisions largely based on what are 
available to them with the existing accounting information system. Once the 
information system stops to provide certain data, managers will tend to neglect the 
missing data set and continue to make decisions.
Concluding Remarks for the Controlled Students Test
The engagement of this controlled test with students carefully selected to monitor 
their knowledge base and business experience is to establish some controlled results 
from an academic perspective, so that comparison can be made between academic
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views and practising views. From the results obtained in this controlled test it seems 
that the framework of analysis and the hypotheses as proposed in Chapter 4 above 
are at least substantiated from an academic perspective. In a decision making 
process, decision makers have to select their calculation and ranking models in order 
to analyse and rank alternatives that are available for selection. Thus for the 
purpose of testing the possible use of the opportunity cost decision model, the 
cognitive decision behaviour of a decision maker (the students) is tested and studied 
to identify in what way he will select a particular cost calculation model, and under 
what circumstances he will select an opportunistic cost model for analysis and 
decision purposes. His selection of a particular cost model reflects his willingness 
and perceived ability in invoking that cost model to substantiate his decision choice.
With the results obtained from the controlled test, the following observations can be 
made in respect to the proposed framework of analysis and the hypotheses:
1. Students collectively prefer performance related salary and bonus schemes, 
which represent performance related reward and compensation packages in 
a broader sense. Since many companies use reporting profitability in it 
various forms as a measurement yardstick for performance (Reece & Cool 
1978), it is reasonable to expect that the MSc students who are managers in 
their day time employment, have also experienced with a performance
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measurement system using reporting profitability. Thus, the established 
relationship between performance and reward system have led managers 
trying to select the reporting cost model instead of the decision cost model in 
making decisions.
2. Various results across the controlled test prove that the setting and operation 
of the accounting information system exert much influence to the decision 
behaviour of a decision maker, in a sense that a decision maker will be 
largely restricted and affected by what are the accounting outputs and in what 
way information are collected and presented to his knowledge. Thus a major 
constraint in the adoption of the opportunity cost model in decision making 
is whether accounting outputs based on such a cost model can be produced 
and made available to the decision maker or not. Since only a relatively more 
advanced accounting information with a wider scope of database can provide 
such kind of accounting outputs, hypothesis one (which proposes that the 
more advanced a management accounting information system is maintained, 
the higher will be the adoption rate of the opportunity cost model in decision 
cases) is proved in a logical deductive way.
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3. There is also clear evidence from the test results that the students try to get 
away from detailed cost calculations and refer to more judgmental process in 
a decision situation which is highly uncertain and complex. Since the 
opportunity cost model, like other accounting models, requires accurate and 
comprehensive information to show an acceptable analysis in respect to 
decision alternatives, a desertion of detailed calculations logically means that 
the more uncertain and complex a decision situation is, the less possibility 
will a decision maker invoke the opportunity cost model in calculating 
alternative payoffs. As stipulated in previous chapters, a decision maker may 
still apply the opportunity cost reasoning in accordance with his own 
judgement, and include for his own model such items that cannot be 
quantified and presented in an opportunity cost statement. However, with 
reference to the theory of choices and the REMM model, it is still evident 
that the decision maker has not applied the opportunity cost model in the 
accounting perspective (that is, calculating and presenting opportunity cost 
statements for decision purposes). The master students may have considered 
from an opportunity cost reasoning to reject the adoption of the opportunity 
cost decision model, because the extra effort is great for them in pursuing 
such a cost model in the formal calculation process. Thus hypotheses 3 and 
4 are also proved.
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Since the above conclusions are only arrived at through a research with the students 
groups, another research based on a sample of practising accountants is 
simultaneously carried out to find out the decision behaviour of real life managers 
and their views about the adoption of the opportunity cost model in a decision 
process.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ADOPTION OF THE OPPORTUNITY COST MODEL 
IN A REAL LIFE COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT
There are very little management and accounting researches that are related to 
the studies of the cognitive decision behaviour of business managers in Hong 
Kong. It is partly because of the lack of initiatives in performing researches with 
the stipulated group of population, and partly because of the peculiar culture and 
tradition of the Chinese people in Hong Kong (Hofstede 1980). In Hong Kong 
businessmen regard almost every part of their management practice as 
confidential, and unless a strong personal relationship has been built up between 
the researchers and these corporate managers, rarely would these "confidential" 
information be released to the knowledge of people outside the firm. Thus, in 
Hong Kong the response rate of researches through questionnaires is usually 
lower than the normally accepted minimal. Despite this major constraint in 
performing researches, an understanding of the decision behaviour of business 
managers in Hong Kong is crucial to the success and value of the current 
research. As stipulated in the first Chapter, Hong Kong is the major business 
partner of China. Many listed firms in Hong Kong are involved in investing 
projects in China. Thus, they have accumulated valuable experiences of the 
better ways to carry on businesses with the Chinese officials and entrepreneurs.
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In this respect the experiences of managers in Hong Kong are good examples to 
managers in the Western Hemisphere in dealing with Chinese entrepreneurs, and 
to carry on business in China. Also the success of the current research will 
contribute to the expansion of the cultural perspective analysis in combination 
with the behavioural decision theories, reflected in the accounting and 
management practices of the adoption of cost calculation models in decision 
processes.
Selection of Population and Sample Group for the Field Study
Public companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are selected as the 
population group for the purposes of the current research. The reasons for 
selecting listed companies as the research domains are to ensure that all sample 
companies are comparatively large in size (because there are prescriptions about 
the minimum asset base of listed companies), and have had the business 
experiences required for this research. Moreover, these companies employ well 
qualified accountants who have acquired adequate professional and managerial 
knowledge in handling with decision situations. These accountants could well 
operate and maintain an opportunity cost database and provide opportunity cost 
data in case management require said data for decision making purposes. Thus, 
there is feasibility that these listed companies could employ the opportunity cost
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approach in decision making processes if management wish to. These two 
stipulated factors of concern, that the sample companies have the required 
experiences and the ability to invoke opportunity cost models for decision 
making purposes, are prerequisite for a company to be qualified as a sample. 
Therefore, the population group of companies is restricted to the listed 
companies in Hong Kong. With reference to the population list there were 
roughly 580 listed companies in Hong Kong in 1995, and a random sample of 
200 listed companies was constructed therefrom. These randomly selected 
companies represented diversified interests in different industries and cultural 
background. Based on the sample list, a set of questionnaires was sent to the 
chief accountant / financial controller of each company to obtain information 
regarding the real life decision practices of management of these companies. 
Questionnaires were sent to the chief accountants of these companies for three 
reasons :
1. The chief accountant is the person who provides accounting and 
cost information to management for decision making purposes. 
Thus the accountant is in the best position to know about the 
accounting routines that are used by the company and the variation 
of information needs by management under different circumstances.
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2. The chief accountants of these listed companies (in Hong Kong) are 
qualified professional accountants, so that they are well equipped 
and acquainted with the questions being asked in the questionnaire, 
especially the case study part.
3. The chief accountant as information processor and provider can 
provide company wide information about managerial decision 
behaviour whereas individual managers may only provide feedback 
from personal experience or intuition.
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, since management of many companies 
kept internal information in confidentiality, 48 completed questionnaires only 
were returned and received, representing 24% of the total sample size. Included 
in these 48 replies actually some accountants had indicated that they completed 
the questionnaire and agreed to release their corporate practices to the 
knowledge of the candidate just because they had some personal connections 
with the candidate, either as past students of the candidate or professional 
companions frequently met in professional and academic gatherings. The 
circumstances in the data collection process had reconfirmed the situation that 
Chinese people like to keep things in confidentiality, and personal relationship is
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an important factor to the success of business interactions. Several companies 
replied that they would not release any information regarding corporate practices 
to outsiders in accordance with senior management’s decisions. Other companies 
did not provide any reply. I had tried to improve the response rate by making 
phone calls to about 30 companies who had not given any reply. This was 
feasible because for those companies who gave me a reply, they sent back the 
questionnaires in their own envelopes which bore the name of the company. 
Despite my follow up calls, all companies denied my request with the same 
reason, that decision practices were regarded as confidential information and 
would not be released. After all, a response rate of 24% would be regarded an 
acceptable rate for the proceeding of data analytical works.
Organisational Setting
To obtain important background data from the respondents, and to follow the 
normal sequence of general questionnaire design (so that prospective respondents 
will feel more comfortable with the questionnaire), data regarding organisational 
setting are asked at the beginning of the questionnaire. Replies from the 
respondents reveal that the total group of replies represent a wide variety of 
interests among different categories of industry as suggested by the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, with each individual category of companies counting less than
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one sixth of the total respondent size. This is a desirable combination because 
industrial characteristics of any particular category of companies will not be 
dominant enough to affect the collective results across the responding companies. 
The respective asset size of the responding companies also constitute a well 
balanced portfolio as below:
Table 16: Size Distribution of Responding Companies
Asset Base Below
HK$200M
$200M - 
$500M
$500M - 
$1000M
$1000M - 
$5000M
Above
$5000M
No. of 
Companies
9 12 5 10 12
With reference to Table 16 broadly 21 companies fall into the smaller size group 
(asset size below HK$ 500 millions) and 22 companies represent the larger size 
group (asset size above HK$ 1 billion). Based on the size distribution of the 
companies, the size effect to managerial decision behaviour will also be 
minimised. Given the industrial and size data, it is presumably true to say that 
subsequent findings and analyses reflect what management of listed companies in 
Hong Kong would practise in general, and do not bias towards any particular 
industrial or size group of companies.
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The announced corporate objectives of the responding companies are similar to 
normal expectations of a commercial firm. Out of 48 companies, 41 have 
claimed profit maximisation as its sole or prime objective. A less expected 
answer is that 21 companies have claimed an objective of providing quality 
service to clients. Among these 21 companies 14 have dual corporate objectives 
of profit maximisation also, but still there remains a total of 7 companies who 
claim that quality service to clients is their sole objective. Based on the response 
the listed companies in Hong Kong are also aware of the importance of client 
service and satisfaction in the securing of profitability in the current business 
atmosphere. This finding is also matched with the finding in the control group 
test, as the students also regard profit maximisation and provision of quality 
services the two prime business objectives in Hong Kong. However, since a 
study of the trend of business objectives is beyond the scope of this research, no 
further data collection and analysis is made in this respect.
Rewarding System of Managers
With reference to the proposed framework of analysis the current commercial 
practice of the determination of salaries and bonus schemes is an important piece 
of information to the study of the effect of rewarding system to decision 
behaviour as proposed by the agency theory, the expectancy theory, and the
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behavioural decision theories. Details of the current salaries and bonus structure 
are tabled below:
Table 17: Bases for the Determination of Salaries Structure
No. of 
Companies
A fixed scale without variation except annual increments 5
A variable scale by senior management's recommendation on 
staff performance
39
A pre-determined scale linked to target achievement 3
Others (unspecified by respondent) 1
Table 18: Bases for the Determination of Bonus Scheme
No. of 
Companies
Some scales directly related to managerial performance 15
Overall corporate profitability disregarding personal or 
departmental performance
3
A balance between departmental achievement and senior 
management appraisal
13
A fixed scale irrespective of corporate profitability nor 
departmental achievement
3
Discretion by senior management or board of directors 12
Others (No bonus payment) 2
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Data presented in table 17 and 18 provide clear evidence that most business 
managers' salaries and bonus payments that constitute a majority part of the total 
compensation package are performance related. Only five companies out of a 
total of 48 have selected a fixed salary scale irrespective of performance for the 
determination of salaries for their managers, while six companies have selected 
to pay bonus to managers without due regard to their performance. To the 
majority of managers who have to rely on assessed performance to get their share 
of increased salaries and bonuses, they will have to maximise their performance. 
Since about 80% of the responding companies are profit maximised companies, 
it is perfectly logical to presume that managers' performance are measured by 
their ability in enhancing profitability of the company, either through generation 
of more revenue, or through reduction and saving of costs, or both. These listed 
companies have to present and provide published accounts to the shareholders 
and general public as required by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, and thus 
maximisation of profits can be interpreted as maximising reporting profits in the 
published financial reports, which means that all the financial accounting 
domains would be followed, and performance assessment will also follow the 
same traits. With reference to this fact it is quite probable that the findings and 
arguments of Solomons (1965), Flower (1970), and Moizer & Pratt (1988) find 
their places here, and managers in Hong Kong will attempt to maximise reporting
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profits even from a decision perspective a motivation of such may not lead to 
optimal decisions. The consequence of adopting reporting performance bases for 
reward calculation will thus lead to a temptation of the business managers to 
reject the employment of the opportunity cost model in decision making 
processes.
Maintenance of Management Accounting Information System
One of the essential features for the adoption of the opportunity cost model in 
decision making processes is the operation and maintenance of a management 
accounting information system which caters for opportunity cost information. 
Since the listed companies have sufficient funding and expertise to maintain a 
reasonably sophisticated management accounting information system, 
management of these companies have every feasibility to adopt such an 
information system if they wish to. Despite the apparent ability to maintain a 
management accounting information system, results indicate that not all listed 
companies have maintained same:
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Table 19: Maintenance of Management Accounting Information System
No. of 
Companies
Only the financial accounting system is maintained 9
An integrated accounting system is maintained 27
An interlocking accounting system is maintained 4
Management accounting data are collected on ad hoc basis 
without maintaining a routine accounting system
8
Out of the total respondents 17 companies do not maintain any management 
accounting information system. The general distribution of both the group of 
thirty one companies who maintain a management accounting system, and those 
seventeen companies who have not maintained such a system, is diversified 
across the respondents both in terms of industry and size. The diversified 
distribution of group companies thus act as an indication that both industrial and 
size factors do not exert any significant influence to the research results. The 
major concern here is that, despite the availability of resources and expertise, 
what are the main reasons that lead to management of these seventeen companies 
giving up the maintenance of a management accounting information system. 
Comparing with the students’ perception, less than 10% of the students admit the 
disposal of the management accounting information system, whereas about 35%
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of the companies take the view. To clarify the situation, interviews have been 
arranged with the chief accountants of five listed companies, with one company 
happened to be a company not maintaining a management accounting system. 
The accountant of this company gives an explanation that management does not 
perceive any real need to maintain such a system, rather they prefer to have ad 
hoc information every time they see a need. The accountant further admits that 
the process of information collection and analysis will be ineffective in times 
because of the absence of a formal information database, but he is in the opinion 
that management does not bother much about the possible ineffectiveness of 
information processing. When the accountant is asked about the frequency of 
using the opportunity cost approach in decision process, he states that the 
adoption or otherwise of the opportunity cost approach depends on each 
situation, and actually in the minds of the management they have not bothered 
about which cost concept has been adopted, so long as they are happy with the 
provided data. The other four accountants also express their views which, based 
on their experience present or past, they do not perceive that business 
entrepreneurs in Hong Kong really rely on management accounting information 
in making decisions. Thus, in their opinions it is not unusual that some of listed 
companies in Hong Kong do not maintain a formal management accounting 
system.
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The observed phenomenon in the maintenance of a management accounting 
system is that, in the absence of such, it is with reservation that management of 
these companies will and could employ the opportunity cost approach in making 
decisions, as they may probably lack adequate cost information in this respect. 
Of course it is possible that companies maintain separate opportunity cost 
database other than a routine management accounting system. To verify the 
situation respondents are also asked to indicate whether they have maintained an 
opportunity cost database:
Table 20: Maintenance of Opportunity Cost (OC) Database
No. of 
Companies
Student
Response
OC database form part of the management 
accounting system
8 22
OC database separately maintained 1 15
OC data only collected on ad hoc basis 25 13
OC data is not required by management in most 
cases
14 3
Based on the accountants' responses, out of 31 companies who have maintained a 
management accounting system, only 9 companies claim that they have also
maintained an opportunity cost database. On the other hand, 14 companies 
constituting about 30% of the total respondents do not make use of opportunity 
cost data in most cases. This is clearly different from the students' perception 
that OC database should be maintained. With less than 20% of the companies 
claiming maintenance of a routine OC database, it is suspicious if management 
decision making will be based on opportunity cost approach in a systematic way. 
Since more than 50% of the respondents state that OC data would be collected 
on ad hoc basis, it seems more plausible to say that management of the listed 
companies in Hong Kong will only make use of opportunity cost approach in 
certain decision situations from time to time. The results thus constitute 
supporting evidence that the employment of opportunity cost model is affected 
by some variables, which form the core concern for the following analyses. An 
analysis of the specific items of economic and quantitative data maintained by the 
responding companies further substantiate this observed fact:
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Table 21: Maintenance of Economic and Quantitative Database
No. of 
Companies
Students'
Response
Competitors' product price movement 22 53
Materials' price movement for main products 31 50
Relative utilisation rate of labour 17 38
General economic data of Hong Kong 24 32
General economic data of main export country 24 46
Product line profitability statistics 30 50
Input contribution ratios of company's input 
resources
15 43
With approximately the same number of respondents between the academic 
group (53 students) and the professionals (48 accountants), the results show a 
significant difference between perceived need and actual practice. Although the 
selected items are important data for various types of decisions, at most about 30 
companies only will maintain record of a particular item. Further breakdown 
have shown that only 4 companies have kept track of records for all these data, 
while 5 companies do not keep any record for these data at all, and 30 companies 
have maintained records of four items or less. All these results undoubtedly 
point to the assertion that managers of listed companies in Hong Kong will only 
selectively use opportunity cost data which meet their own requirements.
Cognitive Decision Behaviour of Managers in Practice
In studying the cognitive decision behaviour of business managers, their 
understanding of the opportunity cost concept is verified as the starting point. 
However, based on the accountant's responses only 18 accountants have selected 
the "normal" definition of opportunity costs, that is, the highest value foregone in 
selecting a particular course of action. On the other hand, 18 accountants have 
selected the alternative answer that the opportunity cost concept is a situational 
concept, which means that the opportunity cost concept could be interpreted in 
different ways under different circumstances. If this is the case, then an 
accountant could adopt different conceptual bases and approaches in calculating 
opportunity costs, although in each time he claims that he is (or is not?) adopting 
the opportunity cost concept. The remaining 12 accountants have selected other 
definitions as shown on Table 9 which are not usually adopted in textbooks. 
Based on the accountants’ responses, they have not indicated an unanimous or 
overwhelming agreement on the definition of the opportunity cost concept. The 
diversity of views about the interpretation of the opportunity cost concept may 
affect the accountant’s choices of provision of data to managers in discharging 
managerial functions. Disregarding this possible influence about information 
choices, the respondents are asked about their understanding of the practices of 
their companies in soliciting information sources under different task
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characteristics.
Task Characteristics and Data Sourcing
Although in the student group controlled research it has been proved that task 
characteristics, notably task complexity and task uncertainty, contribute to the 
modification of decision behaviour reflected in the choice of selection of 
information source for decision making purposes, the same test must be repeated 
with the business perspective to ascertain its validity in practices. Thus the same 
set of questions regarding task characteristics and data sourcing are asked to 
solicit the opinions of the accountants on behalf of their companies. The 
accountants as respondents are clearly reminded in this situation to indicate the 
practice of their company and management - and not their own perception about 
which data source should be solicited.
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Table 22: Frequency of Data Searching for Different Decision Situations
Accountants'
Response
Students'
Response
Data from Accounting System
Product pricing decisions 1.91 1.89
Asset replacement decisions 2.31 2.06
Asset acquisition decisions 2.50 2.25
Expansion of existing operations 2.11 1.83
Investment in new business line 2.46 2.19
Investment in new geographical area 
(excluding China
2.76 2.12
Investment in the China market 2.56 2.14
Data from Information Database
Product pricing decisions 2.41 1.88
Asset replacement decisions 2.94 2.06
Asset acquisition decisions 2.81 2.19
Expansion of existing operations 2.55 1.68
Investment in new business line 2.60 1.67
Investment in new area 2.67 1.88
Investment in the China market 2.69 1.69
Ad Hoc Internal Data
Product pricing decisions 2.46 2.53
Asset replacement decisions 2.83 2.57
Asset acquisition decisions 2.75 2.55
Expansion of existing operations 2.56 1.98
Investment in new business line 2.61 2.02
Investment in new area 2.80 2.12
Investment in the China market 2.46 2.08
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Ad Hoc External Data
Product pricing decisions 2.67 2.96
Asset replacement decisions 2.89 2.91
Asset acquisition decisions 2.74 2.53
Expansion of existing operations 2.70 2.16
Investment in new business line 2.47 1.80
Investment in new area 2.50 1.75
Investment in the China market 2.33 1.65
Data Provided by Consultants
Product pricing decisions 3.67 3.11
Asset replacement decisions 3.89 3.29
Asset acquisition decisions 3.40 3.07
Expansion of Existing Operations 3.51 2.58
Investment in new business line 3.13 2.04
Investment in new area 3.20 1.84
Investment in the China market 3.00 1.66
The same set of data is also rearranged with respect to types of decisions to show 
the relative data retrieving rate of different data source under different decision 
situations:
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Table 23: Relative Data Retrieving Rate for Different Decision Situations
Accountants'
Response
Students'
Response
Product Pricing Decisions
Data from accounting system 1.91 1.89
Data from information database 2.41 1.88
Ad hoc internal data 2.46 2.53
Ad hoc external data 2.67 2.96
Data provided by consultants 3.67 3.11
Asset Replacement Decisions
Data from accounting system 2.31 2.06
Data from information database 2.94 2.06
Ad hoc internal data 2.83 2.57
Ad hoc external data 2.89 2.91
Data provided by consultants 3.89 3.29
Asset Acquisition Decisions
Data from accounting system 2.50 2.25
Data from information database 2.81 2.19
Ad hoc internal data 2.75 2.55
Ad hoc external data 2.74 2.53
Data provided by consultants 3.40 3.07
Expansion of Existing Operations
Data from accounting system 2.11 1.83
Data from information database 2.55 1.68
Ad hoc internal data 2.56 1.98
Ad hoc external data 2.70 2.16
Data provided by consultants 3.51 2.58
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Investment in New Business Line
Data from accounting system 2.46 2.19
Data from information database 2.60 1.67
Ad hoc internal data 2.61 2.02
Ad hoc external data 2.47 1.80
Data provided by consultants 3.13 2.04
Investment in New Geographical Area 
(Except China)
Data from accounting system 2.76 2.12
Data from information database 2.67 1.88
Ad hoc internal data 2.80 2.12
Ad hoc external data 2.50 1.75
Data provided by consultants 3.20 1.84
Investment in the China Market
Data from accounting system 2.56 2.14
Data from information database 2.69 1.69
Ad hoc internal data 2.46 2.08
Ad hoc external data 2.33 1.65
Data provided by consultants 3.00 1.66
An initial descriptive analysis shows some interesting findings. Although 
students representing some form of academic views emphasise the important 
roles of accounting and information database, the revealed practices do not 
reflect the same degree of reliance in making decisions. In fact accountants have 
demonstrated a much lower frequency of retrieving data for decision analyses for
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almost every single source of data. This fact alone gives an indication that 
management of these listed companies in making decisions have placed less 
reliance on information as what is originally expected. As a corollary, it is 
believed that judgemental process in making decisions is exercised to a greater 
extent than a direct dependence on the calculated outcomes from source data. 
Notwithstanding the less frequent uses of source data in general in decision 
processes, the relative retrieving rate among various data sources still varies 
across different types of decisions, showing that data from a certain source may 
be more frequently called upon for one type of decisions, but less frequently 
called upon for another type.
With reference to Tables 22 and 23, even a glance will immediately identify that 
external professional advice is seldom invoked in all prescribed decision 
situations. This is contradictory to the students' perception, who think that as the 
degree of uncertainty and complexity increases, external advice will also be 
increasingly called upon. However, it is still arguable that the relative degree of 
retrieving rate increases as the decision case involves more and more external 
factors (from 3.89 in asset replacement decision to 3.00 in China investment 
projects). Another obvious finding is that, except in the China investment 
projects and other geographical investment projects, accounting data are the data
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source that is most frequently called upon. However, with regard to the 
geographical investment projects, ad hoc external data are more frequently called 
upon, indicating that accounting data play a less important role in the decision 
process of this type. These findings are compatible with the theoretical 
framework, as decision task characteristics will affect the decision maker's 
choice of selection of accounting and information processing models. The 
statistical relationship of these source data also substantiates these comments :
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Table 24: Wilcoxon Test of Data Retrieving Frequency by Decision Type
5% 1%
Product Pricing Decisions
Accounting data - All other data source p=0.000
Asset Replacement Decisions
Accounting data - All other data source p<0.008
Information database - Other data source p<0.01
Asset Acquisition Decisions
Accounting data - All other data source p<0.001
Expansion of Existing Operations
Accounting data - All other data source p<0.001
Information database - other data source p<0.002
Investment in New Business Line
Accounting data - All other data source p<0.002
Investment in New Geographical Area
Accounting data - ad hoc internal data p=0.0219
Accounting data - Consultant's Data p<0.003
Ad hoc external data - consultant's data p<0.01
Investment in the China market
Accounting data - consultant's data p=0.000
Accounting data - other data source p<0.0320
Matched with the fact that only 9 companies have maintained a routine database 
system, and less than 5 companies have kept record of important economic and 
quantitative data, it is not surprising to find that the retrieving rate of accounting
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data is significantly higher than all other sources of data in all decision cases 
except investment decisions in new geographical regions. The interesting 
findings are that, apart from the accounting data, other sources of data are called 
for in similar frequencies irrespective of the decision types, as there is no 
significant difference in the retrieving rates of these information sources. The 
findings apparently contradict with the proposed hypotheses that different 
decision tasks should require information portfolios that distinguish between each 
other. However, when the relative retrieving rate of source data are viewed from 
a source perspective, results are compatible with the hypotheses :
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Table 25 : Wilcoxon Test of Data Retrieving Frequency by Data Source
5% 1%
Data from Accounting System
All other decisions p=0.0000
Data from Information Database
Asset replacement decisions p=0.0177
Asset acquisition decisions p=0.0046
Investment in new business line p=0.0303
Investment in new area p=0.0077
Investment in the China market p=0.0212
Ad Hoc Internal Data
Asset replacement decision p=0.0030
Asset acquisition decision p=0.0148
Ad Hoc External Data
Asset replacement decisions p=0.0039
Asset acquisition decisions p=0.0271
Data Provided by Consultants
Investment in the China market p=0.0411
Following the presentation in Table 13, utilisation frequency of data for other 
decisions are compared with the rate of product pricing decisions. Based on 
Table 25, clearly the relatively utilisation rate of source information under 
various types of decision can be significantly different. A major contradiction 
revealed from data shown between Tables 13 and 25 is that, although students 
perceive that accounting data would be used in similar frequencies for all types
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of decisions, professional feedback have just provided an answer of the other 
extreme, where the relative utilisation rates of accounting data are significantly 
different among decisions. According to analysis, the utilisation rate of 
accounting data in product pricing decisions are significantly higher than in other 
decisions. This means that in calculating product prices, more reliance has been 
made on accounting data; whereas in other decisions accounting data are less 
relied upon. In fact a cross study of the inter-relationship among all types of 
decisions indicates that not only do significant differences exist between product 
pricing decisions with others, but similar significant differences also exist 
between each paired comparison of decision cases. These results have an 
important impact to the understanding of the role of the accounting information 
system in a decision process. A message has been given in the results that the 
role of the accounting information system is very much depended upon the nature 
of the decision tasks, which is a clear indication that the selection of the cost 
calculation model is also depended upon the nature of the decision tasks, thus 
confirming the proposed expectancy decision processing model put forward in 
Chapter Four. Apart from accounting data, other sources of data show a similar 
pattern of analysis towards the interacting effects between task characteristics 
and the employment of information and cost models which can be supported by 
the perceived degree of uncertainty and complexity in these decision situations:
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Table 26: Accountants' Perception in Task Uncertainty and Complexity
Decision Complexity Decision Uncertainty
Accountants Students Accountants Students
Product Pricing 2.81 3.30 3.88 2.72
Asset Replacement 2.96 2.83 2.83 2.32
Asset Acquisition 2.54 2.98 2.34 2.47
Expansion Decision 2.79 3.66 2.45 3.25
Investment in 
Business Line
3.65 4.28 3.21 4.04
Investment In New 
Area
4.22 4.43 3.78 4.15
Investment in China 4.11 4.32 3.73 4.26
As with the analysis of the students, the accountants' view also exhibit the 
interesting perception that perceived degree of complexity is greater in every 
decision situation than its counter part of perceived degree of uncertainty, with 
the exception only in product pricing decisions. Except for asset replacement 
decisions, a significant difference at 2% level at most is observed in all other 
decision situations. This observed perception reflects the accountants' cognitive 
perception between the factors of decision task complexity and uncertainty. 
When the smaller sample of accountants are subsequently asked about this 
perception during interviews, the common response is that most decisions are 
complex in nature; however, since the companies will accept an expected result
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expressed in some acceptable range or margin of error, the possibility of having 
uncertain outcomes is reduced. Thus they do not view decisions as highly 
uncertain as that of complexity. According to the accountants’ collective view, 
therefore, degree of complexity is reflected in the process while degree of 
uncertainty is reflected in the results, and so it is not unusual that different 
perception exists between the two factors.
Hypothetical Case Analyses
With the purposes of verifying the decision behaviour of the responding 
accountants and the managers of their companies, the same three hypothetical 
cases used in the students' questionnaire are also reproduced for the accountants 
to make decisions. As a basic information the accountants are first asked to 
indicate their preference about general decision approach :
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Table 27: Accountants* Preferred Approach in Making Business Decisions
Accountants Students
Maximising short term reporting profits 1 8
Maximising total reporting profits for the 
project / task
5 9
Maximising total decision profits 11 6
Selecting action as it sees fit, disregarding 
profitability whatsoever
13 1
A situational choice, depending on 
circumstances
18 29
Out of 48 respondents, more than one third have selected to express a situational 
concern in making decisions, and this is absolutely normal in terms of realistic 
situation. As previously discussed in Chapter Three, it is recognised that in many 
cases businessmen hold multiple business objectives, and the desired objectives 
that are wished to be achieved could change from time to time (Kreitner 1989, 
Drucker 1990). Because of this possible shift of business objectives from time to 
time (although it may not change every time a decision needs to be made), the 
respondents may consider the alternative answer that the preferred decision 
approach is a situational choice more reflects their daily practices. A major 
difference between the students’ perception and the accountant' view is that, more 
accountants tend to favour the alternative answer of selecting action as it sees
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fit, whereas students (including the master students who are working managers in 
the day time) tend to follow a more pattemised decision rule. When the last two 
expressions of the accountants are added together, immediately the accountants 
have already expressed a clear signal that there is no pattemised decision 
approach, all depending on the circumstances as well as the subjective judgement 
of the accountants (or the managers of their companies, as they are reflecting the 
practices of their companies). This is perfectly matched with the expectancy 
decision processing model, as the model has contemplated the interactions 
between people's expectation with circumstantial factors in making decision 
choices, and the probable dispositions of decision makers in adopting any 
particular decision approach. According to the expectancy decision processing 
model, managers’ (and accountants) choices of decision cost models will vary 
when situation changes, depending on the perceived situations of the independent 
variables as described in the Model. Thus, there will not be any pattemised 
decision rule of adopting a particular cost concept and approach in making 
decisions of all types. Results shown in Table 27 confirm this proposition. With 
reference to Table 27, the results of the hypothetical cases are presented and 
analysed in below:
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Case One: Pricing for Ad Hoc Production Order
The respondents are asked about their choices of decision in the same 
hypothesised case of a company with idle production capacity. Please refer to 
the Case One in the questionnaire for details of the case data.
Question 1: At what offered price will you accept the order?
Accountants Students
Only accept offered price at or above current 
selling price
5 9
Accept offered price at or above total 
production costs
25 26
Accept any offered price above the marginal 
costs of production
15 18
Question 2: If competitors have reduced selling price from $200 / unit to $180 / 
unit, at what offered priced will you accept the offer ?
Accountants Students
Only accept offered price at or above current 
selling price ($200)
3 4
Accept offered price at or above reduced selling 
price ($180)
9 12
Accept offered price at or above total costs of 
production
20 23
Accept offered price at or above marginal costs 
of production
13 14
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Question 3: If competitors' price is reduced to $180 per unit, and future materials 
price will rise by 50%, then:
Accountants Students
Only accept offered price at or above current 
selling price ($200)
11 14
Accept offered price at or above reduced selling 
price ($180)
1 2
Accept offered price at or above revised total 
costs of production
26 32
Accept offered price at or above revised 
marginal costs of production
10 5
Question 4: If labour costs are fixed on a monthly basis, at what offered price 
will you accept the offer?
Accountants Students
Only accept offered price at or above current 
selling price
1 6
Accept offered price at or above total 
productions costs excluding labour costs
17 16
Accept offered price at or above total production 
costs
21 27
Others (revised marginal production costs) 5 4
Statistical analysis using both Wilcoxon tests and ANOVA models show that
decision preferences of the respondents have changed significantly under various
hypothetical conditions. For example, a F value of 26.274 is calculated between
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the decisions made for the first and the second question, showing a significant 
difference between the two groups of decision preferences at a level of less than 
1%. Thus it is proved that when conditions change, the same respondent will 
adopt a different costing approach. Moreover, there is a central tendency that the 
listed companies in question will take total costs of production as the minimum 
price for their product outputs, no matter whether they have idle capacity or not. 
Less than one third of the accountants state that their companies will accept 
orders at marginal costs of production, even though there is sufficient idle 
capacity. Interviews with the sample of five accountants further confirm this 
position, as the accountants in general say that their "bosses" seldom admit the 
concept of marginal contribution approach in business decisions. In order to 
follow the decision traits of the company (and the senior management), these 
accountants claim that they will not adopt the contribution approach in decision 
making in general, rather they tend to follow the full cost approach in many 
cases. Because the opportunity cost approach is not compatible with the full cost 
approach in most cases, thus their behaviour in adopting a full cost approach will 
also lead to the disposal of the opportunity cost approach as a direct 
consequence.
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Case Two: The China Investment Programme
The opportunity use of scarce resources in an investment decision may be 
different from that of a product pricing decision, as both decisions involve 
distinctive characteristics in terms of nature of decision and the level of 
complexity and uncertainty. Questions more directly related to the adoption of 
the opportunity cost approach are asked in this case to obtain direct response 
about the issue:
[Please refer to Case Two in the Questionnaire for Listed Companies]
Question 1: Treatment of Financing Interests
Accountants Students
Treat interests on finance as expenses in 
calculating returns
34 19
Treat interests on finance as capitalised costs 8 32
Ignore interests on finance in calculating project 
returns
3 2
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Question 2: Treatment of Benefits Earned from Existing Funds
Accountants Students
Charge current benefits as expenses in 
calculating returns
27 24
Include current benefits as capitalised costs 9 23
Ignore these earned benefits in calculating 
project returns
9 6
Question 3: Treatment of Contribution Loss to Existing Branch
Accountants Students
Charge contribution loss as expenses in 
calculating returns
32 23
Charge contribution loss as capitalised costs 5 22
Ignore contribution loss in calculating project 
returns
8 8
Question 4: Assessment of Project Returns
Accountants Students
Use a common assessment model for all 
projects
10 7
Use project geared assessment models for 
each project
14 26
Use opportunity cost based assessment model 16 20
Accept only the highest returned project and 
reject others
3 0
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Again, based on ANOVA tests the respondents’ choices change significantly at 
5% level (p=0.0468) when conditions change between question one and question 
two. This serves as an indication that even among accountants (and the listed 
companies in Hong Kong) the treatment of opportunity costs is quite inconsistent.
Since the finance charges are directly related to the acquisition of loans for the 
investment programme, these charges are reasonably charged to the projects. 
However, when the issue is related to idle funds, a proportion of accountants 
change their view and state that they will ignore the opportunity loss of interests 
income currently earned from the depositing of these idle funds. This is because 
the interests income, although no longer able to be earned, is not a direct expense 
arisen from the investment programme in a sense as the finance charges that must 
be paid from time to time after the starting of the investment programme. 
Actually a profit and loss (reporting) statement will not show anywhere the 
cessation of the current deposit interests. Moreover, as reflected by answers in 
question one to question three, accountants tend to bias towards treating 
financing costs and opportunity costs as expenses rather than capitalised costs. 
However, the accounting guidelines 2.205 issued by the Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants has stipulated that borrowing costs should be capitalised, although 
this is not a mandatory process in financial reporting. The treatment of
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borrowing costs as expenses thus clearly demonstrate management of companies 
will select an accounting processing and reporting model which best suits then- 
own expectations, even though the model is not recommended by the 
professional authority (since the Hong Kong Society of Accountants is the only 
professional body in Hong Kong privileged by Law to grant professional 
accounting qualifications and status). The rationale for the accountants and 
managers to treat borrowing costs as expenses is an interesting issue. However, 
a research of such rationale is not directly related to the scope of the current 
research model and thus will not be proceeded with in here.
Case Three: Selection of Plant Site
Being the most difficult case among the three cases, in fact with insufficient data 
from the accounting perspective to arrive at some "concrete" answers, there is an 
ex ante expectation that the accountants will tend to select the alternative that 
points to the deferral of the hypothesised decisions. This is an expected 
behaviour from the professional perspective based on the expectancy decision 
processing model. The processing of decision information is a effort spending 
task. When a greater degree of decision task uncertainty is added to the 
situation, accountants will try to minimise their effort by claiming more concrete 
information from other sources, such as further information provided by other
managers, in order to reduce the degree of uncertainty. Failing of that, 
accountants will have a temptation to defer the provision of decision choice 
recommendations to a later date, as they perceive no benefits to make an earlier 
recommendation of decision choices the benefits of which cannot be calculated 
upon. The minimisation of decision effort is one of the main concerns in the 
Expectancy Decision Processing Model, and therefore in the absence of any 
possibility to obtain further information (after all this is a hypothetical case with 
defined information set), the feasible action in accordance with the Model is to 
defer the decision. Based on the ex ante analysis the responses of the 
accountants are analysed:
[Please refer to Case Three in the Questionnaire for Listed Companies]
Question 1: Recommendation of City Choice for New Subsidiary
Accountants Students
Investment in China should be deferred 2 10
Town One in China should be selected for 
investment
6 7
Town Two in China should be selected for 
investment
2 13
Decision should be deferred as important 
information are missing
36 23
2 6 2
Similar to the findings in the students’ research, 75% of the accountants select to 
defer the decision until more information are obtained. Referring back to 
students’ results, 60% of the accounting students also take the same choice. Thus 
accountants and prospective accountants share similar views. The difference 
between the accountants group and the students group is due to the diverged 
behaviour of management and finance students (who are not accountants 
anyway) and has been discussed in the previous section, therefore the same 
arguments will not be repeated here.
Question 2: Recommendation given Entertainment Expenses in Mind
Accountants Students
Investment in China should be deferred 6 8
Town One should be selected 2 4
Town Two should be selected 1 11
Indifferent between the Two Towns 7 9
Decision should be deferred 29 21
With a perceived similar pattern of decision choices, statistical analysis through 
ANOVA test also shows an insignificant difference between the choices of 
action before and after the entertainment expenses information is added to the 
case. This is plausible as there are still many missing quantitative data that are
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regarded as important data by an accountant. Thus the adding of entertainment 
expenses neither amplifies nor reduces the degree of uncertainty in this case, and 
the logical behaviour with reference to the Expectancy Decision Processing 
Model will also be observed here. Disregarding the statistical impact it is 
noticed that more accountants have selected to make a decision (number of 
advocators for deferring the decision reduces from 36 to 29), despite the adding 
of an expense item which is uncertain in magnitude. This surprising result has 
also been found in the responses of the students, as stipulated on page 226. 
Therefore, the accountants may also favour the possibility of business success 
with the expenditure on business entertainment (expenses). Although there is no 
evidence to substantiate this proposition, it is an interesting point to note about.
Question 3: Recommendation given Uncertain Labour Mobility Costs
Accountants Students
Search for reasonably accurate estimation of 
labour costs before decision
33 32
Arbitrarily estimate labour mobility costs and 
proceed with investment calculations
9 11
Ignore labour mobility costs 2 10
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As accountants, it is completely logical and professional for them to select the 
choice of searching for a reasonably accurate estimation for the specific cost 
item. This is not only compatible with the professional knowledge of an 
accountant, but also viewed as a reflection of the role of the accountant in a firm.
In fact subsequent interviews with the sample of five accountants have 
confirmed this rationality. The interviewees have given the following 
explanation. The accountant as the main information provider in the company 
must often demand for accurate information and estimation of cost and revenue 
items. He is the officer in the firm who should provide as accurate information as 
possible to all other managers. In doing so the accountant reduces management 
uncertainty in many situations and allow for the company to operate in a more 
established route. Thus from an organisational perspective the accountant is not 
allowed to lose sight of this doctrine.
An Insight of the Decision Practices
Based on the comments and feedback provided by the qualified accountants of 
the listed companies in Hong Kong through their responses in the questionnaire, 
as well as subsequent interviews with the five accountants, an insight of the 
decision practices of business people in Hong Kong is formed. The first insight 
is that in the setting of decision environment, based on statistical inference about
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60% of the listed companies have maintained a management accounting 
information system, while less than 20% of these companies maintain an 
opportunity cost database. Moreover, the usual methods of determination 
compensation packages for managers are based on performance related models, 
which in turn relate to the reporting profitability of the companies. These two 
co-existing facts have lead to a situation where managers usually do not have 
sufficient information to make decisions within the opportunity cost context. 
This finding is compatible with the findings of March (1987). At the same time, 
it is found that managers in Hong Kong do not have the general motivation to 
make decisions within the opportunity cost context.
As proposed in the Expectancy Decision Processing Model, managers will try to 
select the cost model that will maximise their expected benefits through 
maximum performance as reflected by the select cost model. As managers 
perceive that they are not rewarded according to an opportunity base evaluation 
model, they incline to use some other decision models that will either minimise 
their contributed effort or maximise their perceived rewards according to a more 
financial reporting oriented model. The responses of the accountants who are 
reminded to provide information of their corporate practices instead of their own 
perceived professional judgement have confirmed this proposition. A majority of
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the companies have not maintained a systematic opportunity cost database, and 
too often the adopting of decision models is situational to the effect that there is 
no commitment if the opportunity cost model is adopted in making decisions.
The second insight is that, apart from the organisational context, managers of 
Hong Kong also favour a closed typed decision process, with little advice being 
sought from external consultants in most of the decision cases. Managers also do 
not follow any perceived pattern of decision traits or decision approach, and 
favour a flexible approach that enables them to adjust their decision choices 
among different decision task characteristics. The exclusion of external advice 
together with a flexible style decision approach have allowed managers to select 
their own favourite decision cost models under different circumstances without 
depriving their ability to maximise the perceived total value of decision behaviour 
as expressed in the framework model. To further facilitate the expectancy mode 
decision behaviour, managers tend to adopt a more human oriented decision 
approach. As a result, personal contact and relationship form an important 
element in the decision making process for business operations in Hong Kong.
The responses made by the accountants in respect to the hypothetical case 
studies have given more weights to the analysed insights stated above.
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Accountants have demonstrated that managers prefer pricing products on the 
total cost approach in accordance with the financial accounting perspective rather 
than a decision contribution approach; that managers like to have their own 
preferred cost calculation models which achieve their desired objectives despite 
there are announced guidelines to the accounting treatment of those items of 
concern; and that accountants in view of their organisational roles minimise 
decision losses while managers maximise decision benefits. All these research 
results have demonstrated a feasibility of substantiating the Expectancy Decision 
Processing Model.
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CHAPTER 7
THE CASE OF A CHAIN SUPERMARKET STORE
To obtain a more thorough understanding of the actual decision practices of 
business managers, a chain supermarket store, The K-K Supermarkets, was 
selected for a case study. The case study was carried out for the purposes of 
getting into more detailed analysis of the actual decision behaviour of business 
people in making various kinds of business decisions. During the case study, 
interviews had been held with the general manager, the operations manager, and 
the accountant of the chain store. Certain documents related to operations and 
policy making of the company were obtained, together with a half day in house 
observation with the general manager on how he made routine and strategic 
decisions. The selection of the chain store is based on the following reasons:
1. This is one of the largest supermarket chain stores in Hong Kong, with 
more than 20 supermarket stores located in various regions in Hong Kong.
2. This is the only supermarket store among other big supermarket groups in 
Hong Kong that is totally run by Chinese people of Hong Kong. The
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supermarket is a subsidiary of a listed company, the chairman of which is 
one of the billionaires in Hong Kong. This gentleman is a traditional 
Chinese businessman and thus business practices and decision behaviour 
of the chain store are representative to the general practices of Chinese 
people in Hong Kong.
3. The gentleman, as a billionaire in Hong Kong, is also a good friend of 
many Chinese officials and businessmen including the highest rank 
officials of the Country. Thus, he is very familiar with the decision mode 
of Chinese officials and businessmen. An understanding of how managers 
of the supermarket store deal with China trade thus forms a good example 
to those business people, who wish to establish business in China.
The Organizational Structure of the Firm
The chain supermarket store was established in 1986. Mr. Yeung, the general 
manager of the store, headed the firm since its establishment. The company is 
affiliated with two listed companies in Hong Kong and is now one of the top five 
supermarket chains in Hong Kong. Annual turnover of the company by itself is 
about HK$ 400 million. At present the company is taking positive steps to 
expand its business into the China market. It is going to launch its first retail
outlet in the form of a discount wholesale club in China by early 1996.
The general manager is the operational head of the whole supermarket chain. 
Basically the company adopts a functional structure. Managers are appointed to 
head a functional department and are responsible for a particular function across 
the company. Mr. Yeung, the general manager, admitted that the functional 
structure was most appropriate to the company, as at the time of interview all the 
locus of management was situated in Hong Kong. Moreover, this structure 
would remain in force for the coming future even though the company is 
expecting to expand its geographic business region into different cities in China. 
The main reason for retaining this type of organizational structure is to retain 
centralised control for management. As expressed by the general manager, the 
company following the management culture of the holding company and its 
chairman had adopted a more authoritative or parental type of management 
control. He considered that this is the normal managerial practice of Chinese 
businessmen in Hong Kong.
The Decision Mode of the Company
With the establishment of a functional structure and a more centralised locus of 
control, the company had adopted a more or less top down decision mode in
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making business decisions. Generally, the decision hierarchy was compatible 
with the management hierarchy, with more decision authority rested with the 
higher rank managers. Staff and managers of lower rank were allowed to submit 
comments and suggestions in relation to a particular decision of the company. 
However, final decisions rested with the managers concerned. Once the decision 
was made, junior managers had no alternatives to object but had to follow 
instructions to carry out the decision. Only in very rare cases senior management 
of the chain store invited a participative mode of decision making process, and 
in most cases senior managers did not even need to explain to subordinates why 
a particular decision was made.
This top down parental type of decision mode was viewed as acceptable and 
normal by the general manager and the operations manager, who also held the 
view that most managers of the company, senior or otherwise, also accepted this 
type of decision mode and regarded the practice as normal and functional. 
Because of the non-participative decision mode, decision information was also 
selectively disclosed to the managers concerned only, while lower rank managers 
were usually debarred from obtaining such kinds of "confidential" decision 
information. The retention of confidentiality in information processing was 
compatible with the mode of centralised control, so that managers could only act
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according to instructions without much opportunity to take self-initiated actions. 
Senior managers were of the opinion that if managers of various levels were able 
to carry out management plans as told, then the expected performance of the 
company would more likely to be achieved. Although this view has to be based 
on the presumption that senior and top management had given appropriate 
instructions, both the general manager and the operations manager of the 
company saw no problems to this decision practice. Although they had not 
expressed to me in a more explicit way, both managers had implicitly 
demonstrated their confidence in giving appropriate instructions to sub-managers 
in achieving the company's business objective.
Performance Evaluation and Reward
The performance evaluation and reward system of the company was basically 
divided into two categories. For operational managers they were usually 
assessed according to their operational results, together with an appraisal made 
by their immediate supervisors. With regard to the managers of supportive 
functions (e.g. the accountant and the personnel manager), performance 
assessment was largely based on supervisors’ appraisal. The general manager 
admitted that sometimes bias might exist by way of managerial appraisal, but he 
also pointed out that management judgement was crucial in determining whether
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a manager was really performing well or not, as he asserted that in many cases 
performance could not be visualised merely by some recorded data. Since the 
emphasis of this case study is primarily related to operations and investment 
decisions, measurement and reward of operational management receive primary 
attention.
Reward Scheme for Operational Management
Basically the salaries of operational managers fell within a fixed range according 
to their ranks. Within the range, the performance of the manager as reflected by 
both operational results and supervisor's appraisal was counted for the final 
determination of a manager's salaries. To the branch managers of the K-K 
supermarkets, the branch's achieved sales and gross profits were taken as the 
initial indicators for operational performance. As explained by Mr. Poon, the 
operations manager, the reasons of using these two figures were :
1. Turnover expansion was one of the best indicators to validate the 
company's claim as a top supermarket chain in Hong Kong. Moreover, 
because of the peculiar business nature of the supermarket business, more 
turnover would mean more suppliers' financing, which was beneficial to 
the company.
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2. Some expenses were not controllable by the branch managers, and thus 
they had restricted effort to effectively control the net profitability of the 
branch. Actually these branch managers were not allowed to know the 
magnitude of some of the operational expenses. Therefore, it was useless 
to require these managers to maximise net profits.
The branch managers were told of the measurement indicators, so that they knew 
what they should do at the outset. However, both the general manager and the 
operations manager expressed that managerial adjustment to these two figures 
would be made. The general manager had quoted examples of population 
movement to illustrate the point. He said that if a particular branch supermarket 
was situated in a newly developed area where the population had doubled in one 
year, then the turnover of the supermarket was also expected to be doubled by 
way of pure turnover per capita calculation. Moderate increases of turnover from 
last year thus was not an indication of better performance, but rather an 
indication of incapable management. On the other hand, for some supermarkets 
which were located in the "old" areas where more and more residents of the 
younger generations were moving away, leaving behind only the old people 
living in these areas, then a decrease of turnover was surely expected. To the
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managers of these supermarkets, appropriate adjustments must be made to reflect 
the reality. Therefore, the branch results were only used as a reference rather 
than a determinant measurement.
Apart from the branch results, branch managers were also assessed on their 
managerial capacities. The operations manager would visit the branches himself 
at intervals. He would see if the layout of the supermarket was good, whether 
the full categories of goods were available, whether staff of the supermarket were 
working properly, and whether in his opinion good customer service had been 
provided. With reference also to the zone managers' (who supervise a group of 
branch managers) opinion, the operations manager then gave an appraised grade 
to the manager concerned, which was used as an important reference in the 
reward calculation.
The salaries of operational zone managers were based on zone performance, 
together with operations manager's personal appraisal. Again a greater part of 
the assessment process was based on managerial judgement rather than recorded 
data of the zone. Branch and zone managers were also paid with a bonus at the 
end of year. The calculation and determination of bonus payments for each 
manager were similar to that of salaries setting, and thus better performed
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managers would be paid a larger sum of bonuses, and poorly performed 
managers would be paid a lesser sum, or even deprived of the bonus payment.
Although the managers knew about the basic assessment criteria, the actual 
assessment process had not been disclosed to the managers concerned. 
Managers would only receive the notice of decision as made by the operations 
manager, and they were not told of the reasons about the decision. Both the 
general manager and the operations managers regarded this practice as 
reasonable, and they saw no reason why discussion needs to be held between the 
branch manager and senior management before the amount of salary and bonus 
payments were decided, although this practice was advocated in some accounting 
texts (Drury 1992).
A question was raised to both managers to seek their viewpoint whether they 
would think that branch and zone managers, knowing that the turnover and gross 
profitability were looked upon, would take actions to maximise reporting figures 
of such at the expenses of the company in the long run. Both managers rejected 
this possibility as they emphasized that managerial appraisals were made and 
thus managers could not manipulate accounting data to suit self interests. They 
also pointed out that one of the main reasons to introduce managerial appraisals
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was to avoid manipulation of accounting performance by operational managers. 
Their opinions perhaps have substantiated the argument that managerial 
judgement is more important than accounting statements in many occasions.
Accounting and Management Information Systems
The company maintained a hill set of financial accounts. Basically the set of 
financial accounts as maintained by the company was similar to most other firms 
in Hong Kong. The financial accounting system was maintained at corporate 
headquarters, with branch and zone management being denied of any access to 
the financial books and records. The following monthly accounting reports were 
prepared by the accountant of the company :
1. Monthly Profit and Loss Account
2. Monthly Balance Sheet
3. Gross Profit Analysis on Branch Basis
4. Warehouse Scan Report -
This was a report of stock levels and stock movements.
Also, for each half year, an accounting report was produced for the purpose of 
analysis of gross profitability on important categories of products being sold by
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the company through its supermarket chains. All the above-mentioned reports 
were only circulated among senior management (operations manager and above), 
except that the warehouse scan report would also be distributed to the inventory 
control section. Also the accounting system had been designed in a way that 
only the chief accountant could gain access to the full set of accounting 
information, and other accounting staff had no opportunity to know about the 
overall profitability of the company. The purpose of access denial of accounting 
information was to ensure that the company's financial information would not be 
released to the knowledge of any third party. This practice also forms evidence 
that the company incorporates centralised control, and the company similar to 
most companies in Hong Kong regards its financial data as confidential data 
which should not be released in any way.
Non-existence of A Management Accounting Information system
Regarding management accounting system the general manager confirmed that 
the company had not ever maintained a cost accounting or management 
accounting system. When asked about the reasons of not maintaining such a 
system, he admitted that there was no need in the previous years when the 
trading results of the company were in a satisfactory growing trend. He further 
admitted that he would only search for ac hoc managerial accounting data as and
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when he saw necessary. To further clarify the point, the general manager was 
asked if he thinks that it was not cost benefit worthy to maintain a management 
accounting system for the company. Surprisingly he answered that this was not 
an issue of cost and benefit analysis. In terms of money the company had no 
problem at all in keeping a full set of management accounts and employing a 
management accountant to look after the costing books and ledgers. Rather the 
main reason was that he had never come to his mind that there was a need to 
establish a formal system to provide management accounting information on a 
routine basis. To eliminate suspicion the general manager confirmed that he was 
an accounting graduate and had obtained the designation of AICPA. Therefore, 
the preclusion in the setting of a management accounting system was not based 
on his ignorance in the area. During the discussions the candidate had exchanged 
views with the general manager, Mr. Yeung, on some management accounting 
issues, and accordingly I recognized that Mr. Yeung was well versed with 
current management accounting concept and knowledge. Therefore, the 
explanation as provided by Mr. Yeung for not maintaining a management 
accounting system (that he did not perceive a need of maintaining such a system) 
was acceptable.
Referring to the current conditions of Hong Kong, Mr. Yeung agreed that the
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business atmosphere of Hong Kong was becoming more unfavourable. Because 
of more severe competition and the weakening consumption power of people in 
Hong Kong, his firm was facing with tough times. In order to be more 
competitive in terms of cost control and market planning, he was planning to 
establish a management accounting system for the company in order that more 
accurate cost information are available for decision making purposes. Mr. 
Yeung's idea also echoes his earlier statement that he had not thought of 
introducing a management accounting system when times were good and profits 
were improving in previous years.
Apart from the internal accounting information, Mr. Yeung confirmed that the 
company had maintained some data that were useful for decision making. These 
data included:
1. Competitors* Product Prices
There were two major competitors to the company, namely the Welcome 
Supermarket Chains and the Park N Shop Chains. To maintain 
competitiveness of the company, price movements of the products being 
sold by these two supermarket chains were closely recorded. If the 
marketing manager was aware that the price of a particular category of
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goods was getting much higher than one of the competitors, then prices 
had to be lowered to regain competitiveness and retain customers from 
shifting to the competitors.
2. General Economic and Demographic Data
The company had maintained data relating to the general economic 
conditions of Hong Kong, including the gross domestic production data, 
populations, gross income range of productive people, the average income 
per capita, and other useful data that showed reflections on possible 
consumption power of people in Hong Kong. Moreover, demographic 
data were also stored, such as population distribution among different 
areas, age group distribution, and rough customer preferences for different 
categories of customers.
Apart from data of Hong Kong, the company was also beginning to collect 
data related to China, especially those data which were related to the 
Guang Dong Province which would be the target stepping stone for the 
company to penetrate into the China market. The purpose of collecting 
groups of data relating to China was to ensure that some comparison could 
be made between the Hong Kong market and the China market. Through
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the comparison processes, experiences of Hong Kong became more 
valuable for the company to plan for its emergence into China, as the 
general manager could decide if the characteristics experienced in the 
Hong Kong market might also apply to the China market.
Although most economic and demographic data were not reflected in the 
normal accounting reports, the general manager of the company asserted 
that these data were very important in making decisions. As an example, 
he confirmed that he would rather decide to open a new branch store in a 
rural area with growing population than to open a branch store in an 
established area where people were shifting to other residential areas and 
only the old ones were left behind. In this example Mr. Yeung asserted 
that the population and age distribution data were far more important than 
the basic profitability calculations in the determination of priority of new 
branch stores.
The Decision Making Processes
To obtain core data for the purposes of this case study, both the general manager 
and the operations manager were asked about how they make decisions in 
different circumstances. Similar to other companies, Mr. Yeung, the general
2 8 3
manager, stated that the general approach in making routine decisions was 
different from making non-routine decisions. As further clarified by the general 
manager, in general some set of policies and calculation models were maintained 
for the routine decisions, and the responsible managers needed only follow the 
rules in making decisions. Managerial judgement was exercised in a lesser 
extent in these kind of decisions, and accounting data was more relied upon. On 
the other hand, for non-routine decisions Mr. Yeung preferred to describe the 
decision practice as a case oriented practice, that in each individual decision 
situation he had to consider what data should be obtained and used. He 
confirmed that in general as the decision becomes more complex and more 
uncertain, he would require more information, and the final decision was to a 
greater extent based on his own managerial judgement rather than to the 
accounting calculations. He further said that in many cases accounting data only 
held a relatively trivial position in the decision process. To understand his ideas 
more clearly, specific decisions were used as examples to show how decisions 
were made.
Pricing Decisions for the Company’s Products
The operations manager was specifically asked about how does the company 
determined the prices of the products sold in their supermarket stores. Mr. Poon,
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the operations manager, explained that the marketing manager or his delegates 
determined the price of products. In deciding what prices should be charged, the 
following data were referred to:
1. The costs of the products
Costs of the products included the prices as charged by the supplier and 
any freight in costs. In general the cost data was used as the reference and 
also as the base line price.
2. The prices set by the major competitors
as mentioned before the company faced competition from two major 
competitors, the Welcome Shop and the Park N Shop. The prices charged 
by these two supermarket stores for the same product were duly 
considered to ensure competitive prices could be set.
3. The forecasted demands
Mr. Poon asserted that many products experienced seasonal or cyclical 
demand periods. In a period of expected peak demands, the prices of 
those demanded products would be set a little bit lower to further stimulate 
the buying wishes of the consumers. He quoted soft drinks as an example,
that during the Summer periods when the weather was very hot in Hong 
Kong, at least one to two brands of soft drinks were priced at a reduced 
level each time to attract more consumption by customers. Mr. Poon 
further confirmed that price reduction were seldom made for soft drinks in 
Winter time when demand was expected to be low, and the products 
became more price inelastic.
4. Stock conditions
Some categories of goods and stock had only a short life period, beyond 
which the products would become obsolete or perished. These perishable 
goods were carefully monitored to ensure their saleability. When the 
conditions of these products were good, prices would be set according to 
other conditions mentioned in the previous sections. But as the products 
got closer to the end of their life period, special reduction in price would 
be made to encourage immediate demands for these products.
As confirmed by Mr. Poon, the marketing manager who took into consideration 
all the factors stated above arrived at final settlement of price for individual 
products. At present there was no formula or any quantitative model for the 
setting of product prices, and in all cases managerial judgement was exercised in
determining the prices. Usually he would have a look on the set prices and see if 
he had any disagreement. If he did not find anything wrong, then the branch 
managers were informed of the set prices and they would label the prices of the 
products. Mr. Poon confirmed that in general prices of products would be the 
same across all supermarket outlets, and branch managers had no authority at all 
to alter such set prices, nor could they offer any discount to customers.
A question was raised that why were the branch managers deprived of the 
authority to adjust product prices or give discounts to customers. Mr. Poon, the 
operations manager, replied that branch managers should not be granted such 
authority, otherwise the supermarket chain as a whole would be inconsistent in 
product prices and internal competition might arise among individual branches, 
especially some of the branches were physically located in nearby regions. A 
follow up question was asked about the problem that as branch managers had no 
authority to reduce product prices to attract business, they were debarred from 
improving their branch performance to a greater or lesser extent. The operations 
manager then reassured that branch managers could make use of other methods 
to attract customers, such as providing better services to the customers. Also he 
stressed that branch managers’ salaries, bonuses, and even promotion prospects 
were not solely based on the branch performance as reflected in the accounting
profitability; rather senior management's view and judgment might count more. 
Therefore branch managers should not be granted too much authority in order to 
retain tight control across the company.
Expansion Decision
As the company was still in a growing stage, new branches of supermarkets were 
being opened from time to time. The general manager and the operations 
manager were asked about how they decided where to open a new branch, and 
what factors were taken into serious consideration.
The operations manager in the first place provided the general procedures in the 
expansion decision process:
1. A search of suitable location for the opening of a branch supermarket was 
constantly made. Usually a suitable location in the initial sense meant that no 
sizeable supermarket store had been established in that location either by the 
company itself or by its major competitors. These locations included the 
newly developed rural areas, new housing estates, and some loosely 
populated areas in the countryside.
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2. Once a suitable location was identified, a search for a site suitable for a
branch supermarket was made. The site might be a shop space in a large 
shopping mall, or on the ground floor of some commercial buildings. The 
site must also be located either near the centre of the area, or easily 
accessible by customers from around the location.
3. When a suitable site was identified, the owner of the site was approached
to negotiate for the renting or purchases of the site, as the case may be, for
the purposes of ascertaining the feasibility of the expansion project.
4. Upon initial agreement being sought from the owner of the site, the cost of 
renting / purchasing the space was known. An estimated profitability 
analysis was then prepared to consider whether it was profitable to open a 
branch supermarket at the location. With reference to such, the estimated 
profitability in the first two to three years formed the core concern from 
the accounting point of view. However, because of the peculiar situation 
of suppliers financing in the supermarket industry, turnover would be the 
crucial factor in the analysis. Moreover, as stressed above by the general 
manager, there were special circumstances when a branch supermarket
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would be planned to open in an area with expected loss in the first years, 
with a long run expectation of large profitability when population would be 
gradually building up in the area.
In preparing the profitability analysis, the operations manager admitted that many 
estimates were subject to high degree of uncertainty, and at times rough guesses 
could only be made for particular items. When the operations manager was 
asked if he had ever made use of the opportunity cost approach in arriving at the 
profitability analysis, he confessed that actually he had never considered what 
approach should be used in preparing the analysis, and he had never come to 
mind about the opportunity cost concept in making the expansion decisions. To 
clarify about the operations manager’s opinions, he was asked for a further 
elaboration of what he said. To start with, the operations manager was tested to 
ensure that he knew about the opportunity cost concept, at least from a 
theoretical perspective. After confirming that he was familiar with the basic 
opportunity cost concept, the operations manager was questioned why he did not 
make use of the concept in making decisions, as advocated in the accounting 
texts. He did not provide any reasons for the rejection of such, except from 
saying that he simply had never considered the concept in practice. Mr. Poon 
was then further asked if he had ever adopted the opportunity cost concept in
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decision making processes. He simply replied that he would identify necessary 
information for decision making, and he was care about whether he had adopted 
the opportunity cost approach or not in a particular decision. He further said that 
he would not deny if he had adopted the opportunity cost approach in some 
decisions, but he would consider it equally true that he had not adopted the 
concept in other decisions. The operations manager was then asked if he could 
identify some characteristics of the decisions for which he had adopted the 
opportunity cost approach. But he could not provide an answer to this question.
The Case of Idle Resources in the Expansion Decision
To obtain a more exact opinion of how management view about the opportunity 
cost concept in the decision process, a hypothetical situation was raised with 
both the general manager and the operations manager to consider.
It was hypothesized that, in the opening of a particular new branch, the required 
staff and labour could be transferred from other existing branches, so that no 
additional staff was required to be recruited. Since these existing staff were 
paying salaries and wages by the company (and presuming that the company had 
no intention at all to terminate their employment because of whatever reasons), 
both the general manager and the operations manager were asked if in this case
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the staffs salaries and wages would still be charged to the new branch in the 
calculation of estimated profitability. The question was raised in separate 
occasions so that either manager did not know that the same hypothetical 
question was asked to the other party, to ensure that they would give their own 
view irrespective of the other manager's opinion.
Responding to the question, both managers immediately replied that staff salaries 
and wages must be included in the calculations. An explanation was then made 
to the managers, that within the context of the opportunity cost concept, since the 
staff were transferred from existing branches, and their salaries and wages were 
being paid, there was no value foregone in transferring the staff to the new 
branch, and thus the salaries and wages were regarded as "free costs" and should 
not be included in the cost benefit calculation. These existing staff, in this 
hypothetical case, were actually "idle capacity" of the company and were thus 
needed to be disregarded (whether interpreted by the relevant cost concept or the 
opportunity cost concept) in the calculation of estimated profitability.
The operations manager seemed to be surprised at the explanation. He did not 
raise any argument on the conceptual validity of the opportunity cost concept. 
Rather he simply said that this was not the usual practice in making such kind of
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decisions. Mr. Poon, the operations manager, further stressed that only by 
including staff salaries and wages in the calculation of estimated profits could he 
have a clear idea whether the branch would be profitable or not. Similar answers 
were also provided by Mr. Yeung, the general manager, who also considered that 
a new branch would only be opened if expected revenues could cover total costs, 
including staff wages and salaries, be it staff newly recruited or transferred from 
existing branches. Mr. Yeung, as an accountant himself, expressed his view that 
although he knew what were taught at college, he would not follow that simple 
trick of opportunity cost model and disregard idle capacity costs in real business 
decisions, especially the expansion decision involved a longer term of 
consideration.
Adoption of the Opportunity Cost Concept
At the end of the field study, discussion was directly pointed to the adoption of 
the opportunity cost concept in business decisions. The framework of analysis 
was shown to Mr. Yeung for his comments, especially on the issue whether he 
would consider a particular independent factor as shown in the framework could 
significantly explain the adoption or otherwise of the concept of opportunity 
costs in business decisions. After carefully studying the framework diagram, and 
exchanging view with the candidate, Mr. Yeung provided the following
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comments about the issue:
1. He would disregard the personal attributes factor and considered that this 
factor, although a very important factor by itself in the selection of the final 
decision choice, was not important at all in respect of whether the 
opportunity cost approach was adopted or not. The reason he provided 
was that the adoption of the opportunity cost approach was dependent 
upon technical feasibility and environmental circumstances in essence, 
which preclude the application of personal attributes.
2. The essence of adopting the opportunity cost approach from an accounting 
perspective was that, for each decision alternative, all related data must be 
presented in form of quantified opportunity costs. Only in such situation 
could a pure opportunity cost model be adopted and used in arriving at the 
decision choice. However, the quantification of decision data into 
quantified opportunity costs was a technical issue where barriers existed in 
most cases. Relating to the framework of analysis, Mr. Yeung first 
pointed out the mere maintenance of a financial reporting system, or even 
a routine management accounting system, did not necessarily suffice to 
provide required opportunity cost data in many situations, as opportunity
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costs in many cases were those costs unrelated with any recorded 
transactions of the company whatsoever. Mr. Yeung pointed out that the 
accounting systems maintained by companies in Hong Kong were 
transaction based in domain, and were internally generated in most cases 
(including the traditional standard costing systems). These transaction 
based and internally generated accounting systems did not provide 
sufficient data to present accounting statements from an opportunistic 
approach, and thus either special accounting reports were solicited by the 
accountant in isolated circumstances, or that managers had to rely upon 
these "routine’' accounting statements in making their decisions. However, 
as an accountant himself and being a senior professional manager for many 
years, Mr. Yeung admitted that preparation of a special accounting report 
from an opportunistic approach was a very tough task. Knowing the 
difficulty in preparing such an accounting report he himself rarely 
demanded it from the accountant.
3. Similar to the effect of accounting system, the task characteristics 
constituted another important factor to the adoption of the opportunity cost 
concept. In the opinion of Mr. Yeung, task uncertainty and the possibility 
of contradictory results from alternatives form the basic deterrent in
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adopting the opportunity cost approach. According to Mr. Yeung, most of 
the real life business decisions involved factors that were highly uncertain 
in nature, to the extent that even a rough estimation within the tolerable 
error range about the event probabilities of different alternatives might not 
be able to be made. In these cases the calculation of opportunity gains and 
losses from an accounting perspective were virtually impossible, other 
than applying the (professional) judgement of the manager concerned. Mr. 
Yeung further blamed the usual examples shown in accounting textbooks 
that these examples had misled accounting students to the presumption that 
somehow certain quantitative models must be applicable to most of the 
decision cases (be it statistical model or otherwise) in arriving at some 
calculated results from an accounting perspective. Rather he stated in his 
own experience that many business decisions had to be made in the 
absence of any applicable quantitative models of analysis. In addition to 
task uncertainty, the general manager also recognized the effect of task 
complexity, which exerted a similar burden to the adoption of the 
opportunistic approach in decision processes.
In his concluding remarks, Mr. Yeung admitted that he would exercise judgment
in respect of the opportunity cost reasoning in many business decision situations.
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However, invoking the opportunity cost reasoning from a managerial perspective 
was quite different from an accounting perspective, with the core difference 
being that he did not need, and had not required, any opportunity cost statements 
in making such decisions. Mr. Yeung further admitted that even he himself had 
no idea at all how to quantify the opportunity costs of different decision factors 
when he made decisions. He quoted an example about his recent investment 
decision in China involving a capital fund of US $100 million. The investment 
was decided to be made in Shanghai of China rather than another alternative city 
simply because Mr. Chow, the multi-billionaire who was chairman of the holding 
company, got to know the mayor of Shanghai better than that alternative city. 
Mr. Yeung said that he had no idea of how to quantity the impact of better 
personal relationship between Mr. Chow and the mayor of Shanghai in any 
acceptable accounting calculations, somehow he felt more comfortable in 
investing in Shanghai because of this better personal relationship. He stressed 
that this factor of personal relationship was a concern of opportunity cost 
reasoning, and he considered himself invoking the opportunity cost approach in 
the investment decision, but the problem was that he could not agree to any 
assertion or advocacy that he was invoking an opportunity cost accounting model 
within the accounting perspective in making this investment decision. A further 
concern of Mr. Yeung was that he would not strike hard to obtain the opportunity
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cost data, as there was no motivation for him to do so, and he perceived himself 
making good decisions that could improve the reporting profitability of the 
company without such full set of opportunity costs information. He concluded 
that only if all available data were able to be quantified into opportunity costs 
could the approach be adopted in business decision processes, but that situation 
would only happen in very rare cases in the lower levels of concern.
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CHAPTER 8
A Critical Review of the Opportunity Cost Concept
The Accounting Craft as an Artifact of the Business World
Distinguished from the physical world, the accounting craft is after all an 
invented tool by people to fulfil certain human needs. The original purposes of 
creating such an artifact were to keep record of human activities and transactions, 
business or otherwise, from an economic perspective, so that people knew what 
had happened to their wealth endowment through a series of activities and 
transactions (Edwards 1937). As an artifact of this kind, the accounting craft is 
thus a tool or system which is subject to modification, alterations, and even 
reconstruction from time to time to reflect the different desires of people in 
different decades (Hopwood 1987). Along the trajectory of time, there were 
evidence that demonstrate the change of circumstances in the social, economical 
and other aspects of the human society, which affected and interacted with 
people in the formation and evolution of a new society. People perceiving the 
changes in various aspects of the society in turn adjust and modify the accounting 
craft to the required extent in order that this invented tool will continuously serve 
the changing demands and needs of people. Thus the concept, paradigm, and 
operations of the accounting craft are undergoing constant changes along the
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passage of time (Yip 1987). As a corollary the identification, recognition, 
interpretation and operation of a particular cost concept have all undergone 
changes between decades of time, and opportunity cost concept is no exception 
to this norm.
The Theory of Choice and Opportunity Cost Concept
Since the very first formal discussion of the opportunity cost concept it has been 
linked with the theory of choice of actions and the acceptance or rejection of 
alternative choices. The costs of decision choices are claimed to be the value 
that is foregone by the decision maker (who is also inherently meant to be the 
beneficiary as well) in taking up a particular choice and rejecting the others 
(Smith 1776, Coase 1938, Thirlby 1946, Buchanan 1973). When a person is 
going to make a decision, he is bound to consider the possible values of all 
available alternatives and select the one that allows him to obtain the highest 
value among the choice set (Edwards 1937).
Based on a general interpretation of the Marshallian demand curve analysis, a 
point on the demand curve of a particular product or commodity represents, 
strictly speaking, the maximum quantity that people are willing to buy at the 
corresponding price. This willingness to pay the price and buy the commodity
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represents the consumers' preferred choice and decision to spend the amount of 
money in obtaining utility. In terms of the theory of choice this willingness to 
buy means that consumers consider that by buying the commodity at the set 
price, the utilities that can be obtained from the ownership and consumption of 
the commodity is greater than, or at least as good as, spending the amount of 
money elsewhere, thus they are willing to give up the alternative opportunities of 
spending the money. However, the interpretation of the Marshallian demand 
analysis is usually linked with the statement that "other things being the same". 
Although there can be different interpretations to this phrase (Friedman 1953), it 
is the meanings of this conditional phrase that have imposed unsolved constraints 
to the application of the opportunity cost concept to the demand analysis.
According to the Marshallian demand curve, with the ordinary expression that 
other things being the same, a point on the demand curve of a person in regard to 
a commodity represents the maximum quantity that a person is willing to buy at 
the price, and other points along the curve represent the change of choice action 
of that person to increase or reduce the quantity of purchases in response to the 
change of price, and the shifting of the amount of economic resources (money) to 
and from other commodities that he can obtain at their respective prices. This 
shifting of purchasing and consumption decisions are demonstrated by way of
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marginal utility analysis (Marshall 1920). However, the existence of the demand 
curve, the analysis of change of consumption behaviour with respect to the 
relative change in prices, and the validity of the theory of choice all depend on 
the basic presumption that there is a choice available to the person who selects to 
consume economic resources in return for satisfaction, as it has been asserted 
that if there is no choice, there is no cost at all (Robbins 1934). If there is no 
choice at all, such that there is only one commodity in the world that is available 
for purchase and consumption, then the consumer would have no choice but to 
spend all his money to buy whatever quantity he may get of that commodity. He 
can only decide his own preference list of consumption choices until and unless 
there are alternative commodities that are available for purchases, which then 
affect the collective demand curves of individual commodities and make valid the 
application of the opportunity cost and marginal utility analysis. The problem of 
applying the above argument in practice is that it is not the issue of whether 
choices are available as a matter of fact, it is the issue of whether the decision 
maker has perceived the available set of choices; and base on the perceived set 
of choices, whether he can actually construct the preferred set of choices 
according to the theory of choice and the opportunity cost concept.
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Application of the Opportunity Cost Concept
With reference to the theory of imperfect information and information 
asymmetry, the perceived set of available choices will be different from the total 
set of available choices in many cases. Thus a person in practice is always 
considering a subset of choices to the universal set that restricts his ability to 
obtain for an optimal choice of actions in maximising his utilities. It may be 
argued that the presence of imperfect information needs not invalidate the theory 
of choice and the application of the opportunity cost concept, that so long as the 
person makes decision in according to the opportunity cost reasoning given the 
restricted perceived set of choices, the economic analyses still exert their 
influence in explaining and demonstrating economic phenomena (Coase 1938). 
However, there are two problems arising from the issue. Firstly, making a 
decision in the knowledge of imperfect information inevitably leads to the risk of 
sub-optimal decisions which would affect the decision maker’s choice, as the 
decision maker has to make subjective judgement of the risk distribution. As put 
forward by Coase (1938, pp. 104), a person who buys a lottery ticket is not 
interested in the most probable result. The decision to buy a lottery ticket is 
inevitably a personal choice of preference, that he rather spends, say, a dollar to 
buy a lottery ticket than to spend it the other way. However, whether this is a 
rational, or economic wise a good decision with available opportunities, is unable
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to be verified by any observer.
This problem can be better illustrated when the second issue is taken into 
consideration. To enable an optimal decision to be made, even within the scope 
of bounded rationality (Simon 1957), the decision maker must be able to decide, 
at least to his own recognition, the preferred list of alternative actions, and in 
case of choices of multiple decisions (such as quantity mix in additional to 
number of commodities), he must be able to construct the marginal preference 
list of different mix of choices. This ability to construct the marginal preference 
list is, regrettably, taken as granted in nearly all economic literatures. The ability 
to construct such a list, however, is subject to various constraints in practice. A 
major constraint is the time element. Because the shortage of time a decision 
maker may not be able to construct a marginal preference list for the particular 
decision he is going to make. A failure of doing so renders the decision situation 
showing a higher degree of task uncertainty, as the decision maker is uncertain 
about the possible consequence of his arbitrary choice of actions. The possibility 
that decision factors could change from time to time imposes another constraint 
to construct a marginal preference list of choices. The existence of the variety of 
choices, the availability or otherwise of the information set, and the uncertainty 
of event occurrence probabilities all contribute to a complex situation where
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strict arrangement of preferences is hardly an easy task. Given the constraints 
that exist in a decision making process, a decision maker may be unable to act in 
line with what the theory of choice proposes, and select the alternative that can 
allow for maximum utility or satisfaction in accordance with the opportunity cost 
concept, because he is not necessarily granting the chance to measure, evaluate, 
and identify the preferential opportunities that would in theory bring him the 
greatest satisfaction. As a corollary, a person’s decision choice could be a sub- 
optimal one within available information and choice set. Of course, this 
statement that a sub-optimal decision could be made is subject to two 
reservations. The first reservation is that there has never been any research that 
can provide a rough idea of how fast a person can formulate a marginal 
preference list, and thus it could be argued that every person could construct his 
marginal preference list in seconds. The second reservation refers back to the 
REMM model as proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1994). According to the 
REMM model, a person is always maximising his total utilities, after taking into 
accounts all factors pertaining to the decision situations, including non-economic 
factors that have not been taken into account in most economic literature. 
However, even with reference to these two possible reservations, the argument 
that a decision maker, in a business context, may not be able to make optimal 
decisions by invoking the opportunity cost concept is still valid.
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Business Applications of the Opportunity Cost Concept
With reference to the Expectancy Decision Processing Model in a business 
environment, results of the researches with the students groups and the 
professional accountants group reveal that business managers in making 
decisions are shaped by the said Model, and thus they do not intend to make 
decisions according to the traditional opportunity cost approach as stipulated in 
the general economic and accounting texts. According to the research, the 
results and comments have been arrived at:
1. There is still a wide recognition of the profit maximisation objective 
in the business world. However, apart from the profit concept other 
concepts are also increasingly regarded as prime objectives by 
business firms. The inclusion of non profit oriented objectives is 
compatible with the modem management theories, which recognise 
the multi-objective phenomenon. However, managers of these firms 
have to face with multiple business objectives which arouse some 
technical difficulties in the decision making process, as effects of 
decision alternatives on the non profit objectives will not be readily 
recognised, thus increasing the uncertainty between perceived 
management efforts and successful task performance.
306
2. Although it is desirable to maintain both a management accounting 
information system and also opportunity cost database, in practice 
few companies within the listed companies group in Hong Kong 
have maintained both systems. Results indicate that only about 60% 
of the listed companies operate a management accounting system, 
while less than 20% of the companies maintain a reasonably 
comprehensive information database for the purposes of providing 
opportunity cost data in decision processes. The ineffectiveness in 
the maintenance and operation of the accounting and management 
information will increase the efforts required in employing an 
opportunity cost model as managers and accountants have to spend 
additional efforts in searching for such cost data. Clearly there is no 
indication according to the responses that the professional 
accountants have impressive motivation in calling on the 
opportunity cost model in making decisions.
3. Both students and accountants have confirmed that performance 
related reward calculation systems are preferred in theory and used 
in practice. Results of the researches however indicate that the 
common performance criterion is the profit performance, which is
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implicitly based on the published accounting reports. Thus there 
exists a strong perceived relationship between financial performance 
and expected rewards gained by the managers. According to the 
Expectancy Decision Processing Model, managers will then try to 
use the financial reporting model in decision making processes in 
order to maximise total values of decision. Results indicate that this 
is the case and managers have rejected the opportunity cost 
approach and accepted a more financial reporting oriented approach 
in making business decisions.
3. Managers of Hong Kong in majority favour a closed type decision 
mode and advocate the importance of judgement in making 
decisions under different circumstances. Managers of listed 
companies in Hong Kong seldom invite information and advice from 
external consultants. With the exclusion of external advice, 
managers have greater degree of self-initiated judgmental power in 
making various types of business decisions. Moreover, with a 
situational emphasis on the decision approach, managers are then 
free and able to adopt different decision models in each 
circumstance to maximise their expected total values arising from
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the use of such decision models. The self containment of decision 
authority and flexibility of decision approach are the requisites for 
the operational validity of the proposed Model, and research results 
indicate that managers of Hong Kong very much favour the 
existence of these two requisites.
4. Research results indicate that less than 25% of the listed companies 
in the sample adopt the opportunity cost approach as the prime 
approach in making decisions, and about 15% of the firms maximise 
reporting profits rather than decision returns. Over 60% of the 
companies employ a flexible and see fit approach in making 
decisions, which provides an apparent evidence that the opportunity 
cost approach is not a domain in the business practice for decision 
processes. Although only 15% of the firms select a reporting profits 
approach, in fact more than 60% of the firms have picked up 
answers in the case analysis with regard to this reporting profit 
approach, and only about one third of the companies select the 
opportunity cost approach in arriving at their answers. This is 
strong evidence that the perceived relationship between 
performance model and reward calculations exerts influence to the
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choice of selection of the decision models, thus the proposed 
framework model is substantiated.
5. The degree of decision task complexity and task uncertainty vary 
among different types of decisions. This variation in task 
characteristics in turn affect the employment of different sources of 
data, and the magnitude of data required within each category of 
source data. In general as the degree of decision task complexity 
and uncertainty increase, accounting data from the relatively less 
relied while ad hoc external data are more relied upon. This is again 
supportive to the proposed framework managers will wish to have 
more external data to bridge the uncertainty gap and obtain more 
secured view between decision behaviour and subsequent 
performance and reward. Although additional efforts are required to 
search for external data, it will be reasonably spent if total perceived 
value increase with the acquisition of such ad hoc external data.
A Critical Review of the Opportunity Cost Concept
Although there are different interpretations of the definition, opportunity costs are 
generally defined as the highest value foregone in selecting a particular decision
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alternative and rejecting the others, that is, the highest value carried among the 
rejected alternatives. The definition provides a reasonable explanation of the 
theory of choice and sets out to explain decision behaviour from an economic 
perspective. However, with reference to the more recent theories and 
understanding of human behaviour, notably the REMM model, the agency 
theory, the expectancy theory, and the behavioural decision theories, the concept 
of opportunity costs needs to be reviewed in light of the ever evolving world.
The first proposition for the review of the opportunity cost concept is that the 
concept has to be interpreted in a dynamic way for it to be operative, because it 
is a relative concept with a flexible instead of an absolute nature. The perception 
of highest value from a decision maker's view represents a dynamic process of 
value judgement that is affected by the interactions of many factors. The concept 
of opportunity cost will no longer be sufficiently interpreted by a simple example 
such as Smith's beaver and deer quote. Since the opportunity value of each 
decision alternative is depended on the interactions of different decision factors, 
a small modification of the factors can render the settled values no more 
appropriate for decision making purposes, and a new set of settled values has to 
be calculated again. The relativity of the opportunity cost concept immediately 
invalidate most of the traditional calculation models, which presume that
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opportunity values can be calculated at a particular point, and decision can be 
made accordingly. Rather, the adoption of certain cost models, in particular the 
opportunity cost model, in a decision process should be regarded as a processing 
analysis instead of a static point of time analysis, and a value processing model 
should be established to identify the realistic application of the cost concept in a 
decision making process.
The second proposed review of the opportunity cost concept relates to a more 
technical orientation of the ability in ascertaining alternative values. 
Disregarding the dynamic process in the value adjustments due to changes of 
contingency factors, there is always a limitation of the concept in a sense that the 
opportunity cost concept becomes undefined in a situation when decision 
alternatives have no defined calculated values. Taking a simple example, if a 
hiker gets lost of direction in his way, and he does not know which way out of 
the three ways before him can lead him back to the city, how should the hiker 
select the way to continue his journey? At the end the hiker must select a way 
and try, but in doing so he will have no idea of the opportunity costs of taking 
one way and rejecting the other two. In deciding the way to go, the opportunity 
cost approach is invalidated because the opportunity values of all alternatives are 
undefined. In the business context, there are often similar situations where the
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opportunity values of alternatives cannot be calculated because of a high degree 
of decision uncertainty and decision complexity. But there is insufficient volume 
of literature purporting to solve the operations gap between the theory and 
practice. Although these limitations do not necessarily debar a person from 
taking the opportunity cost reasoning approach in making decisions, they have 
however debarred the application of the opportunity cost model from the 
accounting perspective. This is perhaps one of the possible reasons why 
management texts often emphasise management judgement, and accounting texts 
do not include detailed discussions of the application of the opportunity cost 
model in decision making processes.
The two identified issues in the process of reviewing the opportunity cost 
concept have cast doubts on the application of the said concept in business 
decision practices. To relieve these doubts, rigorous field researches should be 
carried out in order that a more thorough understanding of the decision cost 
analysis process performed by managers and accountants can be achieved.
Suggestion of the Future Research Directions
Based on the Expectancy Decision Processing Model (EDPM) as proposed in 
this thesis, research results obtained hereto have provided some insights of the
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decision process carried out by professional accountants in the adoption of the 
opportunity cost model or other cost models. The EDPM has indicated the 
relevance of specified decision factors that exert influencing or moderating 
effects to the decision model selection behaviour of the decision makers, 
including organisational factors (accounting information system and performance 
measurement and reward schemes) and decision task characteristics (task 
complexity and task uncertainty); and provided some insights of how these 
factors moderate the decision model selection behaviour of the decision makers. 
However, further researches are proposed to be carried out in the following 
directions:
1. Research in the identification of other moderating factors
Although it is proved that organisational factors and decision tasks 
characteristics are among others the main determinant factors of decision 
behaviour, it is not intended to preclude any possibility that other factors 
might also contribute weights in particular circumstances. For example, in 
the study of decision behaviour of management of small size firms the 
cognitive style of the managers may be a contributing factor in addition to 
the two stipulated factors stated above (Gul 1984). Thus there should be 
more research purporting to identify the contingent factors applicable in
314
different circumstances. As argued above the choice of selection of cost 
models should be viewed as a processing analysis, therefore a more 
dynamic and situational analysis has to be performed.
2. Researches to Actually Identify the Moderation Effects in Detail
Even though the independent and moderating factors are identified in this 
research, it is still necessary to have more in depth analysis to actually find 
out how specific changes among factors affect the actual decision process. 
This is a positive direction of research in line with other positive 
researches. For example, further research can be carried out with some 
peculiarly designed reward calculation systems fully compatible with the 
opportunity cost concept and study how managers behave differently 
according to the revised reward calculation scheme.
Unless the prediction role of decision process can be established, research 
efforts cannot be said to have sufficiently contributed to this arena of 
knowledge, and extrinsic validity of the research results would be greatly 
limited to a more conceptual position. Of course this is not an easy task to 
accomplish, but further insights may be feasible if an integrated research 
effort can be formed among current researchers in the arena of behaviour
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decision theories, agency theories, and organisational theories.
In conclusion, the concept of opportunity costs is a fascinating decision concept 
that can explain the basic process of human decision makings. There is little 
doubt that the ultimate logic of the concept is valid in an abstract conceptual 
level, as well as on a personal basis. However, a critical review of its application 
in an evolving business world reveals that at least two issues have to be solved 
for a functional application of the opportunity cost concept in decision processes 
within the business context. A framework of analysis proposed as the 
Expectancy Decision Processing Model is constructed and tested to prove its 
initial validity in providing insights to the current decision processes performed 
by professional accountants and business managers in Hong Kong. Results of 
the research have given initial support to the theory and arguments of the 
proposed model. However, this is only the starting point, and further research 
should be directed along the path to identify how managers make business 
decisions with respect to different situations of the independent variable, so that a 
more fruitful result could be achieved in the understanding of business decision 
practices.
End Of Paper
316
Bibliography
Albrecht, K., & Zembe, R., Doing Business in the New Economy, Dow Jones-Irwin (1985)
Aliber, R., A Theory o f Foreign Direct Investment, in Kindleberger, C., Ed., The International 
Corporation, MIT Press (1970)
Amey, L. R., Readings in Management Decision, Longman. (1973).
Amey, L. R., The Efficiency o f Business Enterprises, London:Allen & Unwin (1969)
Amit, R., Muller, E. & Cockbum, I., Opportunity Costs & Entrepreneurial Activity, Journal 
of Business Venture. 95-106, (1995)
Anthony, R., Deardon, J., & Bedford, N., Management Control Systems, 5th Ed., Richard 
Irwin Inc. (1984)
Anthony, R., Deardon, J., & Bedford, N., Management Control Systems, 6th Ed., Richard Irwin 
Inc. (1989)
Ansoff, H., Strategic Management, Macmillan (1979)
Argyris, C., Increasing Leadership Effectiveness, Wiley (1976)
Argyris, C., Double Loop Learning in Organizations, Harvard Business Review (1977)
Arnold, J., Carsberg, B., & Scapens, R., Topics in Management Accounting, Philip Allen 
(1980)
Arnold, J., & Hope, T., Accounting for Management Decisions, Prentice-Hall (1983)
Arnold, J. & Turley, S., Accounting for Management Decisions, 3rd ed., Prentice-Hall (1996)
Ashton, D., Hopper, T., & Scapens, R., 'Issues in Management Accounting, 2nd ed., 
Prentice-Hall (1995)
Ashton, D., Hopper, T., & Scapens, R., Issues in Management Accounting, Prentice-Hall (1991)
Ashton, A H., & Ashton, R H., Sequential Belief Revision in Auditing, Accounting Review 
(1988)
Ashton, A., Experience and Error Frequency Knowledge as Potential Determinants o f Audit 
Experience, The Accounting Review. 218-239, (1991)
Atkinson, A., Banker, R., Kaplan, R., & Young, S., Management Accounting, Prentice-Hall 
(1995)
Bach, G., Microeconomics: Analysis, Decision Making, and Policy, 11th ed., Prentice-Hall
(1987)
Baiman, S., Agency Research in Managerial Accounting: A Survey, Journal o f Accounting 
Literature. 154-213, (1982)
Baiman, S., Agency Research in Managerial Accounting: A Second Look, Accounting. 
Organizations and Society. 341-371, (1990)
Baumol, W., Economics, Principles and Policy, 2nd ed., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (1982)
Baumol, W., Economics, Principles and Policy, 4th ed., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (1988)
Beaver, W., Accounting for Marketable Equity Securities, The Accountancy. 58-64 (1973)
Becker, S. & Ronen, J, Opportunity Costs -  An Experimental Approach, Journal o f Accounting 
Research (1974)
Beer, S., Decision and Control, John Wilev & Sons (1 966)
Benton, J., Managing the Organisational Decision Process, Lexington Books (1973)
Bimberg, J., Turpolec, L., & Young, S., The Organisational Context o f Accounting, 
Accounting. Organizations, and Society (1983)
Bhaskar, K., & McNamee, P., Multiple Objectives in Accounting and Finance, Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting. 595-621, (1983)
Bodily, S., Modem Decision Making: A Guide to Modeling with Decision Support Systems, 
McGraw-Hill (1985)
Boseman, G., Phatak, A., & Schellenberger, R., Strategic Management, John Wilev & Sons
(1986)
Bradley, I. & Howard, M., Classical and Marxian Political Economy, Macmillan Press Ltd. 
(1982)
Brigham, E., Pappas, J. & Hirschey, M., Managerial Economics, 4th ed., CBS College 
Publishing. (1986)
Bromwich, M., The Economics o f Capital Budgeting, Pitman. (1976).
Bromwich, M., Accounting Standard Setting: An International Perspective, Pitman. (1983)
Bromwich, M. & Hopwood, A.G. (Ed.), Essays in British Accounting Research, Pitman. (1981)
Bromwich, M. & Hopwood, A.G. (Ed.), Research and Current Issues in Management 
Accounting, Pitman. (1986)
Buchanan, J., Cost and Choice, The University o f Chicago Press. (1969)
Buchanan, J., L.S.E. Cost Theory in Retrospect, in Buchanan, J. & Thirlby, G. Ed., L.S.E. 
Essays on Cost, The London School o f Economics and Political Science (1973)
Buchanan, J., & Thirlby, G., (Ed.), L.S.E. Essays on Cost, The London School of 
Economics and Political Science (1973)
Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A., & Hughes, J., The Role o f Accounting in 
Organizations and Society, Accounting. Organizations and Society (1980)
Burchell, S., Clubb, C., & Hopwood, A., Accounting in Its Social Context: Towards a History 
of Value Added in the United Kingdom, Accounting. Organizations and Society. 381-413, 
(1985)
Canterbery, E., & Marvasti, A., Two Coases or Two Theorms, Journal o f Economic Issues. 
218-226, (1994)
Carlsson, C., & Kochetkor, Y. (Ed.), Theory & Practice o f Multiple Criteria Decision Making, 
Prentice-Hall (19831
Carter, C., Merdeith, G. & Slacble, G., Uncertainty and Business Decisions: A Symposium, 2nd 
Ed., Liverpool University Press (1957)
Chang, K. Y., Economics Practice, Goodman Publisher (1989)
CIMA, Costing Terminology, 2nd ed., (1984)
Chan, C., Effects o f Organizational Variables and Performance Evaluation Scheme on Transfer 
Pricing Negotiation Outcomes, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University o f Missouri-Columbia 
(1993)
Chenhall, R. & Morris, D., The Effect o f Cognitive Style and Sponsorship Bias on the 
Treatment o f Opportunity costs in Resource Allocation Decisions, Accounting. Organizations 
And Society. 27-43, (1991)
Clark, J., The Distribution o f Wealth: A Theory o f Wages, Interest and Profits, Macmillan 
(1923)
3
Clark, J., Studies in the Economics o f Overhead Costs, University o f Chicago Press (1923) 
Coase, R., The Nature o f the Firm, Economica (1937)
Coase, R., Business Organization and the Accountant, The Accountant (1938), Reprinted in 
Buchanan, J. and Thirlby G. Ed., L.S.E. Essays on Cost, The London School o f Economics and 
Political Science (1973)
Coase, R., Accounting and the Theory o f the Firm, Journal o f Accounting and Economics. 3-13, 
(1990)
Cooper, R. & Kaplan, R., The Design o f Cost Management Systems, Prentice-Hall (1991)
Copeland, T. & Weston, J., Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, 2nd Ed., Addison-Weslev 
Publishing (1983)
Dale, E., Management: Theory and Practice, 3rd Ed., McGraw-Hill Kogakusha (1973)
Dale, E., Management: Theory and Practice, 4th Ed., McGraw-Hill (1978)
Davis, D. & Cosenza, R., Business Research for Decision Making, PWS-Kent Publishing Co..
(1988)
Dearden, J., Measuring Profit Centre Managers, Harvard Business Review (1988)
DeCoster, D., Schafer, E., & Zeebell, M., Management Accounting: A Decision Emphasis, 4th 
Ed., John Wilev & Sons (1988)
Dejong, D., Forsythe, R., & Uecker, W., The Methodology of Laboratory Markets and Its 
Implications for Agency Research in Accounting and Auditing, Journal o f Accounting 
Research (1985)
Demski, J., & Swieringa, R., Discussion o f Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes o f  
Judgement and Choice, Journal o f Accounting Research. 32-41, (1981)
Dent, J., Accounting and Organizational Cultures: A Field Study o f the Emergence o f a new 
Organizational Reality, Accounting. Organizations and Society. 705-730, (1991)
Devine, K., & Oclock, P., The Effect o f Sunk Costs and Opportunity Costs on a Subjective 
Capital Allocation Decision, Mid Atlantic Journal o f Business. 25-38. (1995)
Dittrich, J., The General Manager and Strategy Formulation, John Wilev and Sons (1988)
4
Dopuch, N  & Sunder, S., FASB’s Statements on Objective and Elements o f Financial 
Accounting: A Review, Accounting Review (1980)
Doukas, M., Opportunity Costs and Entrepreneurial Economics Analysis, ARMA Records 
Management Quarterly. 20-23, (1987)
Drucker, P., The Practice o f Management, 3rd Ed., Harper (1964)
Drucker, P., The Effective Executive, Heineman (1967)
Drucker, P., Management, Pan Books (1979)
Drucker, P., Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practice and Principles, Harpar & Row.
(1985)
Drucker, P., Managing the Non-Profit Organization, Harper Collins (1990)
Drucker, P., Drucker in the Harvard Business Review, Harvard Business School Press (1991)
Drucker, P., Managing for the Future: the 1990s and Beyond, Truman Tallev Books/Dutton
(1992)
Drury. C., Management and Cost Accounting, 2nd ed., VNR International (1988)
Drury, C., Management and Cost Accounting, 3rd ed., Chapman & Hall Ltd. (1992)
Dunning, J., Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Addison-Weslev Publishing
(1993)
Edwards, R., The Rationality o f Cost Accounting, in Plant, A (ed.), Some Modem Business 
Problems. (1937); Reprinted in Buchanan, J. & Thirlby, G (Ed), LSE Essays on Cost. (1973)
Edwards, R., Some Notes on the Early Literature and Development o f Cost Accounting in 
Great Britain, The Accountant (1937)
Einhom, H. & Hogarth, R., Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes o f Judgement and 
Choice, Journal o f Accounting Research. 1-29, (1981)
Eliasson, G., Business Economic Planning: Theory, Practice and Comparison, Wiley (1976) 
Elliott, J., Economic Analysis for Management Decisions, Irwin (1973)
Elzas, B., On the Austrian Notion of Cost, Journal o f Economic Studies. 36-54, (1988)
5
FASB, Statement o f Financial Accounting Concepts, No. 2: Quality Characteristics o f  
Accounting Information (SFAC2), Financial Accounting Standards Board (1980)
Farris, M. & Happel, S., Modem Managerial Economics, Scott. Foreman & Co. (1987)
Fisher, I., The Theory o f Interest, Macmillan (1930)
Flower, J., The Case o f the Profitable Bloodhound, Journal of Accounting Research. 16-36 
(1966)
Flower, J., Measurement o f Divisional Performance, Accounting and Business Research. 205- 
214, (1970)
Flower, J., A Risk Analysis Approach to Marginal Cost Pricing, Accounting and Business 
Research. 335-339 (1971)
Friedman, L., & Neumann, B., The Effects o f Opportunity Costs on Project Investment 
Decisions: A Replication and Extension, Journal o f Accounting Research 371-386 (1980)
Friedman, M., Essays in Positive Economics, The University of Chicago Press (1953)
Garrison, R. & Noreen, E., Management Accounting, 7th ed., Richard D. Irwin (1994)
Garrison, R., Managerial Accounting, 6th ed., Richard D. Irwin (1991)
Gee, K., Advanced Management Accounting Problems, Macmillan (1986)
Gelinas, U. & Oram, A., Accounting Information Systems, 3rd Ed., South Western College 
Publishing (1996)
Gordon, P., Hilton, R. & Welsch, G., Budgeting, Profit Planning and Control, 5th Ed., Prentice- 
Hall (1988)
Green, D., Pain Cost and Opportunity Cost, Quarterly Journal of Economics (1894)
Gul, F., The Joint and Moderating Role of Personality and Cognitive Style on Decision Making, 
Accounting Review (1984)
Gullett. C. & Hicks, H., Management, 4th Ed., McGraw Hill (1981)
Hammer, M., & Champy, J., Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business 
Revolution, Nicholas Brealev (1995)
Hansen, D., & Mowen, M., Management Accounting, 3rd Ed., South Western Publishing 
Co. (1994)
6
Hansen, D. & Mowen, M., Cost Management: Accounting and Control, South Western 
College Publishing (1995)
Hanson, E., James, C., & Walgenbach, P., Principles o f Accounting, 6th Ed., Drvden Press
(1993)
Hart, J. & Wilson, C., Cost Accounting, A Practical Approach, Prentice-Hall (1990)
Hayek, F., The Trend o f Economic Thinking, Economica (1933)
Hayek, F., (Ed.), Collectivist Economic Planning, George Routledge & Sons (1935)
Hayek, F., Economics and Knowledge, Economica (1937), Reprinted in Buchanan, J and 
Thirlby, G. Ed., L.S.E. Essays on Cost, The London School of Economics and Political Science 
(1973)
Hayek, F., (Ed.), Individualism and Economic Order, The University o f Chicago Press.
(1948)
Hayek, F., (Ed.), The Fatal Conceit, (ed. by Bartley, W), Routledge (1988)
Heirs, B., The Professional Decision Maker, Sidgwick & Jackson (1986).
Heitger, L., & Matulich, S., Managerial Accounting, McGraw-Hill (1986)
Hirsch, M. Advanced Management Accounting, PWS-Kent Publishing Co. (1988)
Hirsche, M., & Louderback, J., Cost Accounting: Accumulation, Analysis, and Use, 2nd Ed., 
PWS-Kent Publishing Co. (1986)
Hirsche, M., Advanced Management Accounting, PWS-Kent Publishing Co. (1988)
Hofstede, G., Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values, Sage 
(1980)
Hofstede, G., The Cultural Relativity o f Organisational Practices and Theories, Journal of 
International Business Studies. (1983)
Hofstede, G., The Interaction Between National and Organisational Value Systems, Journal 
of Management Studies. (1985)
Hofstede, G., Neujien, B., Ohayv, D., and Sanders, G., Measuring Organizational Culture: A 
Qualitative and Quantitative Study Across Twenty Cases, Administrative Science Quarterly
(1990)
7
Hogarth, R , A Perspective on Cognitive Research in Accounting, Accounting Review (1991)
Hogarth, R , Accounting for Decisions and Decisions for Accounting, Accounting. 
Organizations and Society. 407-424, (1993)
Holcombe, R , Public Sector Economics, Wadsworth Publishing. Co.. (1988)
Holmstrom, B. & Milgrom, P., The Firm as an Incentive System, American Economics 
Review. 972-991, (1994)
Hopwood, A., An Empirical Study o f the Role o f Accounting Data in Performance Evaluation, 
Journal of Accounting Research. 156-182(1972)
Hopwood, A , Leadership Climate and the Use o f Accounting Data in Performance Evaluation, 
Accounting Review (1974)
Hopwood, A , Accounting and Human Behaviour, London: Havmarket (1974)
Hopwood, A , The Tale o f a Committee that Never Reported: Disagreement on Intertwining 
Accounting with the Social, Accounting. Organizations and Society. 361-377, (1985)
Hopwood, A., The Archaeology o f Accounting Systems, Accounting. Organizations and 
Society. (1987)
Hopwood, A., Accounting From the Outside, Garland. (1988).
Hopwood, A., International Pressures o f Accounting Change, Prentice-Hall. (1989).
Homgren, C., Cost Accounting, A Managerial Emphasis, 4th Ed., Prentice-Hall (1977)
Homgren, C., Introduction to Management Accounting, 4th Ed., Prentice-Hall (1978)
Homgren, C., Cost and Management Accounting, Yesterday and Today, in Bromwich, M. & 
Hopwood, A., Ed., Research & Current Issues in Management Accounting. Pitman (1986)
Homgren, C. & Foster, G., Cost Accounting, A Managerial Emphasis, 6th ed., Prentice-Hall
(1987)
Homgren, C. & Foster, G., Cost Accounting, A Managerial Emphasis, 7th ed., Prentice-Hall
(1991)
Homgren, C. & Sundem, G., Introduction to Management Accounting, 8th ed., Prentice- 
Hall. (1990)
8
Hymer, S., La grande firme Multinationale, Revue Economique (1968), Quoted in Dunning, J., 
Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Addison Weslev (1993)
Hymer, S., The Efficiency Contradictions of Multinational Corporations, American Economic 
Review. 441-448, (1970)
LASC, Framework for the Preparation and Presentation o f Financial Statements, International 
Accounting Standards Committee . (1989)
Ijiri, Y., Historical Cost Accounting and its Rationality, Canadian Certified General 
Accountants’ Research Foundation (1981)
Ingram, J., History o f Political Economy, London (1888)
Jauch, L. & Glueck, W., Strategic Management and Business Policy, 3rd Ed., McGraw Hill
(1989)
Jensen, M. & Meckling, W., Theory o f the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, The Journal of Financial Economics (1976)
Jensen, M. & Meckling, W., The Nature o f Man, Journal o f Applied Corporate Finance (1994) 
Jevons, W., The Theory o f Political Economy, 2nd ed., Macmillan & Co (1879)
Johnes, G., Economics for Managers, Prentice-Hall (1990)
Johnson, H., The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of the International Corporations, in 
Kindleberger, C., Ed., The International Corporation, MIT Press (1970)
Joyce, E. & Libby, R., Some Accounting Implications o f "Behavioural Decision Theory: 
Processes o f Judgement and Choice", Journal o f Accounting Research. 544-550, (1981)
Kaplan, R., Advanced Management Accounting, Prentice-Hall (1982)
Kaplan, R., Measuring Manufacturing Performance: A New Challenge for Managerial 
Accounting Research, The Accounting Review 686-705 (1983)
Kaplan, R. & Atkinson, A., Advanced Management Accounting, 2nd Ed., Prentice-Hall (1989)
Kaplan, R., & Cooper, R., Relevant Lost: The Rise and Fall o f Management Accounting, 
Harvard Business School Press (1988)
Keith, R., Smith, J. & Stephens, W., Managerial Accounting, McGraw-Hill (1988)
Kotler, P., Principles o f Marketing, 6th ed., Prentice-Hall (1994)
9
Kreitner, R., Management, 4th ed., Houghton Mifflin Co.. (1989)
Kumar, N., Multinational Enterprises in India, Routledge (1990)
Ladd, G., Costs & Goals of the Multiproduct Firm, Managerial & Decision Economics. 279- 
281,(1988)
Landreth, H. & Colander, D., History of Economic Thoughts, 3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Co.
(1994)
Lere, J., Management Accounting: A Planning - Operating - Control - Framework, John 
Wilev & Sons (1990
Laughlin, R., Accounting Systems in Organisational Contexts: A Case for Critical Theory, 
Accounting. Organizations and Society. 479-502, (1987)
Lawrence, P. & Lee, R., Insight into Management, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press (1989)
Lessard, D., Multinational Diversification and Direct Foreign Investments, in Eiteman, D., & 
Stonehill, A., Ed., Multinational Business Finance, Addison Weslev (1982)
Lucy, T., Costing, An Instructional Manual, 2nd ed., D P Publications (1984)
Maciariello, J., Management Control Systems, Prentice-Hall (1984)
March, J., Ambiguity and Accounting: The Elusive Link Between Information and Decision 
Making. Accounting. Organizations and Society 153-168 (1987)
Mark, K., Capital, A Critique o f Political Economy, International Publications (1967)
Marshall, A., The Principles of Economics, 20th Ed., (1920).
Marshall, A., The Early Writings of Alfred Marshall, Edited by Whitaker, W., London: 
Macmillan (1975)
Marshall, G. & McCormick, B., Economics o f Managerial Decision Making, Basil Blackwell.
(1986)
Maslow, A., Motivation and Personality, 2nd Ed., Harper & Row (1970)
Matulich, S. & Heitger, L., Managerial Accounting, McGraw-Hill (1986)
McCormick, R., Managerial Economics, Prentice-Hall (1993)
McGregor, D., The Human Side o f Enterprise, McGraw-Hill (1960)
10
Merchant, K., Rewarding Results: Motivating Profit Centre Managers. Harvard Business School 
Press (1989)
Menger, K., Principles o f Economics, Translated by Dingwall, J. and Hoselitz, B.. The Free 
Press of Glencoe 0950)
Milgram, P., & Roberts, J., Economics Organization, and Management, Prentice-Hall (1992)
Miller, B., & Buckman, A., Cost Allocation and Opportunity Costs, Management Science. 626- 
639, (1987)
Mintzberg, H., The Nature o f Managerial Work, Harper & Row (1973)
Mitchell, T. & Scott, W., Organization Theory: A Behavioral Analysis for Management, Richard 
D Irwin (19671
Moscove, S., & Simkin, M., Accounting Information Systems, 3rd Ed., Wilev (1987)
Mouritsen, J., Management Accounting in Global Firms, in Ashton, Hopper, & Scapens,
Ed., Issues in Management Accounting, 2 Ed., Prentice Hall (1995)
Moizer, P & Pratt, J., The Evaluation o f Performance in Firms of Chartered Accountants, 
Accounting and Business Research (1988)
Mulligan, J., Managerial Economics, Allvn & Bacon (1989)
Neumann, B. & Friedman, L., Opportunity Costs: Further Evidence Through an Experimental 
Replication, Journal o f Accounting Research (1978)
Neurath, O., Empiricism and Sociology (1919), Reprinted and Edited by Neurath, M. & Cohen, 
R , with translations, Dordracht: Reidel (1973)
Northcraft, G. & Neale, M., Opportunity Costs and the Framing o f Resource Allocation 
Decisions, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes. 348-356, (1986)
Otley, D., The Contingency Theory o f Management Accounting: Achievement and Prognosis, 
Accounting. Organizations, and Society (1980)
Otley, D., & Emmanuel, C., Accounting for Management Control, Chapman and Hall (1985)
Otley, D., Emmanuel, C., and Merchant, K., Accounting for Management Control, 2nd ed., 
Chapman and Hall (1990)
11
Ouchi, W., A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organisation Control Mechanisms, 
Management Science (1979)
Pappas, J & Hirschey, M., Managerial Economics, 5th Ed., Drvden Press (1987)
Peters, J., Decision Making, cognitive Science and Accounting: an Overview of the Intersection, 
Accounting. Organizations and Society. 383-405, (1993)
Pierson, N., The Problem of Value in the Socialist Society, in Hayek, F. A., Ed., Collectivist 
Economic Planning. George Routledge & Sons (1935)
Pieters, R., A Note on Cost in Economic Psychology, Journal o f Economic Psychology. 441- 
455, (1989)
Pollard, S., The Development of the British Economy, 3rd Ed., Edward Arnold (1983)
Porter, M., Ed., Competition in Global Industries, Harvard Business School Press (1986)
Reece, J & Cool, W., Measuring Investment Centre Performance, Harvard Business Review
(1978)
Reekie, W. & Crook, J., Managerial Economics, 3rd Ed., Philip Allan. (1987)
Ricardo, D., The Works and Correspondence o f David Ricardo, edited by Piero Sraffa, 
Cambridge University Press (1953)
Robbins, L., Remarks Upon Certain Aspects of the Theory o f Costs, Economic Journal (1934), 
Reprinted in Buchanan, J and Thirlby, G. Ed., L.S.E. Essays on Cost, The London School of 
Economics and Political Science (1973)
Robbins, L., Interpersonal Comparison of Utility, Economic Journal (1938)
Ronen, J., & Livingstone, J., An Expectancy Theory Approach to the Motivational Impacts of 
Budgets, The Accounting Review (1975)
Rowe, A., Mason, R., Dickel, K., Mann, R , & Mockler, R., Strategic Management: A 
Methodological Approach, 4th ed., (1994)
Rugman, A., International Diversification and the Multinational Enterprise, Lexington Books
(1979)
Ryan, B., & Hobson, J., Management Accounting: A Contemporary Approach, McGraw- 
Hill (1988)
12
Scapens, R., Management Accounting, A Revision of Recent Development, Macmillan 
Publishers Ltd (1985)
Schumpeter, J., Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Harper. (1950)
Schumpeter, J., History o f Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press (1954)
Seale, D., Raporport, A. & Budescu, D., Decision Making under Strict Uncertainty: An 
Experimental Test of Competitive Criteria. Organizational Behaviour & Human Decision 
Processes. 65-75, (1995)
Sebora, T., & Cornwall, J., Expected Utility Theory Vs Prospect Theory: Implication for 
Strategic Decision Makers, Journal o f Management Issues. 41-61, (1995)
Shields, M., Effects o f Information Supply and Demand on Judgement Accounting: Evidence 
from Corporate Managers, Accounting Review. 284-303, (1983)
Simon, H., Administrative Behavior: A Study o f Decision-making Processes in Administrative 
Organization, 2nd ed., Free Press (1957)
Simon, H , Models o f Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human 
Behavior in a Social Setting, Chapman & Hall (1957)
Simon, H , Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-making Processes in Administrative 
Organization, 3rd ed., Free Press (1976)
Simon, H., Models of Bounded Rationality, MIT Press (1982)
Smith, A., The Wealth o f Nations (1776), Reprinted, London (1954)
Smith, J., Keith, R., & Stephens, W., Managerial Accounting, McGraw-Hill (1988)
Soeters, J., & Schreuder, H., The Interaction Between National and Organizational Cultures in 
Accounting Firms, Accounting. Organizations and Society. 75-85, (1988)
Solomons, D., Divisional Performance Measurement and Control, Irwin (1965)
Spriegel, W., Principles o f Business Organization and Operation, 3rd Ed., Maruzen Co.
Ltd, (1960)
Thirlby, G., The Ruler, South African Journal o f Economics (1946), Reprinted in Buchanan, J. 
& Thirlby, G. Ed., L.S.E. Essays on Cost, The London School o f Economics and Political 
Science (1973)
13
Thirlby, G., The Economist’s Description of Business Behaviour, Economica (1952), Reprinted 
in Buchanan, J. & Thirlby, G. Ed., L.S.E. Essays on Cost, The London School o f Economics 
and Political Science (1973)
Thompson, A., Economics of the Firm: Theory & practice, 5th Ed., Prentice-Hall (1989)
Toda, M., The Design o f a Fungus-eater: A Model o f Human Behavior in an Unsophisticated 
Environment, Behavioral Science 64-83 (1962)
Trebing, H., Some Thoughts on the Future o f Economic Planning: The Gruchy /
Institutionalist Contribution, Journal o f Economic Issues. 409-419, (1991)
Vatter, W., Managerial Accounting, Prentice-Hall (1950)
Veblen, T., The Limitations of Marginal Utility, in Place o f Science in Modem Civilisation. 
(1919), Quoted in Schumpeter, J., History o f Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press 
(1954)
Vroom, V., Work and Motivation, New York: Wiley (1964)
Walker, M., Agency Theory: A Falsificationist Perspective, Accounting. Organizations and 
Society. 133-153, (1989)
Warfield, T., Wild, J., & Wild, K., Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choices, and 
Informativeness o f Earnings, Journal of Accounting and Economics. 61-91, (1995)
Watts, R., & Zimmerman, J., Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year Perspective,
Accounting Review. 131-158, (1990)
Webb, S., The Co-operative Movement in Great British, Aldershot. Hans. Gower. (1987)
Webb, S., A Contribution for the Socialist Commonwealth o f Great British, The London School 
of Economics and Political Science (1975)
Wieser, F. Von, Natural Value, Macmillan (1893)
Woolf, H. Ed., Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, G & C Merriam Co. (1982)
Yip, D., A Tentative Review of the Opportunity Cost Concept, Proceeding Paper, Second 
Annual Conference o f Accounting Academics. Hong Kong (1990)
Yip, D., A Historical Perspective o f the Concept o f Cost, Unpublished Master Paper, The 
London School o f Economics and Political Science (1987)
14
Zajac, E. & Westphal, J., The Costs and Benefits o f Managerial Incentives and Monitoring 
in Large U.S. Corporations, Strategic Management Journal 121-142, (1994)
Zeff, S., The Rise o f “Economic Consequences”, The Journal o f Accountancy (1978)
LONDON 
S, UNIV. J
Lists of Accounting Texts for the Literature Survey:
Arnold, J., & Hope, T., Accounting for Management Decisions (1983)
Ashton, D., et al, Issues in Management Accounting (1991)
Atkinson, A., & Kaplan, R., Advanced Management Accounting, 2nd Ed., (1989) 
Cooper, R., & Kaplan, R, The Design o f Cost Management Systems (1991)
DeCoster, D., et al, Management Accounting: A Decision Emphasis, 4th Ed., (1988) 
Drury, C., Management and Cost Accounting, 2nd Ed., (1988)
Drury, C., Management and Cost Accounting, 3rd Ed., (1992)
Garrison, R., Managerial Accounting, 6th Ed., (1991)
Gee, K., Advanced Management Accounting (1986)
Gordon, P., et al, Budgeting, Profit Planning and Control, 5th Ed., (1988)
Hart, J & Wilson, C., Cost Accounting, A Practical Approach (1990)
Heitger, L., & Matulich, S., Managerial Accounting (1986)
Hirsch, M., Advanced Management Accounting (1988)
Hirsch, M., & Louderback, J., Cost Accounting: Accumulation, Analysis, and Use, 2ne 
Ed., (1986)
tViHomgren, C., Cost Accounting, A Managerial Emphasis, 4 Ed., (1977)
Homgren, C., Introduction to Management Accounting, 4th Ed., (1978)
tViHomgren, C., & Sundem, G., Introduction to Management Accounting, 8 Ed., (1989) 
Kaplan, R., Advanced Management Accounting (1982)
Lere, J., Management Accounting: APlanning-Operating-Control-Framework (1991) 
Lucy, T., Costing, An Instructional Manual, 2nd Ed., (1984)
Moscove, S., & Simkin, M., Accounting Information Systems 3rd Ed., (1987)
Otley, D., Emmanuel, C., & Merchant, K, Accounting for Management Control (1990) 
Ryan, B., & Hobson, J., Management Accounting: A Contemporary Approach (1988) 
Scapens, R., Management Accounting, A Review of Recent Development (1985) 
Smith, J., et al, Managerial Accounting (1988)
List of Management Texts for the Literature Survey:
Anthony, R., et al, Management Control Systems 5th Ed., (1984)
Argyris, C., Increasing Leadership Effectiveness (1976)
Ansoff, H., Strategic Management (1979)
Beer, S., Decision and Control (1966)
Benton, J., Managing the Organisational Decision Process (1973)
Bodily, S: Modem Decision Making: A Guide to Modeling with Decision Support 
Systems (1985)
Boseman, G., et al, Strategic Management (1986)
Carlsson, C., & Kochetkor, Y., Ed., Theory & Practice o f Multiple Criteria Decision 
Making (1983)
Dale, E., Management: Theory and Practice, 3rd Ed., (1973)
Davis, D., & Cosenza, R , Business Research for Decision Making (1988)
Dittrich, J., The General Manager and Strategy Formulation (1988)
Drucker, P., The Effective Executive (1967)
Dmcker, P., Management (1979)
Dunning, J., Multinational Enterprise and the Global Economy (1993)
Gullett, C., Management, 4th Ed., (1981)
Heirs, B., The Professional Decision Maker (1986)
Jauch, L., & Glueck, w., Strategic Management and Business Policy 3rd Ed., (1989) 
Kotler, P., Principles o f Marketing, 6th ed., (1994)
Kreitneer, R., Management, 4th Ed., (1989)
Lawrence, P., & Lee, R , Insight into Management, 2nd Ed., (1989)
Maciariello, J., Management Control Systems (1984)
Mintzberg, H., The Nature o f Managerial Work (1973)
Porter, M. Ed., Competition in Global Industries (1986)
Simon, H., Administrative Behavior, 3rd Ed., (1976)
Spriegel, W., Principles o f Business Organization and Operation, 3rd Ed., (1960)
List of Economic Texts for the Literature Survey:
t tiBach, G., Microeconomics: Analysis, Decision Making and Policy, 11 Ed., (1987) 
Bates, J., et al, Business Economics, 3rd Ed., (1982)
Baumol, W., Economics, Principles and Policy, 2nd Ed., (1982)
Bradley, I., & Howard, M., Classical and Marxian Political Economy (1982)
1L
Brigham, E., et al, Managerial Economics, 4 Ed., (1986)
Buchanan, J., Cost and Choice (1969)
Chang, K., Economics Practice (1989)
Eliasson, G., Business Economic Planning: Theory, Practice and Comparison (1976) 
Elliott, J., Economic Analysis for Management Decisions (1973)
Farris, M., & Happel, S., Modem Managerial Economics (1987)
Friedman, M., Essays in Positive Economics (1953)
Holcombe, R., Public Sector Economics (1988)
Johnes, G., Economics for Managers (1990)
Landreth, H., & Colander, D., History o f Economic Thoughts 3rd Ed.,(1994)
Mark, K., Captial, A Critique o f Political Economy (1967)
Marshall, G., & McCormick, B., Economics of Managerial Decision Making (1986) 
McCormick, R., Managerial Economics (1993)
Milgram, P., & Roberts, J., Economics Organization and Management (1992) 
Mulligan, J., Managerial Economics (1989)
Pollard, S., The Development o f the British Economy, 3rd Ed., (1983)
Reekie, W., & Crook, J., Managerial Economics, 3rd Ed., (1987)
tViPappas, J., & Hirschey, M., Managerial Economics, 5 Ed., (1987)
Schumpeter, J., History o f Economic Analysis (1954)
Thompson, A., Economics o f the Firm: Theory and Practice, 5th Ed., (1989)
Webb, S., A Contribution for the Socialist Commonwealth o f Great Britain (1975)
